买方抗衡势力对上游企业定价形式决策的影响——基于讨价还价博弈的分析
发布时间：2018-07-25 11:59
【摘要】：基于上游垄断、下游双寡头竞争的纵向市场结构,在讨价还价博弈的框架下,构建了下游零售商均无买方抗衡势力和单个零售商具有买方抗衡势力两种情况下的,上游供应商最优定价形式决策模型,分析了买方抗衡势力对供应商定价形式决策的影响。研究发现:从供应商利润角度来说,当零售商均无买方抗衡势力时,两部收费制和RPM(转售价格维持)是等价的,且都优于线性定价;当单个零售商具有买方抗衡势力时,RPM优于两部收费制,同时也优于线性定价,但是两部收费制与线性定价之间的关系不确定。在此结论之上,本文还讨论了政府对RPM采用不同规制政策时,供应商最优的定价形式选择。
[Abstract]:Based on the vertical market structure of upstream monopoly and downstream duopoly competition, under the framework of bargaining game, this paper constructs two situations in which there is no buyer countervailing power for downstream retailers and single retailer has buyer countervailing power. This paper analyzes the influence of buyer's countervailing power on supplier's optimal pricing form decision. From the point of view of supplier profit, when retailers have no buyer countervailing power, the two-part charging system and RPM (resale price maintenance) are equivalent, and both are superior to linear pricing; When a single retailer has the power to compete with the buyer, RPM is superior to the two-part charging system and the linear pricing system, but the relationship between the two-part charging system and the linear pricing is uncertain. On the basis of this conclusion, this paper also discusses the optimal pricing form of the supplier when the government adopts different regulation policies on RPM.
【作者单位】： 东北大学工商管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172150,71472032)
【分类号】：F224.32;F274
，
本文编号：2143753
[Abstract]:Based on the vertical market structure of upstream monopoly and downstream duopoly competition, under the framework of bargaining game, this paper constructs two situations in which there is no buyer countervailing power for downstream retailers and single retailer has buyer countervailing power. This paper analyzes the influence of buyer's countervailing power on supplier's optimal pricing form decision. From the point of view of supplier profit, when retailers have no buyer countervailing power, the two-part charging system and RPM (resale price maintenance) are equivalent, and both are superior to linear pricing; When a single retailer has the power to compete with the buyer, RPM is superior to the two-part charging system and the linear pricing system, but the relationship between the two-part charging system and the linear pricing is uncertain. On the basis of this conclusion, this paper also discusses the optimal pricing form of the supplier when the government adopts different regulation policies on RPM.
【作者单位】： 东北大学工商管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172150,71472032)
【分类号】：F224.32;F274
，
本文编号：2143753
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