我国农业保险低水平均衡的演化博弈分析

发布时间：2018-04-18 16:24

本文选题：农业保险 + 低水平均衡　；参考：《南昌大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：农业作为国民经济的基础，是国民经济其他部门得以进一步发展的前提条件，同时由于农业独特生产方式，对自然环境高度依赖，然而自然环境的多变性就决定了农业的弱质性，尤其是我国自然灾害的频繁发生，使现代农业的发展面临严峻的挑战，导致农民的收入和农业经济处于一种极度不稳定的状态。农业保险作为一种有效的农业风险分散机制，在分散农业风险、分摊经济损失方面有着重要的作用。然而从目前我国农业的发展状况看，农业保险的保障作用似乎并不明显，我国的农业保险市场呈现出“供给不足，需求有限”的低水平均衡状态，本文先简单的阐述了我国农业保险的发展历程和现状，试分析了我国农业保险市场供需不足的原因，并运用演化博弈理论分析了农业保险各参与主体的演化博弈行为，分析各博弈主体行为选择的影响因素，最后结合我国的实际情况，从农户、政府、保险公司三个角度提出政策建议，主要包括：①增加农民农业生产收入，鼓励农业技术创新，鼓励农户集约化经营和专业化生产；②政府加大财政补贴力度，完善补贴方式和农业信息服务体系，并加强农业保险立法，为农业保险的开展创造良好的法制环境；③保险公司加强农险产品的研发和创新力度，推出符合市场需求的保险产品；并且提高自身的经营管理水平，，降低经营成本，以促进我国农业保险达到更高水平的均衡。全文共分六章：第一章，绪论。主要包括本文的选题背景和意义、国内外文献综述和研究内容，总结了可能的创新和不足之处。第二章，相关理论论述。本章阐述了农业保险理论以及本文所要运用的相关理论。第三章，简述了我国农业保险发展历程和发展现状。第四章，我国农业保险市场低水平均衡的原因分析。本章从农业风险的自身特征、农业保险市场的信息不对称、农民非正规的风险规避机制等角度分析了我国农业保险市场低水平均衡的原因。第五章，演化博弈理论的应用。本章主要构建了三个演化博弈模型，分别是农户与农户之间、保险公司与保险公司之间、保险公司和农户之间，动态分析了各演化博弈主体的行为选择。第六章，结论、建议及展望。本章以第四章、第五章的分析为基础进行小结，并分别从农户、政府、保险公司三个角度提出改善我国农业保险低水平均衡的对策。
[Abstract]:Agriculture, as the foundation of the national economy, is the prerequisite for the further development of other sectors of the national economy. At the same time, because of the unique mode of production of agriculture, it is highly dependent on the natural environment.However, the variability of the natural environment determines the weak nature of agriculture, especially the frequent occurrence of natural disasters in China, which makes the development of modern agriculture face severe challenges, resulting in the farmers' income and agricultural economy in a state of extreme instability.As an effective mechanism of agricultural risk dispersion, agricultural insurance plays an important role in spreading agricultural risks and distributing economic losses.However, judging from the current situation of agricultural development in China, the function of agricultural insurance is not obvious. The agricultural insurance market of our country presents a low level equilibrium state of "insufficient supply and limited demand".This paper briefly expounds the development course and present situation of agricultural insurance in China, tries to analyze the reasons for the shortage of supply and demand in the agricultural insurance market of our country, and analyzes the evolutionary game behavior of the participants in agricultural insurance by using the evolutionary game theory.This paper analyzes the influencing factors of the behavior choice of the main players of the game, and finally, combining the actual situation of our country, puts forward some policy suggestions from the perspectives of farmers, governments and insurance companies, mainly including: 1 to increase farmers' agricultural production income and to encourage agricultural technological innovation.The government should encourage farmers to strengthen their intensive management and specialized production, improve the subsidy method and agricultural information service system, and strengthen the legislation of agricultural insurance to create a good legal environment for the development of agricultural insurance.(3) Insurance companies should strengthen the R & D and innovation of agricultural insurance products, introduce insurance products that meet the needs of the market, and improve their own management level and reduce their operating costs in order to promote China's agricultural insurance to achieve a higher level of equilibrium.The full text is divided into six chapters:Chapter one, introduction.This paper mainly includes the background and significance of this topic, literature review and research content at home and abroad, and summarizes the possible innovations and shortcomings.The second chapter, the related theory discussion.This chapter describes the theory of agricultural insurance and the relevant theories to be used in this paper.The third chapter, briefly describes the development of agricultural insurance in China and the status quo.The fourth chapter, our country agriculture insurance market low level equilibrium reason analysis.This chapter analyzes the reasons for the low level equilibrium of the agricultural insurance market in China from the aspects of the characteristics of agricultural risks, the asymmetric information in the agricultural insurance market, and the informal risk aversion mechanism of farmers.Chapter five, the application of evolutionary game theory.In this chapter, three evolutionary game models are constructed, which are between farmers and farmers, between insurance companies and insurance companies, and between insurance companies and farmers.Chapter VI, conclusions, recommendations and prospects.This chapter is based on the analysis of the fourth chapter and the fifth chapter, and puts forward the countermeasures to improve the low level equilibrium of agricultural insurance in China from three angles: farmers, governments and insurance companies.
【学位授予单位】：南昌大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F842.66;F224.32

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