基于演化博弈的政府差异碳税政策与企业生产策略研究

发布时间：2018-07-09 15:04

本文选题：低碳经济 + 差异碳税　；参考：《江西师范大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：工业革命带来经济快速发展的同时,也加剧了全球气候变暖现象,危害着社会的发展与人类的生存。已知温室气体中二氧化碳对气候变暖的影响最大,因此世界将节能减排的目光聚焦在二氧化碳的减排上。发达国家对低碳经济的研究先于中国等发展中国家,在低碳技术研发、新能源开发、清洁生产等方面取得了显著的成效。最广泛使用的市场碳减排政策包括碳排放权交易和碳税,而碳税因为成本最低、途径单一、减排效果好,瑞典、丹麦、荷兰、意大利等多个国家纷纷征收碳税来控制碳排量。中国虽然是碳排放量最多的发展中国家,但是积极地承担着减排的任务,碳税这一有力减排政策将来也会纳入中国税收体系中来,因此研究碳税背景下企业的低碳生产行为具有重要的意义。本文运用演化博弈的相关理论,构建政府与企业策略选择的博弈模型,探索政府分别对低碳生产企业和非低碳生产企业征收统一碳税和高额碳税的情况下,企业生产行为的变化情况。通过构建微分方程、求解复制动态方程,得出系统演化的稳定点,并进一步分析政府、企业和系统的演化稳定性。得知只有企业低碳生产的额外收益收入大于成本时,企业才会倾向于低碳生产;政府实施监管时的总成本小于税收收入,且企业低碳生产与非低碳生产的收益差大于实际投入成本时,系统会演化至政府监管企业选择低碳生产这一状态。最后运用Matlab R2014b进行数值仿真,分析了政府监管概率、补贴系统、差异碳税税率变动时对系统演化的影响,最终得出政府初期监管意愿越高,企业选择低碳生产的可能越大;政府的补贴系数对企业生产行为的影响较小;政府的差异碳税税率对企业的影响较大,税率提升越快,企业选择低碳生产的速度也越快。
[Abstract]:The industrial revolution brought about rapid economic development, but also aggravated the global warming phenomenon, which endangers the development of society and the survival of human beings. Carbon dioxide is known to have the greatest impact on global warming, so the world is focusing on reducing carbon dioxide emissions. The research on low-carbon economy in developed countries is ahead of that in developing countries such as China, and has achieved remarkable results in low-carbon technology research and development, new energy development, cleaner production and so on. The most widely used market carbon abatement policies include carbon trading and taxes on carbon emissions, which have the lowest cost, a single path and a good effect, with Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Italy and other countries imposing carbon taxes to control carbon emissions. Although China is the developing country with the most carbon emissions, it is actively undertaking the task of reducing emissions. The carbon tax policy, which is capable of reducing emissions, will also be included in China's tax system in the future. Therefore, it is of great significance to study the low-carbon production behavior of enterprises under the background of carbon tax. Based on the theory of evolutionary game, this paper constructs a game model of government and enterprise strategy choice, and explores the case that the government collects unified carbon tax and high carbon tax on low-carbon production enterprises and non-low-carbon production enterprises, respectively. Changes in the production behavior of the enterprise. By constructing the differential equation and solving the replicating dynamic equation, the stable point of system evolution is obtained, and the evolutionary stability of government, enterprise and system is further analyzed. Only when the additional revenue from low-carbon production is greater than the cost, the enterprise will tend to low-carbon production; the total cost of government regulation is less than the tax revenue. When the profit difference between low carbon production and non low carbon production is greater than the actual input cost, the system will evolve to the state of government supervising enterprises to choose low carbon production. Finally, using Matlab R2014b to carry on the numerical simulation, analyzed the government supervision probability, the subsidy system, the difference carbon tax rate change to the system evolution influence, finally obtained the government early stage supervision will be higher, the enterprise chooses the low carbon production likely to be bigger; The government's subsidy coefficient has little influence on the enterprise's production behavior, and the difference of government's carbon tax rate has a greater influence on the enterprise's production behavior. The faster the tax rate rises, the faster the enterprise chooses the low carbon production rate.
【学位授予单位】：江西师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F279.2;F812.42;F224.32

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