人力资本股权激励制度优化研究

发布时间：2018-11-17 15:44

【摘要】：现在，人类社会已经进入知识经济时代。此时，公司之间的竞争归根结底是知识的竞争，更是人才的竞争。也正是如此，国内外的公司都极力引进优秀人才，扩大自身智囊团，积极探索并实施针对公司高管以及高级技术人员的多种激励措施。股权激励制度作为其中一种激励措施也得到了很大程度的发展。但由于我国资本市场不成熟，股权激励机制不完善等原因，股权激励机制在实施过程中出现了一些问题，其最主要的表现就是众多上市公司尤其是创业板的上市公司高管纷纷辞职套现，给我国的许多公司以及市场经济带来了很大的冲击。但究其实质，股权激励机制真正的问题是其没有充分考虑高管在长远的未来能真正带来的公司成长性。正因如此，众多高管趁机高估公司未来成长性，抬高股价，一方面为自己创造出公司认可的业绩，另一方面，可以通过辞职等手段实现套现目的。本文首先分析了上市公司高管辞职套现这一经济行为，进而深入分析了这一行为出现的缘由：现行股权激励机制存在的内在问题——高估公司未来成长性。其次分析高估公司未来成长性的性质极其危害，并提出了防止高估公司未来成长性的途径和对策。为了防止公司成长性受到损害，公司必须严格限制出资者通过高估成长性获得股票发行价的虚高，进而通过套现损害股票市场发展，而具体手段就是以承诺收益法进行出资估价、人力资本出资者退出即注销其股权和公开募股价与特殊股权持有者保证的最低成长性挂钩。本文从一个新颖的角度对现行股权激励机制存在的问题进行了深入的分析和研究，并提出了相应的对策，笔者认为这一研究具有非常现实的意义：一方面，可以解决现行股权激励机制存在的问题，将管理者的利益真正与公司的长远利益相结合，防止人才的流失，有利于公司的健康发展；另一方面，可以促进整个市场经济的平稳发展，避免股票市场产生大的波动。
[Abstract]:Now, the human society has entered the era of knowledge economy. At this time, the competition between companies is ultimately the competition of knowledge, but also the competition of talent. It is also true that companies at home and abroad are trying their best to introduce talents, expand their own think tanks, and actively explore and implement a variety of incentives for company executives and senior technical personnel. Equity incentive system as one of the incentives has also been greatly developed. However, due to the immature capital market and imperfect equity incentive mechanism, there are some problems in the implementation of the equity incentive mechanism. Its main performance is that many listed companies, especially the gem listed company executives have resigned to cash, to our country's many companies and the market economy has brought a great impact. But in essence, the real problem of equity incentive mechanism is that it does not fully consider the company growth that executives can bring in the long-term future. For this reason, many executives take the opportunity to overestimate the future growth of the company, driving up the stock price, on the one hand, to create a recognized performance for the company, on the other hand, through resignation and other means to achieve the purpose of cash. This paper first analyzes the economic behavior of executive resignation and cash in listed companies, and then deeply analyzes the causes of this behavior: the inherent problem of the current equity incentive mechanism-overestimating the future growth of the company. Secondly, the paper analyzes the nature and harm of the future growth of overestimated companies, and puts forward the ways and countermeasures to prevent the future growth of overestimated companies. In order to prevent the growth of the company from being damaged, the company must strictly limit the investors to obtain the false high price of the stock issue by overestimating the growth, and then damage the development of the stock market by cash. But the concrete means is to use the promise income method to carry on the investment appraisal, the human capital investor withdraws namely cancels its stock right and the public offering price and the special equity holder guarantees the lowest growth. This paper makes a deep analysis and research on the problems existing in the current equity incentive mechanism from a novel angle, and puts forward the corresponding countermeasures. The author thinks that this research has very practical significance: on the one hand, It can solve the problems existing in the current equity incentive mechanism, combine the interests of managers with the long-term interests of the company, prevent the brain drain, and benefit the healthy development of the company. On the other hand, can promote the smooth development of the whole market economy, avoid the stock market produce big fluctuation.
【学位授予单位】：天津商业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51

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