基于公司治理的关联交易对盈余管理影响的研究

发布时间：2018-10-23 17:50

【摘要】：随着我国证券市场的发展,上市公司的关联交易问题越来越突出。这种状况与我国仍然处在资本市场初期,以及企业进行股份制改革的不彻底性有着千丝万缕的联系。盈余管理问题与关联交易是同时期出现在资本市场上的,因为关联交易经常被作为盈余管理采用的一种手段,所以两者之间必定存在着某种关系。许多研究结果都表明,我国目前的内外部环境还不能有效地约束控股股东利用关联交易来进行盈余管理。关联交易对盈余管理影响的因素有很多,笔者从公司治理的角度研究关联交易对盈余管理的影响,希望能够从公司内部治理结构方而提出对策建议以有效防止上市公司利用关联交易进行盈余管理。本文首先,界定了关联交易与盈余管理的概念,阐述了相关理论基础-契约理论与信号理论,并对公司治理与关联交易、关联交易与盈余管理这两两之间的关系的相关文献进行了系统的梳理,然后提出本文的研究内容。其次,分析了公司治理的五个方面对关联交易盈余管理的影响,从而提出本文的5个研究假设。再次,利用描述性分析,相关分析,独立样本T检验和多元线性回归对假设进行实证检验。实证研究结果表明：股权集中度与关联交易对盈余管理的影响正相关;实际控制人为国有的上市公司关联交易对盈余管理的影响越大；独立董事人数比例与关联交易对盈余管理的影响负相关；监事会规模与关联交易对盈余管理的影响不相关；高管人员持股比例与关联交易对盈余管理的影响负相关。最后,对公司治理结构提出改革的建议并对内外监管也提出了若干对策。
[Abstract]:With the development of China's securities market, the related transaction problem of listed companies is becoming more and more prominent. This situation is closely related to the fact that our country is still in the initial stage of capital market and that enterprises are not thorough in stock system reform. Earnings management and related party transactions appear in the capital market at the same time, because affiliated transactions are often used as a means of earnings management, so there must be a certain relationship between them. Many research results show that the current internal and external environment in China can not effectively restrain controlling shareholders from using related party transactions to carry out earnings management. There are many factors that affect earnings management from related party transactions. The author studies the impact of related party transactions on earnings management from the perspective of corporate governance. It is hoped that the countermeasures and suggestions can be put forward from the internal corporate governance structure to effectively prevent listed companies from using related party transactions for earnings management. First of all, this paper defines the concepts of related party transactions and earnings management, expounds the relevant theoretical basis-contract theory and signal theory, and discusses the corporate governance and related party transactions. The related literature on the relationship between related transactions and earnings management is systematically combed, and then the research content of this paper is put forward. Secondly, the paper analyzes the influence of five aspects of corporate governance on earnings management of related party transactions, and puts forward five hypotheses of this paper. Thirdly, the hypothesis is tested by descriptive analysis, correlation analysis, independent sample T test and multivariate linear regression. The empirical results show that: the impact of ownership concentration on earnings management is positively related to the related party transactions, and the effect of affiliated transactions on earnings management of listed companies is greater than that of listed companies that are controlled by the state. The proportion of independent directors is negatively correlated with the impact of related party transactions on earnings management; the size of supervisory board is not related to the impact of related party transactions on earnings management; and the proportion of senior executives holding shares is negatively correlated with the impact of related party transactions on earnings management. Finally, some suggestions on the reform of corporate governance structure and some countermeasures for internal and external supervision are put forward.
【学位授予单位】：西北大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224

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