我国国有上市公司股票期权激励实证分析

发布时间：2018-11-03 11:22

【摘要】：20世纪30年代，随着股份公司股东股权的逐渐分散和管理技术的复杂多变，出现了所有者与经营者分离的现象；到了60年代变得更为突出，由于信息不对称，出现了股东不能够对管理者进行有效监督；80年代后期，世界各地的大多数公司开始采用股票期权作为对公司高管理人员的报酬激励，以实现所有者与经营者统一的目标；发展到90年代，股票期权激励已成为美国上市公司高管理人员的主要报酬，西方国家如英国、加拿大、法国等也开始使用股票期权激励公司的经营者。可见在西方国家，股票期权激励已经成为了公司高管激励所广泛采用的方式。但是，20世纪90年代后期，美国安然公司、世通公司等国际知名企业和会计师事务所共谋的财务舞弊让人们开始对股票期权产生质疑。如何看待股票期权这一激励手段，应该辩证的看待，可以比做一把“双刃剑”，既要关注其解决了委托代理关系的正面效应，，也要看到起内在的缺陷。近年来，我国国有上市公司把深化改革放在各项工作的首要位置，围绕公司发展，大力推进股份制改革，完善公司法人治理结构，为公司发展提供了强大的动力。随着国有企业改革的深入，国有的上市公司组织机构和经营机制也发生了重大变化，但国有企业的实际内部人控制以及道德风险问题逐渐显现出来，国企管理层利用手中的代理权与企业所有者的目标发生了偏离，由此造成国有资产严重流失，资产利用效率低下，企业发展缺乏活力，国有上市公司中存在着“激励机制与约束机制同样不足”的问题，并已经制约我国国有上市公司持续发展。所以，在股票期权激励机制进入我国以后，我国国有上市公司纷纷展开了积极的学习与实践。本文将以国有上市公司做为研究对象，依据股权激励的理论，通过运用实证分析的研究方法，对我国国有上市公司在实施股票期权薪酬激励的现状、存在的一些实践问题进行了分析，并借鉴了西方发达国家在实施股票期权这一薪酬激励中的实践经验，针对我国国有上市公司在运用股票期权激励存在的问题，设计一个能够适应我国国有上市公司的股票期权激励计划框架。论文最后从宏观与微观两个方面分析股票期权激励制度在我国应用存在的问题，并对完善我国国有上市公司股票期权激励制度提出有效的解决措施。
[Abstract]:In the 1930s, with the gradual dispersion of shareholders' equity and the complexity of management technology, the separation of owners and managers appeared. In the 1960s, it became more prominent, because of the asymmetry of information, shareholders could not supervise the managers effectively; In the late 1980s, most companies around the world began to use stock options as a reward incentive to the company's high managers, in order to achieve the goal of the unity of owners and managers. In the 1990s, stock option incentive has become the main reward of American listed companies. Western countries such as Britain, Canada, France and so on have started to use stock options to motivate the managers of companies. Therefore, stock option incentive has been widely used in western countries. However, in the late 1990s, American Enron Corporation, WorldCom and other international well-known enterprises and accounting firms colluded in financial fraud to make people begin to question stock options. How to treat the stock option as an incentive means should be dialectically treated as a "double-edged sword", which not only solves the positive effect of the principal-agent relationship, but also sees the inherent defects. In recent years, the state-owned listed companies in our country put the deepening reform in the primary position of all kinds of work, around the company development, vigorously promotes the shareholding system reform, consummates the corporate governance structure, has provided the powerful motive force for the company development. With the deepening of the reform of state-owned enterprises, great changes have taken place in the organization and management mechanism of state-owned listed companies, but the actual insider control and moral hazard problems of state-owned enterprises have gradually emerged. The managers of state-owned enterprises have used their agency power to deviate from the objectives of the owners of the enterprises, resulting in serious loss of state-owned assets, inefficient utilization of assets, and lack of vitality in the development of enterprises. There exists the problem that the incentive mechanism and restraint mechanism are insufficient in the state-owned listed companies, and it has restricted the sustainable development of the state-owned listed companies in our country. Therefore, after the stock option incentive mechanism comes into our country, the state-owned listed companies in our country have carried out active study and practice one after another. This article will take the state-owned listed companies as the research object, according to the stock right incentive theory, through the use of the empirical analysis research method, to our country state-owned listed companies in the implementation stock option compensation incentive present situation. This paper analyzes some practical problems, and draws lessons from the practical experience of western developed countries in the implementation of stock option, aiming at the problems existing in the use of stock option in state-owned listed companies in China. To design a stock option incentive plan framework which can adapt to the state-owned listed companies in China. Finally, the paper analyzes the problems existing in the application of the stock option incentive system in China from the macro and micro aspects, and puts forward effective measures to improve the stock option incentive system of the state-owned listed companies in China.
【学位授予单位】：山西财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F276.1;F832.51;F224

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