公共停车场与私营停车场的博弈定价模型

发布时间：2018-06-10 19:59

  本文选题：交通运输经济 + 停车定价　； 参考：《系统工程理论与实践》2017年07期

【摘要】：本文研究公共停车场和私营停车场之间的定价博弈问题.考虑早高峰出行模式,出行者可以选择小汽车或者轨道交通出行.小汽车出行用户在到达目的时,需考虑停车问题(选用公共停车场或私营停车场).本文首先采用交通流的瓶颈模型分析出行模式与两类停车场定价、各自停车位数量的关系.在此基础上,建立了政府决策者(公共停车场)与私人效益最大化追求者(私营停车场)参与的NASH博弈模型,探讨NASH平衡条件下的两类停车场的最优收费模式.同时,比较了两类停车场共存的博弈竞价机制与单一私营停车场供应的社会效益.研究结果表明,以最小化社会总成本为目标,政府决策者是否实施停车补贴,将取决于公用停车场停车位数量.政府决策者可以通过调整公共停车位的数量和收费水平,使得交通系统性能趋于系统最优.
[Abstract]:This paper studies the pricing game between public parking and private parking. Considering the morning rush trip mode, travelers can choose to travel by car or rail transit. Car users should consider parking when they reach their destination (public parking or private parking). In this paper, the bottleneck model of traffic flow is used to analyze the relationship between the travel mode and the pricing of the two types of parking lots, as well as the number of parking spaces. On this basis, a Nash game model involving government decision makers (public parking) and private maximizer (private parking) is established, and the optimal charging models of two types of parking lots under Nash equilibrium are discussed. At the same time, the game bidding mechanism of two kinds of parking lot and the social benefit of single private car park supply are compared. The results show that whether government decision makers implement parking subsidies in order to minimize the total social cost will depend on the number of parking spaces in public parking lots. Government decision makers can adjust the number of public parking spaces and the level of fees to make the system performance more optimal.
【作者单位】： 同济大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金(71531011,71601142,71125004) 上海市浦江人才计划项目(16PJC090)~~
【分类号】：F224.32;F570.5;F572
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本文编号：2004416