全流通背景下我国上市公司控制权私有收益研究

发布时间：2019-06-18 15:42

【摘要】：20世纪90年代以来,控制权私有收益问题成为公司金融和公司治理的重点研究问题之一,其研究已经取得丰硕成果。无论是在世界范围还是在我国国内,控股股东为获取控制权私人收益而侵占公司资源和中小股东利益的现象已经成为资本市场的一大顽疾。控股股东为了追逐控制权私利,很可能不会再以公司价值最大化为目标作为决策和行动的标准,这严重损害了中小股东的利益和公司价值,造成资本市场的融资功能丧失、资源配置效率低下的严重后果。因此,如何防范控股股东的利益侵占行为不仅是我国公司治理研究的焦点问题,也是世界上大多数国家公司治理研究的重点问题之一。本文在充分借鉴国内外控制权私有收益最新研究成果的基础上,以我国上市公司控制权私有收益为研究对象,结合我国逐步迈入全流通的时代背景,采用不同的度量方法对全流通背景下(限售股解禁前后)的控制权私人收益水平进行测度和比较,并将股票价值纳入控股股东的利益范畴进行分析,考虑了限售股背景下控股股东所持股份市场增值预期与控股股东攫取私利的之间的关系。进而研究了全流通过程中在控股股追逐控制权私利影响下的资本配置行为。通过以上的系统研究,本文期望对进一步改善全流通背景下我国上市公司治理机制、减少控股股东的控制权私利、保护中小投资者利益提供理论支持和政策建议。本文主要内容如下：首先,在系统梳理相关资料的基础上,本文结合我国上市公司特有的制度背景,运用实证分析方法从所有权性质的角度对中国上市公司控制权私人收益水平进行了度量,并对其影响因素进行了探讨。研究结论表明：国有法人的控制权私人收益最高,私人控股的控制权私人收益次之；在国有股中,股权集中度、股权制衡度、国有股比例对控制权私有收益有一定的抑制作用,国家控股公司更倾向于采取在职消费等隐蔽方式攫取控制权私人收益；在私有股份中,股权集中度和制衡度与控制权私人收益成反比,但作用有限,这种现象在个人控股公司中更为普遍。其次,在全流通过程中的限售股解禁背景下,检验了限售股解禁给控股股东所带来的市场预期收益与控制权私利之间的相关关系,并同时对控制权私利的影响因素进行了相关分析。研究发现,公司盈利水平、公司规模、股权制衡度与控制权私有收益负相关,非流通股溢价倍数、公司负债率、股权转让比例、股权离散度与控制权私有收益正相关；流通股规模可能并不是影响控制权私人收益的主要因素。再次,基于资本投资形成控制权收益的理论诠释,结合我国上市公司目前特定的市场化程度、股权制度安排和渐进式的股权分置改革情况,从固定资产投资和股权投资两个方面对限售股解禁前后的控股股东利益攫取行为进行实证研究。结果发现：限售股解禁后的控制权私利水平高于解禁前的私利水平；控股股东通过资本投资获取控制权私利,而且固定资产投资规模与控制权私利水平正相关,随着限售股的解禁,其正相关关系有所削弱；股权投资规模与控制权私利水平正相关,在限售股解禁后,由于控股股东利益的多元化,控制权私利水平对股权投资规模更为敏感。最后,在全流通过程中的限售股减持背景下,以控制权收益理论为基础,构建控股股东跨期投资的两期利益侵占模型。研究现金流权比例、限售股减持比例、远期减持收益率对控制权私利的影响。结果表明：现金流权比例与控股股东的即期最优侵占水平和远期最优侵占水平负相关；限售股减持比例与控股股东的即期最优侵占水平和远期最优侵占水平正相关；远期减持收益率与控股股东的即期最优侵占水平负相关,但与远期最优侵占水平无关。控股股东在两期侵占中的即期最优水平低于单期侵占中的即期最优水平；由于控股股东的限售股减持行为,使得两期侵占中的远期最优水平高于单期侵占中的远期最优水平。
[Abstract]:Since the 1990s, the private income of control has become one of the key research problems of the company's financial and corporate governance, and its research has achieved fruitful results. Whether in the world or in our country, the phenomenon that the controlling shareholders encroach on the resources of the company and the interests of the small and medium-sized shareholders in order to gain control of the private income of control has become a stubborn disease of the capital market. In order to pursue the self-interest of the controlling shareholders, the controlling shareholders are likely not to use the value of the company as the standard of decision-making and action, which seriously undermines the interests of the small and medium-sized shareholders and the value of the company, resulting in the loss of the financing function of the capital market and the serious consequences of the low resource allocation efficiency. Therefore, how to prevent the interests of the controlling shareholders is not only the focus of our corporate governance research, but also one of the key problems in the research of the corporate governance of most countries in the world. This paper, based on the latest research results of the private income of control right at home and abroad, is based on the private income of the control right of the listed companies in our country, and combined with our country's step-by-step into the time of full circulation. In view of the view, measure and compare the level of control of the control right of the control right (before and after the release of the restricted share) of the whole circulation background by means of different measurement methods, and share the stock value in the interest category of the controlling shareholder The relationship between the value-added expectation of the controlling shareholders and the self-interest of the controlling shareholders under the background of the limited-selling unit is considered. This paper further studies the capital allocation line under the influence of the control unit's self-interest in the whole circulation process. In order to study the above system, this paper expects to further improve the governance mechanism of listed companies in China, to reduce the control of the controlling shareholders and to provide the theoretical support and policy building for the interests of the small and medium-sized investors. The main contents of this paper are as follows: Abstract: First of all, on the basis of the system combing the relevant data, this paper, combining with the specific system background of the listed company in our country, applies the positive analysis method to the private income level of the control right of the Chinese listed company from the perspective of the property of ownership. The metrics are measured and their impact factors are The results of the study show that the private gain of the control right of the state-owned legal person is the highest, and the private gain of the private control is the second. In the state-owned share, the share concentration, the balance of the equity and the proportion of the state-owned shares have a certain effect on the private income of the control right. In production, the state holding company is more inclined to take the private gain of control power in a hidden way, such as on-the-job consumption; in the private shares, the degree of equity concentration and the balance of checks and balances are inversely proportional to the private income of the control, but the effect is limited, and the phenomenon is higher in the personal holding company Second, under the background of the restriction of the limited selling unit in the whole circulation process, the relationship between the market expected income and the self-interest of the controlling shareholders is checked, and the influence factors on the self-interest of the control unit are also carried out. The study found that the company's profitability, the size of the company, the balance of the equity and the control of the private income of the control, the multiple of the non-tradable shares, the ratio of the company's debt, the proportion of the equity transfer, the divergence of the equity and the private right of control. The proceeds are positively related; the size of the tradable shares may not affect the private gains of control On the basis of the theory of capital investment forming control profit, this paper, combined with the current market-oriented degree, stock-stock system arrangement and gradual stock of listed companies in our country, In the case of non-tradable shares, the interests of the controlling shareholders before and after the release of the restricted shares from the investment of fixed assets and equity investment In order to carry out the empirical study, it is found that the self-interest level of the control right after the release of the restricted stock is higher than the self-interest level before the release; the controlling shareholder obtains the gain of the control right through the capital investment, and the investment scale of the fixed assets is positively related to the self-interest level of the control right, The relationship between control and control has been weakened; the level of equity investment is positively related to the level of self-interest of control, and after the release of the restricted shares, the interests of the controlling shareholders are diversified, and the level of self-interest is in the interest of the equity investment. It is more sensitive to the scale of capital. In the end, under the background of the reduction of the limited share in the whole circulation process, the cross-period investment of the controlling shareholders is built on the basis of the theory of control income. The ratio of cash flow rights, the proportion of limited share reduction and the yield of long-term reduction of yield are studied. The result shows that the proportion of cash flow rights is negatively related to the spot optimal occupation level and the long-term optimal occupation level of the controlling shareholders, and the reduction ratio of the restricted stock shares and the spot optimal occupation level and the long-term of the controlling shareholder The optimal appropriation level is positively correlated; the long-term reduction yield is negatively related to the spot optimal occupation level of the controlling shareholder, but it is far from that of the controlling shareholder The optimal level of the controlling shareholder in the two-stage occupation is lower than the spot optimal level in the single-period invasion, and the long-term optimal level in the two-stage occupation is higher than that of the single-stage invasion due to the reduction of the limited-selling shares of the controlling shareholders.
【学位授予单位】：东北大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51;F271

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