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基于博弈分析的银行保险金融控股模式共赢机制研究

发布时间:2018-05-20 12:48

  本文选题:银行保险 + 金融控股模式 ; 参考:《昆明理工大学》2014年博士论文


【摘要】:银行保险的发展经历了四种合作模式:协议代理模式、战略联盟模式、股权合作模式和金融控股模式。不论在合作模式下,合作各方的共赢问题是合作的关键,而其中的手续费分配问题是能否达成共赢的核心。西方的金融监管体系较为完善,因此,不论在何种模式下,银行保险合作各方基本能够达到共赢局面。国内的银行保险出现较晚,目前主要以协议代理模式为主。由于国内特殊的金融体系特征,目前国内银行保险的手续费恶性竞争问题严重,合作各方并没有形成真正意义上的共赢。 随着国内金融监管混业政策的逐步放宽,2010年前后,国内首家银行系保险公司成立,标志着国内金融控股模式下的银行保险出现,并表现出了更加强劲的发展势头。鉴于国内银行保险在初级的协议代理模式下并未形成真正意义上的共赢,因此,系统性的研究银行保险延伸至更高级的金融控股模式下合作各方共赢机制的构建问题,对于国内保险和金融市场的健康发展具有重要的理论和现实意义。 论文主要包括以下三方面内容: (1)金融控股模式下银行保险的相关要素研究。首先,本文研究了金融控股模式下的银行保险在国内的出现、发展及存在的一些问题;其次,详细分析了金融控股模式下银行保险的合作形式、合作流程、价值链活动、博弈树、主要经济主体的行为动机等要素;最后分析了金融控股模式下银行母公司、银行系保险子公司和传统保险公司间开展银行保险合作的战略层、经济层和非经济层因素。 (2)金融控股模式下银行保险合作各方复杂的多委托—代理博弈研究。本文按照银保合作的逻辑顺序为原则,分别研究了金融控股模式下银行母公司与传统保险公司间的单委托—代理博弈、银行母公司与银行系保险子公司间的单委托—代理博弈和银行母公司同时与银行系保险子公司及其他传统保险公司间的多委托—代理博弈。 (3)金融控股模式下银行保险柜员的复杂二重委托--代理博弈研究。首先,本文对于银行保险业务中柜员的三种收入方式进行了分析;其次对于柜员的三种收入方式中银行、保险公司、银行柜员三者之间的博弈模型逐一进行了建立与求解;最后,对三种收入方式中求解得到的博弈结果进行了对比、讨论,并对三种收入方式的优劣进行了判断。 论文基于上述金融控股模式下主要博弈模型研究的结果并对比分析前人所研究的协议代理模式下手续费分配的结果,提出金融控股模式下银行保险合作各方共赢机制构建内容作为本文的结论,其主要内容包括以下三个方面: (1)金融控股模式下银行保险共赢机制构建的利益分配机制建设,主要包括合理制定大帐手续费率β的标准、按照合作产能制定透明的努力程度α的分配原则、制定合理的柜员激励机制和明确各方的责任承担机制等。 (2)金融控股模式下银行保险共赢机制构建的行业制度保障机制建设,主要包括银行母公司实施利益相关者关系管理、制定具有“强制约束力的协议”和形成明确的责任追究和惩处机制等。 (3)金融控股模式下银行保险共赢机制构建的社会制度保障机制建设,主要包括从监管、消费者、政府部门及其他社会团体的角度制定一些完善的社会制度作为保障等。 论文的创新之处在于: (1)深入分析了金融控股模式下银行保险合作的形式、流程、价值链活动、博弈树、主要经济主体的行为动机等要素,以及金融控股模式下银行保险合作的战略层、经济层、非经济层因素,并与协议代理模式下的相关要素进行了比较。 (2)通过对金融控股模式下银行保险合作各方复杂的多委托—代理博弈求解结果的分析,界定了博弈各方关于手续费率β分配的最优比例范围和银行母公司的努力程度α的分配原则。 (3)通过对金融控股模式下银行柜员三种收入方式中的复杂二重委托—代理博弈求解结果的分析,提出了银行保险柜员收入激励方式的选择、激励比例η范围和柜员努力程度α的分配原则。 (4)通过对银行母公司金融控股模式下银行保险合作主体间的多委托—代理博弈和银行柜员复杂的二重委托--代理博弈的分析,提出了金融控股模式下银行保险合作主体间共赢机制构建的内容。
[Abstract]:The development of bank insurance has gone through four modes of cooperation: the mode of agreement agency, the model of strategic alliance, the mode of equity cooperation and the mode of financial holding. No matter in the mode of cooperation, the win-win problem of the parties is the key to the cooperation, and the issue of the allocation of fees is the core of the win-win situation. The financial supervision system in the west is more important. Therefore, no matter what mode, all parties in the bank insurance cooperation can basically achieve a win-win situation. The domestic banking insurance is late, mainly with the mode of agreement agency. Due to the special characteristics of the domestic financial system, the domestic bank insurance procedures are serious, and the cooperation parties do not come true. A win-win situation.
With the gradual relaxation of the domestic financial regulatory mixed policy, the first domestic banking insurance company was established in China before and after 2010, marking the emergence of bank insurance under the domestic financial holding mode and showing a stronger momentum of development. Therefore, it is of great theoretical and practical significance for the healthy development of the domestic insurance and financial markets to establish a systematic study of the construction of the win-win mechanism of the cooperative parties under the more advanced financial holding mode.
The paper mainly includes the following three aspects:
(1) research on the related elements of bank insurance under the mode of financial holding. First, this paper studies the emergence, development and existing problems of bank insurance under the mode of financial holding. Secondly, it analyzes the cooperation form, the process of cooperation, the activity of value chain, the game tree and the main economic subject under the mode of financial holding. At last, it analyzes the strategic layer, economic layer and non economic layer of bank insurance cooperation between the bank parent company, the bank insurance subsidiary and the traditional insurance company under the financial holding mode.
(2) the complex multi principal agent game study of the bank insurance cooperation under the financial holding mode. According to the logic order of the cooperation of silver insurance, this paper studies the single principal agent game between the bank parent company and the traditional insurance company under the financial holding mode, and the single entrustment between the bank parent company and the bank insurance subsidiary. The agency game and the multi principal agent game between bank parent company and bank insurance subsidiaries and other traditional insurance companies.
(3) the complex dual principal-agent game study of the bank insurance teller under the financial holding mode. First, this paper analyzes the three income modes of the teller in the banking insurance business; secondly, the game model between the three kinds of income modes of the teller is established and sought one by one between the bank, the insurance company and the bank teller. Finally, the game results obtained from the three revenue methods are compared, discussed, and the merits and faults of the three income modes are judged.
On the basis of the results of the main game model under the above financial holding model and the comparison and analysis of the results of the fee distribution under the previous agreement agency model, the paper puts forward the conclusion of the construction content of the win-win mechanism of the all parties under the financial holding mode, and its main contents include the following three aspects:
(1) the construction of the benefit allocation mechanism constructed by the mutual benefit mechanism of the bank insurance under the financial holding mode mainly includes the standard of rationally making the rate beta of the big account formalities, formulating the distribution principle of transparent effort degree alpha according to the cooperative capacity, formulating the reasonable teller incentive mechanism and making clear the responsibility mechanism of each party.
(2) the construction of the industry system guarantee mechanism constructed by the win-win mechanism of bank insurance under the mode of financial holding, mainly including the implementation of stakeholder relationship management in the bank's parent company, the formulation of a "compulsory and binding agreement" and the formation of a clear mechanism of accountability and punishment.
(3) the construction of the social system guarantee mechanism for the construction of the win-win mechanism of the bank insurance under the mode of financial holding, mainly including the establishment of some perfect social systems as security from the perspective of supervision, consumers, government departments and other social groups.
The innovation of the thesis lies in:
(1) in-depth analysis of the form of banking insurance cooperation under the financial holding mode, process, value chain activities, game tree, the behavior motivation of the main economic subject, as well as the strategic layer, economic layer and non economic layer of the bank insurance cooperation under the financial holding mode, and compare the related elements under the protocol agency model.
(2) through the analysis of the complex multi principal agent game results of the bank insurance cooperative parties under the financial holding mode, the optimal proportion of the beta distribution of the formalities and the allocation principle of the degree of effort of the bank's parent company are defined.
(3) through the analysis of the results of the complex dual principal-agent game solution in the three income modes of the bank teller under the financial holding mode, the choice of the income incentive mode of the bank insurance teller, the scope of the incentive ratio and the distribution principle of the level of the effort of the teller are put forward.
(4) through the analysis of the multi principal-agent game between the main body of the bank insurance cooperation and the complex dual principal-agent game of the bank teller under the financial holding mode of the bank's parent company, this paper puts forward the content of the construction of the win-win mechanism between the main bodies of the bank insurance cooperation under the financial holding mode.
【学位授予单位】:昆明理工大学
【学位级别】:博士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F842;F832.2;F224.32

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