推广成本信息不对称下推广商与酒店间的合作契约设计

发布时间：2018-06-01 01:33

本文选题：酒店 + 需求推广　；参考：《运筹与管理》2017年05期

【摘要】：为应对日趋激烈的酒店市场竞争、加强对销售渠道的控制,酒店急需与推广商合作以提高自有销售网站的需求水平。文章基于推广成本信息不对称,构建了一个占主导的酒店和一家推广商关于需求推广合作的博弈模型,分析了信息不对称情形下推广商的谎报动机,指出合作契约设计的必要性。并提出一套契约菜单,在保证推广商依据自身实际成本类型进行契约选择的前提下,实现了酒店利润的最大化。最后通过算例分析,验证了所设计的合作契约的有效性,并给出了参数灵敏性分析。
[Abstract]:In order to cope with the increasingly fierce competition in the hotel market and strengthen the control of sales channels, the hotel urgently needs to cooperate with the promoters to improve the demand level of its own sales website. Based on the asymmetric information of promotion cost, this paper constructs a game model of demand promotion cooperation between a dominant hotel and a promoter, and analyzes the false motivation of the promoter under the condition of asymmetric information. The necessity of cooperative contract design is pointed out. A set of contract menu is put forward to maximize the hotel profit under the premise of ensuring the promoters choose the contract according to their actual cost types. Finally, the effectiveness of the designed cooperative contract is verified by an example, and the parameter sensitivity analysis is given.
【作者单位】：华南理工大学工商管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71371075) 教育部人文社科青年项目(15YJC630053) 安徽省高等学校自然科学研究重点项目(KJ2015A335)
【分类号】：F224;F719.2

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