基于第四方医院复核机制的社会医疗保险供方道德风险防控研究

发布时间：2018-04-14 09:21

本文选题：医疗保险 + 供方道德风险　；参考：《社会保障研究》2013年06期

【摘要】：医疗保险领域中的道德风险具有发生可能性大,造成的后果严重,而防范的措施又难以制定的特点。由于医疗领域的信息不对称性,医疗服务的提供方往往决定了医疗服务的种类和价格,故而社会医疗保险中的供方道德风险尤其显著。其又具有发生可能性大,造成后果严重,且防范措施又难以制订的特点。因此,如何衡量和防范社会医疗保险中的供方道德风险成为一个具有重要理论和实践意义的课题。文章在前人的研究基础之上,运用信息经济学、博弈论等学科的相关知识,对我国现有社会医疗保险体系中的供方道德风险进行了深度分析。从理论上证明了我国社会医疗保险领域的供方道德风险的存在,进而提出利用第四方复核机制防控供方道德风险的方案,并通过博弈论方法证明了其可行性。
[Abstract]:The moral hazard in the field of medical insurance has the characteristics of great possibility, serious consequences, and difficult to formulate preventive measures.Because of the asymmetry of information in medical field, the provider of medical service often determines the type and price of medical service, so the moral hazard of provider in social medical insurance is especially significant.It also has the characteristics of high possibility, serious consequences and difficult to formulate preventive measures.Therefore, how to measure and prevent the moral hazard in social medical insurance has become an important theoretical and practical significance.On the basis of previous studies, this paper makes a deep analysis of the moral hazard of the suppliers in the current social medical insurance system by using the relevant knowledge of information economics, game theory and other disciplines.This paper theoretically proves the existence of the moral hazard of the supplier in the field of social medical insurance in China, and then puts forward the scheme of preventing and controlling the moral hazard of the supplier by using the fourth party review mechanism, and proves its feasibility by the method of game theory.
【作者单位】：华东师范大学金融与统计学院;
【分类号】：F842.6

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