基于Hotelling模型的两厂商选址定价完全序贯决策

发布时间：2018-05-19 16:31

本文选题：博弈模型 + 完全序贯决策　；参考：《山东大学学报(理学版)》2017年06期

【摘要】：针对现代市场中广泛存在厂商先后进入的情况,基于Hotelling模型构建了线性市场上二次运输成本下两厂商水平竞争的完全序贯决策模型,其中先进入市场的厂商先选址再定价,随后跟随者先选址再定价。两厂商的博弈分析表明:跟随者具有后发优势,将获得更大的利润;先进入者将定位在市场端点,并采取低价策略;跟随者将定位在市场中心,并采取高价策略。进一步对所建的完全序贯决策模型、两厂商先后同时选址与定价的博弈模型、两厂商先同时选址再同时定价的博弈模型、两厂商先同时选址再先后定价的博弈模型进行了对比分析,研究结果表明:完全序贯决策与两厂商先后同时选址与定价的决策一致,且定价和厂商利润均较低;4种博弈顺序下两厂商水平竞争均衡都难以实现社会福利最大,需要政府"有形的手"发挥作用。
[Abstract]:Based on Hotelling model, a complete sequential decision model of horizontal competition between two firms in the linear market under secondary transportation cost is constructed, in which the firms that enter the market are located first and then priced. The follower then selects the site and then sets the price. The game analysis of the two firms shows that the follower has the advantage of late development and will gain more profit; the first entrant will be positioned at the end of the market and will adopt the low price strategy; the follower will be positioned in the market center and will adopt the high price strategy. Furthermore, for the established complete sequential decision model, the game model for the two firms to locate and price at the same time, and the game model for the two firms to locate and then price at the same time. The results show that the complete sequential decision is consistent with the decision of the two firms to locate and price at the same time. Moreover, the equilibrium of horizontal competition between the two firms is difficult to achieve the maximum social welfare under the four kinds of game order of lower price and lower profit, which requires the government's "tangible hand" to play its role.
【作者单位】：南昌大学管理学院;南昌大学中国中部经济社会发展研究中心;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71561018,71502076) 江西省高校人文社会科学重点研究基地项目 2016年度江西省研究生创新项目(YC2016-B015)
【分类号】：F224;F274

【相似文献】