基于生态位理论的航空复杂产品研发团队技术共享机制研究

发布时间：2018-01-08 01:22

本文关键词：基于生态位理论的航空复杂产品研发团队技术共享机制研究　出处：《南昌航空大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：二十一世纪,我国经济强国之路越来越依赖于复杂技术产业的创新和发展。航空复杂产品集多种复杂技术、密集型知识于一体,属于典型的复杂产品。航空复杂产品创新趋向于多领域跨组织异地协同研发。该协同研发机制要求合作关系相对稳定的核心企业系统集成商与上游组建供应商、用户、下游互补方、专业科研机构、政府等关联企业组成的研发团队,释放技术创新能力,提高技术创新效率,升级航空产业技术创新水平。然而,在现实的协同合作过程中,各研发主体拥有的技术存量、技术的经济属性及价值存在差异,影响研发主体技术共享决策,给技术共享带来了障碍,使技术链容易扭曲甚至中断。这加剧了各研发主体追求自身利益最大化的动机,可能会出现不积极或部分技术成果不进行共享和“搭便车”行为。为了探索各研发主体在不同位势下的技术共享决策,本文基于生态位理论和演化博弈理论,通过建立引入“态”“势”参数的航空复杂产品研发主体演化博弈改进模型,分别对生态位视角下不同类型的研发主体技术共享行为进行分析。本文展开逻辑如下:首先阐述了现实背景和研究问题,介绍了研究内容与方法;随后界定了相关概念以及介绍国内外研究现状、生态位理论以及演化博弈理论。接着依据生态位理论将航空复杂产品研发团队分为四个类型。其次依据演化博弈理论分别对不同类型的博弈模型求均衡点,并对均衡点进行稳定性分析;在此基础上,分析研发主体技术共享意愿演化方向的影响因素,并运用数值仿真验证了理论分析的结果。最后构建相应的机制促进研发主体进行技术共享。研究结果表明:(1)研发主体的技术共享行为与其各自的“态”值和“势”值密切相关。当研发主体的“态”值和“势”值处在不同的范围时,构建的二维动力系统会依次呈现不同演化均衡策略。(2)在“态”“势”参数的影响下,生态位视角下航空复杂产品单群体研发主体间博弈的演化方向与多群体层级间研发主体博弈的演化方向不同。(3)技术共享成本系数、收益分配系数、协同收益系数以及额外收益影响不同位势的研发团队的技术共享行为的效果是一致的。(4)构建了成本分担机制、资源整合机制、激励机制以及联盟合作机制来提高研发主体的技术共享意愿。
[Abstract]:In twenty-first Century, the innovation and development of China's economic power of the road increasingly rely on sophisticated technology industry. Many complex technical aviation complex products, intensive knowledge in one, belongs to the typical complex products. Aviation complex product innovation tend to cross organizational multi domain distributed collaborative development. The core enterprise system integrators and users upstream of the co R & D cooperation mechanism requires a relatively stable form, downstream suppliers, complementary, professional research institutions, government and other related enterprises R & D team, release the ability of technological innovation, improve the technological innovation efficiency, upgrade the aviation industry technological innovation level. However, in the cooperation of the real process, the main R & D technology stock owned and the economic attribute and the value of technology differences, the main impact of the development of technology sharing decision, brings the obstacle to sharing technology, the technology chain is easy to distort Even interrupt. This increased the main R & D to pursue their own interests to maximize motivation, there may be less active or not sharing part of technological achievements and the "free rider" behavior. In order to explore the research subject at different potentials technology sharing niche theory and decision making, this paper based on Evolutionary Game Theory, through the establishment of the "state" and "potential" parameters of the aviation complex product development the main evolutionary game model, the main technology R & D respectively on the different types of ecological perspective sharing behavior analysis. This paper expounds the logic is as follows: firstly, the realistic background and research questions, introduces the research contents and methods; then defines the related concepts and introduction the research status at home and abroad, niche theory and evolutionary game theory. Then based on niche theory to aviation complex product development team is divided into four types. The time Based on the evolutionary game theory of game model for different types of equilibrium, and the equilibrium stability analysis; based on the analysis of the factors influencing the willingness to share the evolution direction of the main technology research and development, and the use of numerical simulation results verify the theoretical analysis. The construction of the corresponding mechanism to promote the development of the main technology sharing. The results showed that: (1) the main R & D technology sharing behavior and their "state" and "potential" value is closely related. When the research subject of "state" and "potential" values in different range, two-dimensional dynamic system construction were presented different evolutionary equilibrium strategy (2). "State" "potential" parameters under the influence of the evolution direction of the main game single group R & D aviation complex products from the ecological perspective and the multi group between the levels of development of the main game. (3) technology Cost sharing coefficient, coefficient of income distribution, income coefficient and additional income synergistic effects of different potential of R & D team technology sharing behavior of the effect is the same. (4) construct the cost sharing mechanism, resources integration mechanism, cooperation mechanism and incentive mechanism to improve the development of the main body of the Alliance Technology sharing.

【学位授予单位】：南昌航空大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F426.5;F273.1;F224.32

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