创业板公司管理层持股比例对公司价值影响的实证分析

发布时间：2019-06-20 01:51

【摘要】：2009年10月,我国第一批创业板公司上市流通。一年之后,迎来了创业板的第一次解禁洪峰,与此相伴的,是上证综指与创业板指数大幅下挫,这不禁引起了众人对于创业板公司管理层尤其是高管减持的深深质疑。创业板公司因其所具备的高度成长性,被寄予了率先发展高新技术、成为中国转变经济增长方式领头羊的厚望。在如此得来不易的发展机遇面前,两百多家上市的创业板公司本应不负众望,在自身发展的同时肩负起国家赋予的历史使命,然而创业板管理层却普遍在公司上市一年之际热衷于减持,令投资者和整个社会大失所望。因此引出本文研究的核心内容,关于管理层持股与公司价值相关性问题的研究。随着股份公司发展规模的扩大,股份公司所有权与经营权分离问题愈加突出,股东对财产经营的控制越来越困难,从而导致企业权力中心由所有者向经营者转移,这种现象成为许多学者关注的对象。那么,拥有公司决策权及经营权的管理层持股对公司价值会有何影响呢?这就是本文的研究目的。管理层持股比例与公司价值的关系,在理论上可分为无关论、正相关论、负相关论、非线性关系论。管理层持股比例,即掌握公司控制权人的持股比例,公司价值的衡量指标以往学者采用具有市场价值含义的Tobin's Q值和MBR比率,但以上两种检验指标都存在着极大的缺陷。本文将构建全新的创业板价值指数,以价值指数为因变量,以管理层持股比例为自变量建立计量模型,利用相关计量软件进行回归分析,通过实证分析研究创业板管理层持股比例与公司价值之间的相关关系。本研究以2011年6月30号前上市的创业板公司为研究对象,研究方法包括统计分析和一般回归分析。实证结果显示,管理层持股比例与创业板价值指数呈正、负、正的非线性相关关系,即当管理层持股小于15.58%时,公司价值随着管理层持股比例的增加而上升,表明管理层与股东之间的利益趋同效应占主导地位,这时增加管理层持股比例会提高上市公司价值；当管理层持股比例属于[15.58%,56.88%]区间时,公司价值随着管理层持股比例的增加而下降,管理层持股比例的增加会导致管理层对股东的利益侵占,损害中小股东利益,增加公司的代理成本,导致公司价值减少；而当管理层持股大于56.88%时,公司价值又随着高管持股比例的增加而上升,即当管理层持股达到相当大比例,甚至相对控股或绝对控股时,股权激励作用越发明显,代理成本逐渐减少,公司价值增加。文章最后提出通过加快推进所有权与管理权的分离；完善市场法律法规,加强市场监管；建立公司监督机制,完善公司治理结构；规范管理层持股路径,把握管理层持股比例等措施来强化企业监管,促使管理层以公司发展和股东利益最大化为经营管理工作的出发点和落脚点,进而提高公司价值。
[Abstract]:In October 2009, China's first batch of gem companies listed and circulated. A year later, it ushered in the first lifting of the ban on the gem, accompanied by a sharp decline in the Shanghai Composite Index and the gem index, which raised deep doubts about the reduction of the holdings of gem management, especially executives. Because of its high growth, gem has been placed on the lead in developing high and new technology and becoming the leader in China's transformation of economic growth mode. In the face of such hard-won development opportunities, more than 200 listed gem companies should have lived up to expectations and shouldered the historical mission given by the state at the same time as their own development. However, gem management is generally keen to reduce holdings at the time of the company's listing for one year, which greatly disappoints investors and the society as a whole. Therefore, it leads to the core content of this paper, the research on the correlation between management shareholding and corporate value. With the expansion of the development scale of joint-stock companies, the separation of ownership and management rights of joint-stock companies is becoming more and more prominent, and the control of property management by shareholders is becoming more and more difficult, which leads to the transfer of enterprise power center from owner to operator. This phenomenon has become the object of concern of many scholars. So, what is the impact of management shareholding, which has the decision-making power and management right of the company, on the value of the company? This is the purpose of this paper. The relationship between the proportion of management shareholding and the value of the company can be divided into three theories: irrelevance theory, positive correlation theory, negative correlation theory and nonlinear relation theory. In the past, scholars adopted Tobin's Q value and MBR ratio with market value, but the above two test indexes have great defects. This paper will construct a new gem value index, take the value index as the dependent variable, take the management shareholding ratio as the independent variable to establish the econometric model, use the relevant measurement software to carry on the regression analysis, through the empirical analysis to study the correlation relationship between the gem management shareholding ratio and the company value. In this study, gem companies listed before June 30, 2011 were taken as the research object, and the research methods included statistical analysis and general regression analysis. The empirical results show that the proportion of management shareholding is positive, negative and positive nonlinear correlation with gem value index, that is, when management shareholding is less than 15.58%, the company value increases with the increase of management shareholding ratio, indicating that the convergence effect between management and shareholders is dominant, and increasing the proportion of managerial shareholding will increase the value of listed companies. When the proportion of management shareholding belongs to [15.58%, 56.88%] range, the value of the company decreases with the increase of the proportion of management shareholding. The increase of the proportion of management shareholding will lead to the encroachment of management on the interests of shareholders, harm the interests of minority shareholders, increase the agency cost of the company, and lead to the decrease of the value of the company. When the management shareholding is more than 56.88%, the value of the company increases with the increase of the proportion of senior executives, that is, when the management shareholding reaches a considerable proportion, or even relative holding or absolute holding, the incentive effect of equity becomes more and more obvious, the agency cost decreases gradually, and the value of the company increases. Finally, the paper puts forward some measures to strengthen enterprise supervision by speeding up the separation of ownership and management power; perfecting market laws and regulations, strengthening market supervision; establishing corporate supervision mechanism and perfecting corporate governance structure; standardizing the path of management shareholding and grasping the proportion of management shareholding, so as to promote the management to take the development of the company and the maximization of shareholders' interests as the starting point and foothold of the management work, so as to improve the value of the company.
【学位授予单位】：江西财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51;F276.6;F224

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