中国开放式基金关联交易与内部治理研究

发布时间：2018-12-18 15:23

【摘要】：开放式基金以超常规的发展态势在十年间迅速成长为中国基金产业的主流，但在发展规模不断扩大的过程中，基金不正当关联交易也随之肆意滋生，严重影响了中国基金产业的投资公信力、阻碍了基金产业进一步健康发展。关联交易黑幕的不断曝出，引起监管部门高度重视，颁布多项法案，但基金关联交易仍屡禁不止。究其根源，开放式基金契约型的组织形式使基金管理公司内部形成双重代理关系，公司容易被“内部人控制”产生关联交易，，与此同时外部治理机制又尚未形成，内部治理监管关联交易的有效性更显重要。现有对基金管理公司内部治理与关联交易研究主要是采用理论分析，对二者关系的实证研究文献很少。因此，本文基于委托代理理论，以开放式基金为研究对象，利用实证方法探索分析基金管理公司现有内部治理机制对基金关联交易监管的有效性，以期为完善基金管理公司内部治理提出建议。首先本文对基金关联交易进行理论分析，探索关联交易产生原因，基金管理公司内部治理缺陷，再对关联交易进行理论界定，对具体的三种关联交易形式进行量化，最后通过多元回归、单因素方差分析实证研究基金管理公司内部治理机制对关联交易的抑制作用并进一步对三类基金管理公司进行比较分析。实证结果发现，提高具有证券或基金从业经历的独立董事在董事会中比例将能抑制基金关联交易的发生，而独立董事占比的提高对抑制同一基金管理公司旗下基金共同重仓持股具有显著作用；董事会的冗余将不利于对基金关联交易托管费规模和关联交易佣金规模的监管；监事会、督察长对基金关联交易的抑制作用不显著；投资决策委员会仅对关联交易佣金规模具有一定抑制作用；而券商“一股独大”将会促进基金关联佣金分仓的发生；同时，三类基金管理公司中券商系基金管理公司关联交易最为盛行，内部治理机制约束相对乏力；盲目的发行新基金将会加重同一基金管理公司旗下基金共同重仓持股，增加基金管理公司整体风险，最终伤害基金持有人的利益。
[Abstract]:Open-end funds have grown rapidly into the mainstream of China's fund industry in the past ten years, but in the process of expanding the scale of development, the illegitimate related party transactions of funds also breed wantonly. It seriously affects the investment credibility of China's fund industry and hinders the further healthy development of the fund industry. The continuous exposure of related party transactions caused great attention by regulators and issued many bills, but fund related transactions are still prohibited. The reason is that the open-end fund contractual organization forms the double agency relationship within the fund management company, and the company is easy to be controlled by the insiders to produce related party transactions, while the external governance mechanism has not yet been formed. The effectiveness of internal governance regulation related party transactions is more important. The current research on the internal governance and related party transactions of fund management companies is mainly based on theoretical analysis, and there are few empirical studies on the relationship between the two. Therefore, based on the principal-agent theory and taking open-end funds as the research object, this paper uses empirical methods to explore the effectiveness of the existing internal governance mechanism of fund management companies on the supervision of fund related transactions. With a view to improving the fund management company internal governance recommendations. First of all, this paper makes a theoretical analysis on the related transactions of funds, explores the causes of related party transactions, the internal governance defects of fund management companies, then defines the related party transactions theoretically, and quantifies the specific three forms of related party transactions. Finally, through multiple regression, univariate ANOVA empirical study of fund management company internal governance mechanism on related party transactions and further comparative analysis of the three types of fund management companies. The empirical results show that increasing the proportion of independent directors with securities or fund experience in the board of directors can inhibit the occurrence of related transactions. The increase of the proportion of independent directors has a significant effect on restraining the mutual heavy holdings of the funds of the same fund management company. The redundancy of the board of directors will be unfavorable to the supervision of the scale of the escrow fee and the commission scale of the related party transaction, and the board of supervisors and the inspector general have no significant inhibitory effect on the related transaction of the fund. The investment decision committee can only restrain the commission scale of the related party transaction, and the securities firm "one share alone" will promote the occurrence of the related commission sub-position of the fund. At the same time, among the three fund management companies, the securities company is the most popular fund management company related transactions, the internal governance mechanism is relatively weak; The blind issue of new funds will increase the mutual shareholding of funds owned by the same fund management company, increase the overall risk of fund management companies, and ultimately harm the interests of fund holders.
【学位授予单位】：重庆大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51

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