高速铁路列车加开方案经济效益博弈分析

发布时间：2018-03-22 23:22

本文选题：高速铁路　切入点：速度匹配方案　出处：《物流科技》2017年03期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：随着铁路改革的深入进行,高速铁路的经济效益一直是一个重大的课题。在我国目前高速铁路普遍采取的高中混行组织模式下,在不同的速度匹配方案对经济效益影响方面的研究仍不够全面。文章从运输市场客流需求入手,针对客流高峰与非高峰两种情况构建动态博弈论模型,对铁路局在何时加开何种速度等级列车能带来更高经济效益进行了研究,分析了铁路局和旅客之间的动态博弈行为,并应用逆向归纳法得到了该过程的子博弈精炼纳什均衡,为日后制定出更加适应市场、综合收益更高的速度匹配方案,实现铁路经济效益的进一步增长提供一定理论参考。
[Abstract]:With the deepening of railway reform, the economic benefit of high-speed railway has been a major issue. The research on the impact of different speed matching schemes on economic benefits is not comprehensive enough. This paper starts with the demand of passenger flow in transportation market and constructs a dynamic game theory model for the peak and non-peak passenger flows. In this paper, the author studies when and which speed stage trains will bring higher economic benefit, analyzes the dynamic game behavior between railway bureau and passengers, and obtains the subgame refined Nash equilibrium of the process by using reverse induction method. It provides a theoretical reference for developing a speed matching scheme which is more suitable to the market and higher comprehensive income and realizing the further increase of railway economic benefits.
【作者单位】：兰州交通大学交通运输学院;
【分类号】：F224.32;F532.3

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