标的价值异估计条件下兼并交易价格确定的博弈分析

发布时间：2018-07-10 06:04

本文选题：Rubinstein讨价还价定理 + 标的价值异估计　；参考：《系统管理学报》2017年05期

【摘要】：尽管Rubinstein讨价还价定理给出了交易标的估值相同情形下的价格确定方法,但是对交易双方标的价值估计不相同情形下价格确定却显得无能为力。在已有研究基础上,提出了交易双方标的价值异估计情形下Rubinstein讨价还价定理的改进,给出了标的价值异估计假设下分布区间相同和不同两种情形下交易价格确定思路。在此分析基础上,给出了常见均匀分布、正态分布以及几何布朗分布等情形下的价格确定的解析表达式,运用数值仿真技术说明了研究结论的现实解释力。最后,通过我国A股资产兼并交易价格确定的实证分析进一步说明了研究结论的现实解释力。
[Abstract]:Although Rubinstein's bargaining theorem gives a method to determine the price under the same valuation of the trading object, there is nothing that can be done to determine the price under the condition of the different valuation of the two sides of the transaction. On the basis of previous studies, the Rubinstein bargaining theorem is improved in the case of the value difference estimation of the two sides of the transaction, and the idea of determining the transaction price under the assumption of the same distribution interval and different distribution under the assumption of the value difference estimation is given. On the basis of this analysis, the analytical expressions of price determination under the conditions of common uniform distribution, normal distribution and geometric Brownian distribution are given, and the practical explanatory power of the research conclusion is explained by numerical simulation. Finally, the empirical analysis of the price determination of A-share asset merger transaction further illustrates the realistic explanatory power of the conclusion.
【作者单位】：河海大学商学院;中央财经大学会计学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71171207)
【分类号】：F224.32;F274

【相似文献】