新型城镇化建设中PPP融资模式运行机制研究

发布时间：2018-03-18 13:03

本文选题：新型城镇化　切入点：PPP模式　出处：《安徽建筑大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：城镇化是现代化的必由之路,是人类文明进步的重要标志。改革开放以来我国城镇化建设发展快速,主要依赖政府财政支出及土地出让金的形式进行建设的传统城镇化重数量轻质量,不能满足全面建设小康社会的发展要求。十八大报告明确提出,作为促进经济发展方式转变的重点和推进完成小康社会建设的载体新型城镇化建设必须走中国特色化道路。相对传统城镇化而言,新型城镇化科学合理的推动建设进程,综合发展、节约发展、协调发展、创新发展相结合,走以人为本、节约资源、环境友好、经济高效、城乡一体化的道路。当前众多因素阻碍了新型城镇化建设的步伐,资金是最为突出的制约因素。主要依赖政府财政支出、地方投融资平台等以政府为主的融资模式,融资渠道狭窄,资金来源无法满足建设需求,突破资金瓶颈,选择正确的融资模式迫在眉睫。新型城镇化建设中引入PPP模式,融资主体多元化的同时拓宽了融资渠道。重点研究利益相关者间如何合理分担风险、分配利益,构建新型城镇化建设中PPP运行机制。固定资产投资额由城镇固定资产投资额与农村固定资产投资两部分组成,国内生产总值与固定资产投资额存在较强的相关性。选取2006年至2015年的国内生产总值与固定资产投资额为样本观察值。构建时间序列模型预测2016年至2020年的国内生产总值,根据Ln(INV)与Ln(GDP)的散点图知二者具有较强的相关性。预测2016年至2020年的固定资产投资额。新型城镇化进程中资金主要来源于自筹资金、国内贷款、国家预算资金、外资、其他方式五个渠道。根据张魁伟等对不同资金来源与GDP的关系知,国家预算资金与外资受上一年说获资金影响,其他三种来源与GDP存在较强的相关关系。预测五种渠道2016年至2020年可能供给的资金。既能影响项目能否成功也能被项目影响的个人或群体都被称之为PPP项目的利益相关者。基于Shapley构建PPP项目核心利益相关者公共部门与私营部门的利益分配模型,得到公共部门、私营部门各自所获的联盟收益。选取四个因素投入比例、风险分摊系数、合同执行度、贡献度对利益分配的影响,建立基于Shapley值修正的PPP项目利益分配模型。不完全信息的讨价还价博弈模型分析公、私各自需要承担的风险,引入海萨尼转换,该模型由无限期转化为完全但不完美的讨价还价博弈。运用逆推法选择三阶段过程,求得精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡解,即公、私部门不需要承担的风险比例。
[Abstract]:Urbanization is the only way to modernization and an important symbol of the progress of human civilization. The traditional urbanization, which mainly relies on the form of government financial expenditure and land transfer funds, is heavy on quantity and light on quality, and cannot meet the development requirements of building a well-off society in an all-round way. As the focus of promoting the transformation of economic development mode and the carrier of completing the construction of well-off society, the new urbanization construction must follow the special road of China. Compared with the traditional urbanization, the new-type urbanization scientifically and reasonably promotes the construction process. Comprehensive development, economical development, coordinated development, innovative development, people-oriented, resource-saving, environment-friendly, economic and efficient, urban-rural integration. Capital is the most prominent constraint factor. It mainly depends on the government financing mode, such as government expenditure, local investment and financing platform, and so on. The financing channel is narrow, the source of funds can not meet the construction demand, and the capital bottleneck can be broken through. It is urgent to choose the correct financing mode. The introduction of PPP mode in the construction of new urbanization, the diversification of financing subjects and the widening of financing channels, focus on how to reasonably share risks and distribute benefits among stakeholders. Constructing the PPP operating mechanism in the new urbanization construction. The fixed assets investment consists of the urban fixed assets investment and the rural fixed assets investment. There is a strong correlation between GDP and investment in fixed assets. The gross domestic product (GDP) and investment in fixed assets from 2006 to 2015 are selected as sample observation values. A time series model is constructed to predict GDP from 2016 to 2016. According to the scattered plot of LnCINV and LnGDP, it is known that there is a strong correlation between them. The fixed assets investment from 2016 to 2020 is predicted. In the process of new urbanization, the main sources of funds are self-financing, domestic loans, state budget funds, foreign capital, etc. There are five other channels. According to Zhang Kui-wei 's relationship between different sources of capital and GDP, state budget funds and foreign capital are affected by the funds received last year. There is a strong correlation between the other three sources and GDP. Predict the funds that may be provided from 2016 to 2020 in five channels. Individuals or groups who can affect the success of the project as well as those who can be affected by the project are all referred to as the benefits of the PPP project. Benefit stakeholders. Based on Shapley to construct the PPP project core stakeholders public and private sector benefit allocation model, Select four factors: input ratio, risk sharing coefficient, contract execution degree, contribution degree to benefit distribution, select four factors of investment ratio, risk sharing coefficient, contract execution degree, contribution degree to benefit distribution, select four factors investment ratio, risk sharing coefficient, contract execution degree, contribution degree to benefit distribution, This paper establishes the profit distribution model of PPP project based on the Shapley value correction. The bargaining game model of incomplete information is used to analyze the risks that the public and private individuals have to bear, and then the Heisani transformation is introduced. The model is transformed from indefinite to a complete but imperfect bargaining game, and the refined Bayesian Nash equilibrium solution is obtained by selecting the three-stage process by using the inverse method, that is, the risk ratio that the public and private sectors do not have to bear.
【学位授予单位】：安徽建筑大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F283

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