基于不同用户信息水平的双边平台最优价格博弈时序研究

发布时间：2018-05-07 02:33

本文选题：同时价格博弈 + 序贯价格博弈　；参考：《管理工程学报》2017年03期

【摘要】：双边平台与市场两边的用户进行价格博弈时有三种可能的时序:同时与两边博弈、与其中一边先博弈或者与另一边先博弈。本文使用双边市场均衡模型的研究框架,在考虑用户信息水平和市场结构影响的基础上,对以上三种价格博弈时序下的均衡利润进行了比较。研究发现:给定交叉网络外部性为正,只要均衡存在、唯一且有效,在"垄断市场-用户完全信息"、"竞争瓶颈市场-用户缺乏信息"和"双寡头市场-用户缺乏信息"这三种情境下同时博弈都是最优的;在"垄断市场-用户缺乏信息"的情境下任意一种序贯博弈都优于同时博弈,但哪边先动的博弈时序是更优的则很难判断;在"竞争瓶颈市场-用户完全信息"和"双寡头市场-用户完全信息"这两种情境下,市场哪一边的差异化相对另一边越强,平台就越倾向于选择哪一边用户后动的博弈时序。
[Abstract]:There are three possible time series when a bilateral platform plays a price game with the users on both sides of the market: at the same time, with both sides, with one of the first game or with the other first game. Based on the research framework of bilateral market equilibrium model and considering the influence of user information level and market structure, this paper compares the equilibrium profits of the above three price game models. It is found that given that the cross-network externality is positive, as long as the equilibrium exists, it is unique and effective. In the three situations of "monopoly market-user complete information", "competition bottleneck market-user lack of information" and "duopoly market-user lack of information" these three situations are the best game at the same time. Any sequential game is superior to the simultaneous game under the situation of "monopoly market-users lack of information", but it is difficult to judge which game sequence is more optimal. In the two situations of "competitive bottleneck market-user complete information" and "duopoly market-user complete information", the stronger the difference on which side of the market is relative to the other side, the more inclined the platform is to choose which user moves after the game time series.
【作者单位】：山西财经大学管理科学与工程学院;西北大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71572146) 教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金资助项目(16YJA630015) 陕西省社会科学基金资助项目(107-221450)
【分类号】：F224.32;F714.1

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