政府扶持中小企业科技创新的动态演化博弈及仿真分析

发布时间：2018-03-21 20:50

本文选题：政府　切入点：中小企业　出处：《科技管理研究》2017年12期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：运用演化博弈理论,在有限理性的假设前提下,借助科技创新利益主体非对称性演化博弈分析的复制动态模型,对政府与中小企业之间的科技创新行为进行博弈分析,重点探讨利益相关主体间的行为及相互影响的动态演变过程,讨论演化参数结果的稳定性及如何形成稳定均衡策略,最后运用Matlab软件仿真演化过程。研究结果表明,在利益双方科技创新意识越强、科技创新成本越小、利益双方获取的收益越大的条件下,系统更容易收敛于理想状态;政府对中小企业科技创新行为的激励力度应当合理控制,激励力度过大容易使中小企业受经济利益驱使,最终使利益双方陷入一种不良"锁定"状态。
[Abstract]:Based on the evolutionary game theory and the hypothesis of limited rationality, this paper makes a game analysis of the scientific and technological innovation behavior between the government and the small and medium-sized enterprises with the help of the replicating dynamic model of asymmetric evolutionary game analysis of the main body of interest in science and technology innovation. This paper mainly discusses the dynamic evolution process of the behavior and interaction among stakeholders, discusses the stability of evolution parameter results and how to form a stable equilibrium strategy. Finally, the evolution process is simulated by using Matlab software. The results show that, The stronger the awareness of scientific and technological innovation, the smaller the cost of scientific and technological innovation, and the greater the benefits obtained by both parties, the more easily the system converges to the ideal state, and the government should reasonably control the incentive strength of the scientific and technological innovation behavior of small and medium-sized enterprises. It is easy for small and medium-sized enterprises to be driven by economic interests by too much incentive, so that both sides of interest fall into a kind of bad "lock" state.
【作者单位】：哈尔滨工程大学经济管理学院;齐齐哈尔大学经济与管理学院;西南财经大学保险学院;
【基金】：中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金重大项目培养计划“国防科技工业国家战略和国家管理研究”(HEUCFZ1607) 黑龙江省自然科学基金项目“中国情境下的高端装备制造企业核心竞争力研究”(G201405)
【分类号】：F224.32;F273.1;F276.3

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