高管薪酬、高管控制权与薪酬不公平性：基于中国垄断行业上市公司的分析
发布时间：2018-11-19 20:55
【摘要】：学术界与理论界对高管薪酬问题的研究由来已久,世界金融危机使得高管薪酬问题被推向了风口浪尖。随着经济的发展,我国贫富悬殊的矛盾日益凸显。目前我国的收入差距正呈现全范围多层次的扩大趋势。地区、城乡、行业、群体间的收入差距有所加大,分配格局失衡导致部分社会财富向少数人集中,这种薪酬差距在垄断行业更为扩大,高管的高薪酬现象引起了民众的反感情绪,高管薪酬的不公平成为社会各界关注的热点。基于这样的现实背景,本文从高管薪酬的不公平角度出发,分别研究我国垄断行业与非垄断行业高管薪酬不公平哪个程度更深?这种不公平的披露是否会对未来的高管薪酬产生影响?如果有影响,是否会在不同高管控制权的作用下,通过不同的调控手段对高管薪酬产生的效果不同? 本文基于公平理论和管理层权力理论框架,提出关于我国垄断行业上市公司高管薪酬不公平的三组假设。本文选取沪、深证券交易所177家垄断行业上市公司2002年—2010年面板数据作为研究对象,用薪酬决定模型衡量高管薪酬的不公平程度,基于总经理董事两职兼任情况、股权分散度、总经理任职年限、总经理是否来自控股单位及综合权力视角构建高管权力的综合衡量指标。实证结果发现,与非垄断行业上市公司相比,我国垄断行业上市公司薪酬不公平程度较高；中国垄断行业上市公司中,薪酬不公平程度会降低下一年度高管薪酬；当高管权力较大时,不公平对下一年度高管薪酬无影响；当权力较小时,不公平仍然会降低下一年度高管薪酬。 由此,本文提出了针对垄断行业高管薪酬、控制权与薪酬不公平的管理启示,认为应该加强对垄断行业高管薪酬不公平现象的披露透明度,促使社会公众舆论、政府管制对过高薪酬的调节作用,在完善公司治理结构时,要关注高管控制权这一因素,避免高管“自定薪酬”现象。
[Abstract]:The academic and theoretical circles have been studying the issue of executive compensation for a long time, the world financial crisis has pushed the issue of executive compensation to the forefront. With the development of economy, the contradiction of the disparity between the rich and the poor in our country is becoming more and more prominent. At present, China's income gap is showing a full range of levels of expansion. The income gap between regions, urban and rural areas, industries and groups has increased, and the imbalance in distribution pattern has led to the concentration of some social wealth to a small number of people. This pay gap is even wider in monopolistic industries. The phenomenon of high executive pay has aroused people's antipathy, and unfair executive compensation has become the focus of attention. Based on such a realistic background, this paper starts from the perspective of unfair executive compensation, respectively to study the monopoly industry and the non-monopoly industry which degree of unfair executive compensation is deeper? Will this unfair disclosure have an impact on future executive pay? If there is an impact, will there be different effects on executive compensation through different means of regulation and control under the role of different executive control? Based on the theory of fairness and the theory of management power, this paper puts forward three hypotheses about the unfair compensation of executives in China's monopoly industries. Based on the panel data of 177 monopoly companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2002 to 2010, the paper uses compensation decision model to measure the unfair degree of executive compensation. The degree of equity decentralization, the tenure of the general manager, whether the general manager comes from the holding unit and the perspective of comprehensive power to construct the comprehensive measure of executive power. The empirical results show that, compared with the listed companies in the non-monopoly industries, the pay of the listed companies in the monopoly industries in China is higher than that in the listed companies in the monopoly industries, and the compensation unfairness degree of the listed companies in the monopoly industries in China will reduce the executive compensation in the next year. When executive power is greater, inequality has no impact on executive pay for the next year; when power is small, inequality still reduces executive pay for the next year. Therefore, this paper puts forward the management enlightenment on the unfair compensation, control and compensation of executives in monopoly industry, and holds that the transparency of disclosure of unfair pay of executives in monopoly industries should be strengthened, and public opinion should be promoted. Government regulation on the regulation of excessive pay, in improving the corporate governance structure, we should pay attention to the control of executive this factor, to avoid executives "self-pay" phenomenon.
【学位授予单位】：华东师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F276.8;F272.92;F832.51;F224
本文编号：2343395
[Abstract]:The academic and theoretical circles have been studying the issue of executive compensation for a long time, the world financial crisis has pushed the issue of executive compensation to the forefront. With the development of economy, the contradiction of the disparity between the rich and the poor in our country is becoming more and more prominent. At present, China's income gap is showing a full range of levels of expansion. The income gap between regions, urban and rural areas, industries and groups has increased, and the imbalance in distribution pattern has led to the concentration of some social wealth to a small number of people. This pay gap is even wider in monopolistic industries. The phenomenon of high executive pay has aroused people's antipathy, and unfair executive compensation has become the focus of attention. Based on such a realistic background, this paper starts from the perspective of unfair executive compensation, respectively to study the monopoly industry and the non-monopoly industry which degree of unfair executive compensation is deeper? Will this unfair disclosure have an impact on future executive pay? If there is an impact, will there be different effects on executive compensation through different means of regulation and control under the role of different executive control? Based on the theory of fairness and the theory of management power, this paper puts forward three hypotheses about the unfair compensation of executives in China's monopoly industries. Based on the panel data of 177 monopoly companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2002 to 2010, the paper uses compensation decision model to measure the unfair degree of executive compensation. The degree of equity decentralization, the tenure of the general manager, whether the general manager comes from the holding unit and the perspective of comprehensive power to construct the comprehensive measure of executive power. The empirical results show that, compared with the listed companies in the non-monopoly industries, the pay of the listed companies in the monopoly industries in China is higher than that in the listed companies in the monopoly industries, and the compensation unfairness degree of the listed companies in the monopoly industries in China will reduce the executive compensation in the next year. When executive power is greater, inequality has no impact on executive pay for the next year; when power is small, inequality still reduces executive pay for the next year. Therefore, this paper puts forward the management enlightenment on the unfair compensation, control and compensation of executives in monopoly industry, and holds that the transparency of disclosure of unfair pay of executives in monopoly industries should be strengthened, and public opinion should be promoted. Government regulation on the regulation of excessive pay, in improving the corporate governance structure, we should pay attention to the control of executive this factor, to avoid executives "self-pay" phenomenon.
【学位授予单位】：华东师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F276.8;F272.92;F832.51;F224
【引证文献】
相关博士学位论文 前2条
1 杨兰品;中国行政垄断问题研究[D];武汉大学;2005年
2 鲁海帆;高管团队内薪酬差距与公司业绩[D];暨南大学;2008年
相关硕士学位论文 前2条
1 郭雨非;高管薪酬与公司绩效的关系[D];西南财经大学;2013年
2 宋子龙;国企高管超额薪酬与薪酬操纵研究[D];长安大学;2014年
，本文编号：2343395
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