保险市场信息的不对称及其法律规制

发布时间：2018-04-13 22:38

本文选题：保险市场 + 信息不对称　；参考：《西南财经大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：作为金融业的重要组成部分之一,保险业在国民经济中占有举足轻重的地位。保险经营活动中,各市场主体所处的地位、信息交流的愿望、拥有的资源和保险知识等差异,造成各方希望了解或本来能够了解的信息不能获得,从而形成了保险市场信息不对称的现象。保险市场上的信息不对称问题使市场上的帕累托最优均衡状态无法仅仅通过市场机制自然实现,从而损失了效率。此外,信息优势方利用自己的信息优势谋取利益,对于信息弱势方而言,也极不公平。在实践中,由于信息不对称而引起的司法纠纷数不胜数,这无疑极大影响了保险行业的形象,对于处于初级发展阶段的中国保险业,为害不浅。因此,对保险市场上存在的信息不对称进行研究,是很有必要的。虽然信息不对称属于经济学的范畴,但是要解决该问题却并不局限于经济学领域。信息不对称本身会影响市场参与主体的行为方式,而法律(特别是保险法)则会影响他们分享信息的意愿和决定。通过研究保险法的具体规制是如何减弱、消除信息不对称对保险市场的影响,对于找出现行法律的不足并加以完善,无疑是有很大裨益的。本文结合了经济学和法学的视角,旨在研究保险市场上广泛存在的信息不对称现象,结合法条和案例对保险法对此的规制进行分析,并找出其中存在的问题,提出笔者的建议。本文的研究一方面可以在信息不对称引起纠纷时,为裁决者提供处理依据和借鉴；另一方面,也试图寻找出保险法中尚存的一些问题,从而为完善保险法提出适当的建议。全文由导论和五章共六部分组成。导论。此部分从保险市场信息不对称法律规制的研究意义、理论研究采用的工具方法两个方面对现有的研究成果文献资料进行归纳总结,并介绍了本文的基本思路以及结构框架。第一章,保险市场信息不对称的相关理论基础。本章明确了保险市场信息不对称的基础理论、界定了保险市场上存在的信息不对称现象,进而展示了信息不对称现象引发的后果,从逆向选择和道德风险两个方面进行了阐述。第二章,保险市场信息不对称的表现和影响。本章分析了保险市场主体之间存在的信息不对称现象,从保险合同双方、保险人与保险代理人、保险人与保险监管方这三个方面,具体进行分析,并通过分析,展示了信息不对称现象对保险市场的不利影响。第三章,保险市场信息不对称的博弈：基于三个层面的分析。本章主要针对上一章阐述的几类信息不对称现象,进行了博弈分析。通过博弈分析,得出部分消除信息不对称不利影响的手段,如建立信息披露制度等。第四章,保险市场信息不对称法律规制的思路及政策建议。本章着眼于我国保险法对保险市场信息不对称的法律规制,分别从保险合同法及保险业法这两个方面着手,结合具体法条,对此进行了分析阐述。通过这些分析,对比国外相关法律规制,找出了现行保险法的一些不足,并据此提出了相关的政策建议。第五章,结语。对本文的基本观点进行总结概括。通过对以往研究文献疏略整理,笔者发现目前研究的一些不足,比如,在保险市场信息不对称方面,目前研究多集中于保险合同双方,对于保险人与保险代理人之间的信息不对称、保险人与监管方之间的信息不对称,也多是保险学理论上的定性分析,缺乏基于信息经济学的博弈分析。相关法律规制方面,在我国2009年第二次修订了保险法之后,修订或者新增加了一些条款,如关于格式条款的第十九条、不可抗辩条款、自杀条款等,目前国内对于这些条款的研究散佚于各个文献之内,并未被系统地纳入保险信息不对称法律规制的研究体系内。此外,保险人与保险代理人之间信息不对称方面的法律规制,目前国内对此的研究多从表见代理、无权代理等法学角度定性分析,而从信息经济学角度分析的则颇为少见。对保险监管方和保险人之间信息不对称的法律规制,国内相关文献则多侧重于监管模式的比较和选择,对法律规制少有具体分析。正是基于以上研究现状未涉及之处,笔者尝试在以下几个方面进行研究及创新：在明确信息不对称的概念,阐述博弈论与信息不对称理论、委托-代理关系理论等基础理论的基础上,结合保险特色,对保险双方、保险人与保险代理人、保险人与监管者之间存在的信息不对称,从表现和影响两方面进行分析；从博弈论的角度对上述几对关系进行经济分析,证明信息不对称会造成社会总福利和效率两方面的损失；对信息不对称的法律规制价值进行经济学和法学两方面的定性分析；结合法条,从保险合同法和保险业法两个方面分别分析对信息不对称的法律规制；依照前文的分析,结合中外法律的比较,找出我国现行保险法律规制存在的问题,并给出改善建议。
[Abstract]:As one of the important parts of the financial industry , the insurance industry plays an important role in the national economy . In the insurance business activities , the position of each market main body , the desire to communicate the information , the resources and the insurance knowledge , etc . , cause the information that the parties want to know or have been able to understand cannot be obtained , thus forming the phenomenon that the information of the insurance market is asymmetric .

The information asymmetry in the insurance market makes the Pareto optimal equilibrium state of the market unable to be realized only through the market mechanism , thus losing the efficiency . In practice , the information advantage party uses its own information advantage to gain the benefit , which undoubtedly affects the image of the insurance industry greatly . In practice , the information asymmetry in China is not shallow . Therefore , it is necessary to study the information asymmetry in the insurance market .

Although the information asymmetry belongs to the field of economics , it is not confined to the field of economics . Information asymmetry itself can affect the behavior of market participants , and laws ( especially insurance laws ) affect the willingness and decision of the market to share information . By studying the specific regulation of insurance law , how to weaken and eliminate the influence of information asymmetry on the insurance market , it is undoubtedly beneficial to find out the inadequacy of existing laws and perfect it .

This paper combines the perspective of economics and law to study the widespread information asymmetry in the insurance market , analyzes the regulation of the insurance law by law and case , and finds out the problems and puts forward the author ' s suggestion .
On the other hand , we try to find out some remaining problems in the insurance law , so as to put forward the appropriate suggestions for perfecting the insurance law .

The full text consists of six parts of the introduction and the five chapters .

On the basis of the research significance of the asymmetric legal regulation of insurance market information , this part summarizes the literature data of the existing research results from two aspects : the research significance of the theory research and the tool method adopted by the theoretical research , and introduces the basic idea and the structural framework of this paper .

Chapter one , the basic theory of information asymmetry in insurance market , defines the basic theory of information asymmetry in the insurance market , defines the information asymmetry in the insurance market , and then shows the consequences of information asymmetry , and expounds the two aspects of adverse selection and moral hazard .

The second chapter analyzes the information asymmetry in the insurance market . This chapter analyzes the information asymmetry between the insurance market subjects , analyzes the three aspects of the insurance contract , the insurer and the insurance agent , the insurer and the insurance regulator , and analyzes the adverse effects of the information asymmetry on the insurance market .

In chapter 3 , the game of information asymmetry in insurance market : Based on the analysis of three levels , this chapter mainly focuses on several kinds of information asymmetry in the last chapter , and makes a game analysis . Through the game analysis , we get some means to eliminate the adverse effect of information asymmetry , such as the establishment of information disclosure system and so on .

Chapter four , the idea and policy suggestion of the asymmetric legal regulation of insurance market information . This chapter focuses on the legal regulation of the information asymmetry in the insurance market by the insurance law of our country . In view of these analyses , the article analyzes the legal regulation of the insurance contract law and the insurance industry law . Through these analyses , the deficiency of the current insurance law is found out , and the relevant policy suggestions are put forward accordingly .

The fifth chapter , the conclusion , summarizes the basic viewpoint of this article .

On the basis of the information asymmetry between the insurer and the insurance agent , the author tries to study and innovate the information asymmetry between the insurer and the insurance agent .
From the point of view of game theory , the economic analysis of the above relations proves that the information asymmetry can result in the loss of social welfare and efficiency .
The qualitative analysis of the economics and the law of the legal regulation value of the information asymmetry ;
The legal regulation of information asymmetry is analyzed from two aspects of insurance contract law and insurance law .
According to the analysis of the former , the author finds out the existing problems in China ' s current insurance law and gives some suggestions for improvement .

【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F842;D922.284

【参考文献】