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高铁走出去PPP项目风险分担与利益分配研究

发布时间:2018-03-28 23:23

  本文选题:高铁走出去 切入点:PPP风险分担 出处:《西南交通大学》2017年硕士论文


【摘要】:目前中国高铁走出去面临转型阶段,传统的机车出口或工程总承包模式已无法满足战略发展需求,同时全球高铁市场的日益壮大为中国高铁走出去合作模式的创新提供了绝佳的机会,PPP模式或成为快速部署一带一路战略、打造中国高铁品牌的突破点。而PPP模式面对复杂多变的海外项目环境显得尤其困难重重,对于高铁走出去PPP项目的风险研究十分必要。风险共担与利益分配是PPP模式的核心点,同时也是目前国内外研究的热点和难点。因此,本文以中国高铁走出去的PPP项目为对象,针对其风险分担以及利益分配等一系列问题展开研究。首先,本文从PPP项目的风险识别、风险分担机制、利益分配机制入手,阅读了大量国内外文献,明晰了 PPP项目风险研究的国内外现状,梳理了目前对于PPP风险分担的研究方法,确定了采用合作博弈中的讨价还价理论对高铁走出去风险分担模型进行构建;其次归纳总结了高铁走出去PPP项目风险研究的相关基本理论,通过案例研究法对高铁走出去关键风险清单进行整理,分析了高铁走出去PPP项目的风险分担基本原则与分配流程,简单讨论了利益分配的要点;然后本文核心部分在于利用Nash讨价还价博弈与Rubinstein讨价还价博弈方法分别构建了高铁走出去PPP项目的风险分担模型,考虑了谈判能力、风险管控努力水平、风险补偿以及政府强势程度等参数,得到公共部门与私营部门的最优风险分担比例,并针对Rubinstein讨价还价模型进行了数值分析,调整参数的不同取值,得出了最优风险分担比例的变化趋势;另外,本文还基于风险分担模型对双方风险承担水平进行计算,以此为调整因素对利益分配的Shapley值进行了修正,使得高铁走出去PPP项目利益分配机制更加公平合理,并以印尼雅万高铁项目背景为参考,识别项目风险,设定参数取值,对风险分担模型和Shapley值改进模型进行了应用;最后本文针对高铁走出去PPP项目的风险分担等问题提出了详细的政策建议。
[Abstract]:At present, China's high-speed railway is facing a transitional stage. The traditional mode of locomotive export or general contracting of projects can no longer meet the needs of strategic development. At the same time, the growing global high-speed rail market provides an excellent opportunity for the innovation of China's high-speed rail cooperation mode to go out to the outside world, or the PPP model or the rapid deployment of Belt and Road's strategy. The PPP model is especially difficult to face the complex and changeable overseas project environment, so it is necessary to study the risk of the high-speed railway going out of the PPP project. Risk sharing and benefit distribution are the core of the PPP model. At the same time, it is also a hot and difficult point at home and abroad. Therefore, this paper takes the PPP project of high-speed railway in China as the object of study, aiming at a series of problems such as risk sharing and benefit distribution. First of all, This paper starts with the risk identification, risk sharing mechanism and benefit distribution mechanism of PPP project, reads a large number of domestic and foreign literatures, clarifies the domestic and foreign present situation of risk research on PPP project, and combs the research methods of PPP risk sharing at present. The paper establishes the model of risk sharing of high-speed railway going out by using bargaining theory in cooperative game. Secondly, it summarizes the relevant basic theory of risk research of high-speed railway going out PPP project. Through the case study method, this paper collates the list of key risks of high-speed railway going out, analyzes the basic principle and flow of risk sharing of high-speed railway going out PPP project, and briefly discusses the main points of benefit distribution. Then the core part of this paper is to use Nash bargaining game and Rubinstein bargaining game method to build the risk sharing model of high-speed railway going out PPP project, considering the negotiation ability, the level of risk management and control efforts. The optimal risk-sharing ratio between the public sector and the private sector is obtained by the parameters of risk compensation and the degree of government strength, and the Rubinstein bargaining model is analyzed numerically to adjust the different values of the parameters. In addition, based on the risk sharing model, this paper calculates the risk-bearing level of both sides, which is used as the adjustment factor to modify the Shapley value of benefit distribution. Make the benefit distribution mechanism of PPP project more fair and reasonable, and take Indonesia Yawan high-speed railway project background as reference, identify project risk, set parameter value, apply risk sharing model and Shapley value improvement model; Finally, the paper puts forward detailed policy suggestions on the risk sharing of PPP project.
【学位授予单位】:西南交通大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F283

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