近十年来房地产调控中的中央与地方政府博弈研究

发布时间：2018-02-04 09:32

本文关键词： 房地产调控博弈中央政府地方政府　出处：《江苏师范大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：我国住房制度自1998年市场化改革以来,期间经历了爆炸式的增长。为遏制盲目投资、无序扩张和房价过快上涨,保障房地产市场健康有序发展,中央曾多次进行调控。然而,回顾十余年来的调控史不难发现,相当一部分调控政策并未真正达到目的。尽管房地产调控效果不佳的原因是多方面的,但其最核心的原因在于:作为政策执行者的地方政府同时既是被调控的对象,又是利益相关者。在房地产调控中,地方政府不断与中央政府进行博弈,造成政策扭曲、偏离和阻滞。本文以十余年来我国房地产调控为研究对象,运用博弈论的研究方法,首先分析从理论上分析在我国当前的政治体制下,在房地产调控中中央政府与地方政府的博弈格局和各自的利益诉求,探讨他们各自可用的支付手段和博弈策略,以及可能产生的影响,构建本研究的总体分析框架。其次,本文通过回顾十年来我国房地产调控的政策演变,从宏观层面回顾我国房地产的兴衰起伏,分析为应对房地产市场出现的各种问题,中央房地产调控政策的演变,并透视中央的政策目标和调控手段的变化。同时研究地方政府在执行房地产调控政策中的行为。在此基础上,分析中央和地方的互动对房地产调控政策执行情况的影响,并总体分析中央房地产调控政策目标的实现程度,以及对我国房地产市场发展造成的各种影响。再次,在对十年来我国房地产调控政策和调控效果总体分析的基础上,从中观角度,剖析在不同时期、执行不同政策的过程中,中央与地方政府博弈的具体目标、策略和效果,进而分析在不同阶段不同调控效果的原因,并探析部分调控政策失效或者失败的原因。最后,从未来更科学和更有效地房地产调控的角度,探析如何更加科学地构建我国房地产调控中中央与地方的博弈格局,包括利益分配格局、权力分享格局和责任分担格局等。如何出台更能够实现中央与地方利益均衡,并能够更精准进行调控的政策体系,以及如何更有效地规制地方政府,确保中央调控政策能够不择不扣得到执行的路径,试图提出具有可操作性的政策建议。
[Abstract]:Since 1998, China's housing system has experienced explosive growth. In order to curb blind investment, disorderly expansion and rapid rise of house prices, the real estate market can be ensured to develop in a healthy and orderly manner. The central government has carried out regulation and control many times. However, it is not difficult to find that a considerable part of the regulation and control policies have not really achieved the purpose, even though there are many reasons for the poor effect of real estate regulation and control. But the most important reason is that the local government, as the policy executor, is not only the object to be regulated, but also the stakeholders. In the real estate regulation, the local government and the central government continue to play games. This article takes the real estate regulation and control of our country for more than ten years as the research object, uses the game theory research method, first analyzes theoretically under the current political system of our country. In the real estate regulation and control of the central government and local governments of the game pattern and their respective interests, to explore their own available means of payment and game strategy, as well as the possible impact. Secondly, by reviewing the policy evolution of real estate regulation and control in China over the past ten years, this paper reviews the rise and fall of China's real estate from the macro level. In order to deal with the various problems in the real estate market, the evolution of the central real estate regulation and control policy is analyzed. At the same time, it studies the behavior of the local government in the implementation of the real estate regulation policy. Analysis of the interaction between the central and local real estate policy implementation of the impact of the overall analysis of the realization of the central real estate control policy objectives. Third, on the basis of the overall analysis of China's real estate control policies and regulatory effects in the past ten years, from the perspective of the meso, analyze the different periods. In the process of implementing different policies, the specific objectives, strategies and effects of the game between central and local governments are analyzed, and then the reasons for different regulatory effects in different stages are analyzed. Finally, from the perspective of more scientific and effective real estate regulation in the future. How to construct the game pattern between central and local government, including the pattern of benefit distribution, in real estate regulation and control of our country more scientifically. Power sharing pattern and responsibility sharing pattern, etc. How to introduce a policy system that can achieve more balance between central and local interests, and more accurate regulation and control, and how to regulate and regulate local governments more effectively. To ensure that the central regulatory policy can be implemented regardless of the path, trying to put forward operational policy recommendations.
【学位授予单位】：江苏师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F299.23;D630

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