政府补贴对上市公司退市影响分析

发布时间：2018-10-24 15:11

【摘要】：上市公司退市制度是证券市场机制的重要组成部分,在证券市场上发挥着极为重要的作用。但目前我国的退市制度过于宽松,被特别处理的公司可以轻易的规避退市风险,退市制度的实施效果不尽人意,没有起到促进上市公司提高质量的作用。2012年6月上海证券交易所出台了新的上市公司退市制度,增加了多项退市指标,为完善上市公司退市制度掀开了新的帷幕。本文结合ST南化的具体案例,就其两次扭亏为盈规避退市的行为中政府补贴所起的作用和影响,探讨了新的退市制度对利用政府补贴实现营业外收益的会计手段的抑制作用。
[Abstract]:The delisting system of listed companies is an important part of the stock market mechanism and plays an extremely important role in the securities market. However, the current delisting system in our country is too loose, and the specially treated companies can easily avoid the risk of delisting, and the effect of the delisting system is not satisfactory. In June 2012, the Shanghai Stock Exchange introduced a new delisting system for listed companies, adding a number of delisting indicators, which opened a new curtain for the improvement of the delisting system of listed companies. Based on the concrete case of ST Nanhua, this paper discusses the role and influence of government subsidy in the behavior of turning losses into profits and evading delisting twice, and probes into the restraining effect of the new delisting system on accounting means of making use of government subsidies to realize non-operating income.
【作者单位】：中国矿业大学(北京)管理学院;
【基金】：中国矿业大学(北京)大学生创新训练项目(项目编号:C201305009)阶段性研究成果教育部人文社科青年基金项目(项目编号:13YJC790048) 教育部高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金(项目编号:20120023120015) 中国矿业大学(北京)“中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金”青年项目(项目编号:2009QG01)资助
【分类号】：F832.51;F812.45

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