地方政府财政行为在上市公司盈余管理中的作用研究
发布时间:2019-06-26 16:53
【摘要】:改革开放以来,地方政府工作模式从“命令—执行”转变为财政分权,其对地方资源配置拥有政治和经济上的权威。上市公司通过资本市场进行资源配置的功能有助于地方经济发展。因此,地方政府从追求政绩的角度出发,有动机也有能力通过财政手段帮助上市公司盈余管理以致其在资本市场再融资。本文认为,地方政府参与上市公司盈余管理这一话题值得深入研究。 本文构建地方政府目标效用函数,从地方政府利益和上市公司发展挂钩的角度解释地方政府帮助上市公司盈余管理的强烈动机。同时,具体分析了地方政府在上市公司上市、上市后发展和戴帽退市三个阶段帮助其盈余管理的可能及手段。 本文实证部分,首先将2006-2008年数据完整的样本上市公司净资产收益率划分为重亏、亏损、增、配股边缘、一般和绩优五区间,通过SPSS完成卡方检验,证明地方政府税收优惠和财政补贴与上市公司净资产收益率分布显著相关,税收优惠对上市公司“摘帽”作用明显,财政补贴有针对性地给予亏损或增、配股边缘区间上市公司。然而,以上海证交所2008年增发上市公司为样本,卡方检验结果表明,增发前三年政府补贴与上市公司补贴前净资产收益率是否达到再融资要求无关,也即部分地方政府财政补贴纳入非经常性损益后,其对上市公司增发资格的影响减弱。当然,政策有效期高于三年的政府补贴仍然对上市公司资本市场再融资发挥积极作用。 此外,本文利用Eviews构建logistic回归模型检验地方政府财政支持式盈余管理与上市公司增发、配股获批概率之间的关系。实证结果显示,地方政府能够有效帮助上市公司盈余管理以实现增发目的。该结论也暴露出我国证券监管部门对上市公司增发、配股资格的审核存在漏洞,地方政府财政支持式盈余管理应被特别关注。 在此基础上,本文对地方政府政绩考核体系、会计准则,尤其是2006年《企业会计准则第16号—政府补助》、企业所得税优惠政策和证券监管部门的监督原则提出了规范和改进的建议。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, the working mode of local government has changed from "order-execution" to fiscal decentralization, which has political and economic authority over the allocation of local resources. The function of resource allocation through capital market is helpful to the development of local economy. Therefore, from the point of view of pursuing achievements, local governments have the motivation and the ability to help listed companies with earnings management through financial means so that they can refinance in the capital market. This paper holds that the topic of local government participation in earnings management of listed companies is worthy of further study. This paper constructs the objective utility function of the local government to explain the strong motivation of the local government to help the earnings management of the listed companies from the perspective of the link between the interests of the local government and the development of the listed companies. At the same time, this paper analyzes the possibility and means of local government to help the earnings management of listed companies in three stages: listing, post-listing development and delisting. In the empirical part of this paper, first of all, the return on net assets of listed companies with complete data from 2006 to 2008 is divided into five ranges: heavy loss, increase, allotment edge, general and excellent performance. Through SPSS chi-square test, it is proved that local government tax concessions and financial subsidies are significantly related to the distribution of return on net assets of listed companies, and the effect of tax concessions on listed companies is obvious. Financial subsidies targeted to give losses or increases, allotment edge range of listed companies. However, taking the additional listed companies issued by the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2008 as a sample, the chi-square test results show that the government subsidy in the first three years of the additional issue has nothing to do with whether the rate of return on net assets of the listed companies meets the refinancing requirements before the subsidy, that is to say, after some local government financial subsidies are included in the non-recurrent profits and losses, their influence on the qualification of the listed companies is weakened. Of course, government subsidies, which are valid for more than three years, still play an active role in refinancing the capital market of listed companies. In addition, this paper uses Eviews to construct logistic regression model to test the relationship between local government financial support earnings management and the probability of additional issuance and rights issue of listed companies. The empirical results show that the local government can effectively help the earnings management of listed companies to achieve the purpose of additional issuance. This conclusion also reveals that there are loopholes in the examination and approval of the rights issue and rights issue of listed companies by the securities regulatory departments of our country, and the local government financial support earnings management should be paid special attention to. On this basis, this paper puts forward some suggestions on the local government performance evaluation system, accounting standards, especially the 2006 Accounting Standards No. 16-Government subsidy, the preferential policies of enterprise income tax and the supervision principles of securities supervision departments.
【学位授予单位】:浙江大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:F275;F832.51
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, the working mode of local government has changed from "order-execution" to fiscal decentralization, which has political and economic authority over the allocation of local resources. The function of resource allocation through capital market is helpful to the development of local economy. Therefore, from the point of view of pursuing achievements, local governments have the motivation and the ability to help listed companies with earnings management through financial means so that they can refinance in the capital market. This paper holds that the topic of local government participation in earnings management of listed companies is worthy of further study. This paper constructs the objective utility function of the local government to explain the strong motivation of the local government to help the earnings management of the listed companies from the perspective of the link between the interests of the local government and the development of the listed companies. At the same time, this paper analyzes the possibility and means of local government to help the earnings management of listed companies in three stages: listing, post-listing development and delisting. In the empirical part of this paper, first of all, the return on net assets of listed companies with complete data from 2006 to 2008 is divided into five ranges: heavy loss, increase, allotment edge, general and excellent performance. Through SPSS chi-square test, it is proved that local government tax concessions and financial subsidies are significantly related to the distribution of return on net assets of listed companies, and the effect of tax concessions on listed companies is obvious. Financial subsidies targeted to give losses or increases, allotment edge range of listed companies. However, taking the additional listed companies issued by the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2008 as a sample, the chi-square test results show that the government subsidy in the first three years of the additional issue has nothing to do with whether the rate of return on net assets of the listed companies meets the refinancing requirements before the subsidy, that is to say, after some local government financial subsidies are included in the non-recurrent profits and losses, their influence on the qualification of the listed companies is weakened. Of course, government subsidies, which are valid for more than three years, still play an active role in refinancing the capital market of listed companies. In addition, this paper uses Eviews to construct logistic regression model to test the relationship between local government financial support earnings management and the probability of additional issuance and rights issue of listed companies. The empirical results show that the local government can effectively help the earnings management of listed companies to achieve the purpose of additional issuance. This conclusion also reveals that there are loopholes in the examination and approval of the rights issue and rights issue of listed companies by the securities regulatory departments of our country, and the local government financial support earnings management should be paid special attention to. On this basis, this paper puts forward some suggestions on the local government performance evaluation system, accounting standards, especially the 2006 Accounting Standards No. 16-Government subsidy, the preferential policies of enterprise income tax and the supervision principles of securities supervision departments.
【学位授予单位】:浙江大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:F275;F832.51
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