政府参与下食品企业监管博弈研究

发布时间：2018-05-04 04:19

  本文选题：食品安全 + 政府监管　； 参考：《系统工程理论与实践》2017年01期

【摘要】：有效的政府监管是控制食品安全事件的重要途径.本文研究政府参与下多食品企业的监管策略,通过建立一对多的政府与食品企业对称博弈模型,探讨当食品企业个数增加时,政府监管存在的失灵现象及政府最佳监管策略.研究表明,企业的不自律边际收益会随着市场上食品企业的数量增加而增加,进而诱发更多的企业生产不安全食品,而现有的政府监管力度难以解决多企业的食品安全问题.同时,在政府与多食品企业的博弈过程中,检查频率、自律成本与不自律处罚是影响企业生产行为的重要因素,加大对企业的检查概率、减低企业自律成本、提高企业不自律的处罚是缓解食品安全问题的有效途径.
[Abstract]:Effective government supervision is an important way to control food safety incidents. This paper studies the regulatory strategies of multi-food enterprises with the participation of government. By establishing a one-to-many game model between government and food enterprises, this paper discusses the failure phenomenon of government supervision and the best supervision strategy when the number of food enterprises increases. The research shows that the marginal income of non-self-discipline will increase with the increase of the number of food enterprises in the market, and then induce more enterprises to produce unsafe food. However, the existing government supervision is difficult to solve the food safety problem of many enterprises. At the same time, in the process of the game between the government and multi-food enterprises, the inspection frequency, self-discipline cost and non-self-discipline punishment are the important factors that affect the production behavior of the enterprise, so the inspection probability of the enterprise is increased, and the self-discipline cost of the enterprise is reduced. It is an effective way to alleviate the food safety problem by raising the punishment of the enterprise's non-self-discipline.
【作者单位】： 中南大学商学院;南洋理工大学商学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金(71573281,71573280) 中南大学创新驱动计划项目(2016CX040)~~
【分类号】：F203;F224.32
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本文编号：1841556