城市地下工程核心安全风险治理:多方协同策略的形成与演化

发布时间：2018-04-01 15:16

本文选题：城市地下工程　切入点：核心安全风险　出处：《土木工程学报》2017年09期

【摘要】：多方协同治理是实现城市地下工程核心安全风险管控的重要途径,然而风险管控主要参与方基于有限理性的决策阻碍了协同治理效应的形成。为探究主要参与方在收益联动下的合理策略选择,本文引入演化博弈研究方法依次构建了"发包人—承包人—保险人"的三方博弈模型,在全局视角下分析了三方不同风险管控参与策略及两方不同知识共享策略的支付矩阵,推演出不同策略组合的渐进趋势。研究表明:在三方博弈关系中,发包人主动管控核心安全风险、承包人积极管控核心安全风险、保险人参与管控核心安全风险是各方的演化稳定策略。基于上述研究结论,从强化风险共管的协同治理理念、固化"三元主体"的治理结构及优化风险治理激励手段三个方面提出了风险协同治理机制设计的相关建议。
[Abstract]:Multi-party cooperative governance is an important way to realize the core safety risk management of urban underground engineering. However, the decision of the main participants in risk control based on limited rationality hinders the formation of synergistic governance effect. In this paper, the evolutionary game research method is introduced to construct the three-party game model of "the contractor, contractor and insurer" in turn. From the overall perspective, the paper analyzes the payment matrix of the three parties' different risk control participation strategies and the two parties' different knowledge sharing strategies. The research shows that in the tripartite game relationship, the contractor actively controls the core security risk, the contractor actively controls the core security risk, and the contractor actively controls the core security risk. The insurer's participation in the management of the core security risks is the evolutionary stability strategy of all parties. Based on the above conclusions, the cooperative governance concept of risk management is strengthened. The governance structure of solidified "ternary subject" and the incentive means of optimizing risk management are discussed in this paper, and the relevant suggestions on the design of risk coordination governance mechanism are put forward.
【作者单位】：天津大学;天津轨道交通集团有限公司;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(71231006);国家自然科学基金(71172148) 中国太平洋财产保险股份有限公司天津分公司委托项目
【分类号】：F299.24

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