工程质量政府监督代理链分析与多层次激励机制探究

发布时间：2018-05-29 15:27

本文选题：工程质量 + 政府监督　；参考：《中国管理科学》2017年06期

【摘要】：政府监督者的执法监督行为是制约工程质量政府监督有效性的内在根源,工程质量政府监督运行的本质特征是双重委托代理机制。国内外多重委托代理研究多局限于同一对象、抽象化主体之间的行为策略与均衡过程,工程质量政府监督具有两层委托代理面向对象差异和第二层次代理人——监督小组的组织结构复杂性特征,探究其代理链多层次激励机制将有利于丰富双重委托代理理论。基于建设主体构成和经济契约特征分析,剖析建设工程质量政府监督的委托代理关系与特征,构建与简化工程质量政府监督代理链;采用Holmstrom与Milgrom参数化方法架构工程质量政府监督委托代理机制模型,基于代理链结构分析形成简化的激励机制模型,通过博弈求解得到工程质量监督的激励参数,并进行了算例演示分析。结果表明:激励系数β是r、σ~2和b的减函数,工程质量形成过程的方差愈大(σ2越大),代理人愈是害怕努力工作,相应承担的风险就愈小;质量监督小组的努力程度a_(ik)=β/bΛ_(ik)~2与β成正比,与其成本系数、工程合同额成反比,提高监督人员的素质和专业水平有利于降低其质量监督成本系数;激励机制运行的前提是建立质量分级评价机制;质量监督成本将会影响到其质量监督努力水平(a_(ik)=β/bΛ_(ik)~2),质量监督成本与监督者能力成反比;若政府监督部门保留费用比例为1-ρ,调整激励机制的系数为ρδ和ργ,仍可使政府的目标函数达到最优;当不考虑项目合同额Λ_(ik)时,模型将简化为委托单代理模型,β=1/1+rbσ~2。除激励机制外,实施惩罚机制、信誉机制、保险机制、评级机制共同作用有利于保障工程质量稳步提升。工程质量政府监督代理链与多层次激励机制研究将为工程质量政府监督协同激励对策制定与运行机制优化提供理论支撑,提供其他公共品监管激励理论借鉴。
[Abstract]:The law enforcement and supervision behavior of government supervisors is the internal root of restricting the effectiveness of government supervision of project quality. The essential feature of government supervision of engineering quality is the mechanism of double principal-agent. At home and abroad, the research of multiple principal-agent is confined to the same object, abstracting the behavior strategy and equilibrium process between the subjects. Government supervision of engineering quality has two levels of principal-agent oriented difference and the complexity of organizational structure of the second level agent-supervision group. It will be beneficial to enrich the theory of dual principal-agent theory by exploring its multi-level incentive mechanism of agency chain. Based on the analysis of construction subject structure and economic contract characteristics, this paper analyzes the principal-agent relationship and characteristics of government supervision of construction project quality, and constructs and simplifies the agency chain of government supervision of construction quality. Holmstrom and Milgrom parameterization methods are used to construct the principal-agent mechanism model of government supervision of engineering quality. Based on the analysis of agency chain structure, a simplified incentive mechanism model is formed, and the incentive parameters of engineering quality supervision are obtained by game solution. A numerical example is given. The results show that the excitation coefficient 尾 is the subtraction function of r, 蟽 2 and b, and the greater the variance of the engineering quality formation process is (the bigger 蟽 2 is, the more afraid the agent is to work hard, the smaller the corresponding risk will be. The construction contract amount is inversely proportional to the cost coefficient, and improving the quality and professional level of the supervisors will help to reduce the cost coefficient of the quality supervision, and the premise of the incentive mechanism operation is to establish the quality grading evaluation mechanism. The cost of quality supervision will affect the level of quality supervision efforts, and the cost of quality supervision is inversely proportional to the ability of supervisors. If the ratio of reserve cost of government supervision department is 1- 蟻 and the coefficient of adjusting incentive mechanism is 蟻未 and 蟻纬, the objective function of the government can still be optimized, and the model will be simplified as a single-agent model with 尾 1 / 1 / 1 RB 蟽 ~ (2) when the project contract amount is not taken into account. Besides incentive mechanism, the implementation of punishment mechanism, credit mechanism, insurance mechanism and rating mechanism are beneficial to the steady improvement of project quality. The research on the agency chain and multi-level incentive mechanism of government supervision on engineering quality will provide theoretical support for the formulation of cooperative incentive countermeasures and optimization of operational mechanism for government supervision of engineering quality, and provide other public goods supervision and incentive theory for reference.
【作者单位】：天津城建大学经济与管理学院;天津职业技术师范大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71171141)
【分类号】：F203

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