基于代理成本理论的管理者过度自信与投资决策关系的研究

发布时间：2019-01-15 07:17

【摘要】：传统的“理性经济人”假设认为，人总是能理性地做出决策，而且理性能使决策者在系统地分析所获得信息的基础上，做出最优的决策。很多心理学家对传统经济学中决策者都是理性的基本假设提出了质疑，，行为经济学家也将认知心理学的理论及研究模式引入到经济学的领域，他们研究结果都表明，决策者的决策行为不仅受到经济利益的驱动，而且容易受到主观心理因素的影响，像本能、情绪、偏见和感觉等。这些命题都围绕着个体认知偏差这一核心观点展开，而到目前为止，过度自信是公司金融学中最关注的认知偏差问题。我国上市公司的成长环境有别于西方发达国家，大多数上市公司都是由国有企业转型而来。鉴于我国特殊的制度背景，本文对管理者过度自信的衡量不同于已有文献，用的是前三名高管的薪酬和与高管人员持股总数变化这两个指标。由于我国国有与非国有上市公司的代理问题有所差异，代理成本的不同对管理者过度自信与企业投资行为的关系会产生怎样的影响，这是一个全新的视角。本文以2008年—2010年沪深两市挂牌交易的所有上市公司为样本数据，运用EVIEWS6.0和EXCEL软件进行了实证研究，得到了以下三个结论：中国上市公司的管理者过度自信与投资现金流的敏感性有显著的正相关关系，而且这种关系在国有上市公司中表现比较显著；国有上市公司的代理成本要显著高于非国有上市公司的代理成本；只有在代理成本高于样本平均数的上市公司中，管理者过度自信引起投资过度的现象才明显。
[Abstract]:The traditional assumption of "rational economic man" is that people can always make rational decisions, and rationality enables decision makers to make optimal decisions on the basis of systematic analysis of the information obtained. Many psychologists have questioned the basic hypothesis that decision-makers are rational in traditional economics, and behavioral economists have also introduced the theory and research model of cognitive psychology into the field of economics. The decision making behavior of decision makers is not only driven by economic interests, but also easily influenced by subjective psychological factors, such as instinct, emotion, prejudice and feeling. These propositions revolve around the core viewpoint of individual cognitive bias, and by far, overconfidence is the most concerned cognitive bias in corporate finance. The growth environment of Chinese listed companies is different from that of western developed countries. Most listed companies are transformed by state-owned enterprises. In view of the special institutional background of our country, the measurement of manager overconfidence in this paper is different from the existing literature, using the compensation of the top three executives and the total change of stock ownership of the top three executives. Due to the difference of agency problems between state-owned and non-state-owned listed companies, how does the difference of agency cost affect the relationship between managers' overconfidence and enterprise investment behavior? this is a new perspective. Based on the sample data of all listed companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2008 to 2010, this paper makes an empirical study by using EVIEWS6.0 and EXCEL software. The conclusions are as follows: there is a significant positive correlation between overconfidence of managers and sensitivity of cash flow of investment in Chinese listed companies, and this relationship is more significant in state-owned listed companies; The agency cost of the state-owned listed company is significantly higher than that of the non-state-owned listed company, and only in the listed company whose agency cost is higher than the sample average, the overconfidence of the manager leads to overinvestment.
【学位授予单位】：南京财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51;F224

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