不同终极控制人下过度投资动机研究

发布时间：2019-02-13 08:52

【摘要】：目前在我国法律保护和公司治理水平较低的状况下，公司控股股东拥有较高的控制权收益。而且上市公司有多任务特性，因此这种公司的投资目标多元化，公司的运营效率可能不是首位，无效率的过度投资有其存在的必要。因此中国上市公司过度投资行为的动机有以下几种：获取控制权收益，提高当地政府税收及促进当地就业。按照终极控制权的传导机制，终极控制人才是实际掌握公司财务政策的主体。不同终极控制人下，上市公司过度投资行为的动机有所不同：终极控制人为中央政府的上市公司为增加当地就业而进行过度投资行为；终极控制人为地方政府的上市公司一方面由于控制权收益引起过度投资，另一方面，过度投资可以满足其公共目标：增加当地就业、提高当地税收；终极控制人为自然人的上市公司的过度投资行为只是为了获得更多的控制权收益。本文遵循终极控制人—过度投资—过度投资动机（获取控制权收益，提高当地政府税收及促进当地就业）这一理论脉络，，分析不同终极控制人的公司其过度投资行为与过度投资动机（获取控制权收益，提高当地政府税收及促进当地就业）的相关性并加以实证分析。本文从终极控制人角度研究了过度投资与过度投资行为动机：获取控制权收益，提高当地政府税收及促进当地就业，不仅拓展了我国公司过度投资问题的研究视角，而且对于监管和规范公司利益攫取行为，提高当地政府税收，增加GDP及解决当地就业问题具有重要意义。
[Abstract]:At present, under the condition of low level of legal protection and corporate governance, the controlling shareholders of the company have higher profit of control. Moreover, the listed company has the multi-task characteristic, therefore this kind of company's investment goal is diversified, the company's operation efficiency may not be the first, the inefficient overinvestment has its existence necessity. Therefore, there are several motivations for Chinese listed companies to overinvest: gain control income, raise local government tax and promote local employment. According to the transmission mechanism of ultimate control, the ultimate controller is the main body of the company's financial policy. Under different ultimate controllers, the motivation of over-investment behavior of listed companies is different: the ultimate control of the central government of listed companies to increase local employment and excessive investment behavior; The ultimate control of the local government listed companies on the one hand because of the income from the control of excessive investment, on the other hand, overinvestment can meet its public objectives: increase local employment, raise local taxes; The ultimate control of natural person listed companies' excessive investment behavior is only to obtain more control benefits. This paper follows the theory of ultimate controlling person and excessive investment motivation (obtaining the income of control, raising local government tax and promoting local employment). This paper analyzes the relationship between the overinvestment behavior of different ultimate controllers and the overinvestment motivation (obtaining the income of control, raising the local government tax revenue and promoting local employment) and makes an empirical analysis. From the perspective of ultimate controller, this paper studies overinvestment and the motivation of overinvestment: obtaining the income of control, raising the tax revenue of local government and promoting local employment, which not only expands the perspective of overinvestment in Chinese companies. Moreover, it is of great significance to regulate and regulate corporate profit grabbing, to raise local government tax, to increase GDP and to solve the problem of local employment.
【学位授予单位】：重庆工商大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51;F275;F224

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