基于三群体演化博弈的小额贷款公司风险补贴机制研究

发布时间：2018-10-09 09:47

【摘要】：本文利用三群体演化博弈模型,研究了在政府贷款风险补贴政策下,政府、小额贷款公司、小微企业的演化稳定策略。研究得出:政府补贴对象应是经营担保贷款的小额贷款公司;小额贷款公司应采取差额担保机制,并确保担保贷款优于信用贷款;小额贷款公司应根据小微企业项目投资成功率,将小微企业划分为优质客户和一般客户,对优质客户贷款,政府补贴率要使得补贴激励效用大于成本,对一般客户贷款,政府补贴率要进一步细化,确定一个补贴率下限值,实际值要接近这一下限;政府要健全小额信贷征信制度,提高小额贷款公司风险防控能力和获利能力,优化项目投资软环境,使政府在较低补贴率下发挥出较高的补贴激励效用。
[Abstract]:Using the three-group evolutionary game model, this paper studies the evolutionary stabilization strategies of government, small loan companies and small and micro enterprises under the government loan risk subsidy policy. The conclusions are as follows: the government subsidy should be targeted at the micro-loan companies which operate the guaranteed loans, and the microfinance companies should adopt the difference guarantee mechanism and ensure that the secured loans are superior to the credit loans. According to the investment success rate of the small and micro enterprises, the small and micro enterprises should be divided into high quality customers and ordinary customers. The government subsidy rate should make the incentive effect of subsidies greater than the cost, and make loans to ordinary customers. The government subsidy rate should be further refined, a lower limit value of the subsidy rate should be determined, and the actual value should be close to this limit. The government should improve the microcredit credit system and improve the ability of micro-credit companies to prevent and control risks and make profits. To optimize the soft environment of project investment, the government can play a higher incentive effect under the lower subsidy rate.
【作者单位】：东北大学工商管理学院;沈阳师范大学国际商学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71671030,71571038) 辽宁省社会科学规划基金资助项目(L15BJY020)
【分类号】：F224.32;F832.39

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