我国保险合同纠纷防范机制研究

发布时间：2018-06-15 09:20

本文选题：保险合同纠纷 + 防范机制　；参考：《西南财经大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：保险合同纠纷是与保险市场相生相伴的问题,一直存在,并在不断发展变化。近年来,随着电子信息技术的快速发展和人们维权意识的提高,保险合同纠纷呈现出新特点新动向。这些新特点新动向包括保险合同纠纷投诉数量全面快速增加、保险合同纠纷的社会效应不断扩大等。保险合同纠纷的存在不仅不利于保险消费者权益的保护、更不利于塑造保险业的形象。鉴于当下保险合同纠纷频发的严峻现实,从保险合同纠纷问题的根源出发,找出保险合同纠纷产生的原因、表现形式,建立完整而严密的保险合同纠纷防范机制以减少保险合同纠纷数量就很有理论和实践意义。本文主要研究我国的保险合同纠纷防范机制。保险合同纠纷实则是保险合同当事人之间的利益对抗,建立保险合同纠纷防范机制势必会对各主体的利益产生不同影响,所以本文从保险合同纠纷的特点、成因、表现形式出发,对保险合同纠纷防范机制涉及到的微观、中观、宏观主体行为选择进行分析,并在借鉴国外经验的基础上,对我国保险合同纠纷防范机制进行构建,同时也明确了保险人、政府、行业协会在保险合同纠纷防范机制中的地位和作用。本文共分5章内容,具体如下：第1章,保险合同纠纷防范机制概述。本部分主要包括保险合同纠纷的特点、成因、表现形式,并简要阐述本文中保险合同纠纷防范机制的基本框架和主要内容。第2章,保险合同纠纷防范机制分析。该章节是本论文的重点章。对保险合同纠纷防范机制中涉及到各主体的行为选择进行分析,包括保险人与投保人诚信选择的完全信息动态博弈,保险代理人和保险经理人行为选择的多任务委托代理模型分析以及保险人自律选择的不完全信息动态博弈分析。第3章,我国保险合同纠纷防范机制的现状及存在问题。该部分主要对我国保险合同纠纷防范机制中存在的问题进行分析。第4章,发达国家和地区保险合同纠纷防范机制的分析和比较。该部分对英、日及我国香港地区的保险合同纠纷防范机制进行分析和比较,以为我国提供有益的借鉴。第5章,我国保险合同纠纷防范机制的构建。在以上章节的基础上,通过各主体行为选择的分析以及借鉴国外经验的基础上,从宏观、中观、微观三个层面出发,构建我国相互支持、相互补充的保险合同纠纷防范机制。本文的特色和创新之处可能在于以下几点：首先研究视角可能具有新意。保险合同纠纷的相关文献主要是事后处理机制的研究,但是保险合同纠纷-旦发生,不仅会增加处理成本,而且给保险业带来的声誉损失也是巨大的。而对于保险合同纠纷事前的防范机制很少有人系统研究,目前也没有成型的结果,本文着重研究保险合同纠纷的防范机制。其次,在保险合同纠纷防范机制的分析这一章节中,分析微观、中观、宏观层面影响保险合同纠纷防范机制构建的因素时,运用了经济数学模型,包括多阶段动态博弈模型、多任务委托代理模型,声誉模型等。最后,在研究保险合同纠纷的类型时,运用了实证分析,并且数据来源于近2,3年保监会发布的最新数据。本文的不足之处在于以下几点：首先,本文中对于我国保险合同纠纷防范机制构建的建议是从理论角度,缺乏实践基础,因此是否能起作用尚不确定。其次,在保险纠纷防范机制的国际借鉴中,由于国外资料的获取有很大难度,所以有可能不能全面的进行对比分析,尤其是微观主体(保险人)其数量众多,保险合同纠纷防范也各具特点,很难一一获取。
[Abstract]:The dispute of insurance contract is a problem that is associated with the insurance market. It has always existed and has been developing and changing constantly. In recent years, with the rapid development of electronic information technology and the improvement of people's consciousness of safeguarding rights, the disputes of insurance contract show new characteristics and new trends. These new characteristics and new trends include the total and rapid increase of the number of disputes in insurance contracts. In addition, the social effect of insurance contract disputes is expanding constantly. The existence of insurance contract disputes is not only harmful to the protection of the rights and interests of the insurance consumers, but also not conducive to the image of the insurance industry. In view of the serious reality of the current disputes over the insurance contract, the reasons for the disputes arising from the insurance contract dispute are found out. It is of great theoretical and practical significance to establish a complete and strict insurance contract dispute prevention mechanism to reduce the number of disputes in insurance contracts.
This paper mainly studies the prevention mechanism of insurance contract disputes in our country. The dispute of insurance contract is actually the interest confrontation between the parties of the insurance contract, and the establishment of the mechanism of insurance contract dispute is bound to have different effects on the interests of the various subjects. Therefore, this article starts with the characteristics, causes and forms of the insurance contract disputes and the insurance contract. The mechanism of dispute prevention involves the analysis of microcosmic, meso, macro subject behavior selection, and on the basis of foreign experience, the mechanism of insurance contract dispute prevention in China is constructed, and the status and role of the insurer, the government and the industry association in the anti model mechanism of the insurance contract dispute are also clarified.
This article is divided into 5 chapters, which are as follows:
The first chapter, the overview of the insurance contract dispute prevention mechanism. This part mainly includes the characteristics, causes, forms of the insurance contract disputes, and briefly expounds the basic framework and main contents of the insurance contract dispute prevention mechanism in this article.
The second chapter is the analysis of the insurance contract dispute prevention mechanism. This chapter is the key chapter of this paper. It analyzes the behavior selection of the main body in the insurance contract dispute prevention mechanism, including the full information dynamic game of the insurer and the insurant's good faith selection, the multi task principal agent of the insurance agent and the insurance manager's behavior choice. Model analysis and incomplete information dynamic game analysis of self-regulation of insurers.
The third chapter is the current situation and existing problems of China's insurance contract dispute prevention mechanism. This part mainly analyzes the existing problems in China's insurance contract dispute prevention mechanism.
The fourth chapter, the analysis and comparison of the prevention mechanism of the insurance contract disputes in the developed countries and regions. This part analyses and compares the insurance contract dispute prevention mechanism in Britain, Japan and the Hongkong region of our country, in order to provide useful reference for our country.
The fifth chapter, the construction of China's insurance contract dispute prevention mechanism. On the basis of the above chapters, on the basis of the analysis of the behavior selection of the main body and the experience of foreign countries, from the macro, meso and micro three levels, we build our mutual support and complementary insurance contract dispute prevention mechanism.
The characteristics and innovation of this article may be the following points: first of all, the research perspective may be new. The related literature of the insurance contract disputes is mainly the study of the post-processing mechanism, but the insurance contract dispute, denier, will not only increase the cost of treatment, but also bring a huge reputation loss to the insurance industry. There are few systematic researches on the prevention mechanism of contract disputes, and there is no result at present. This paper focuses on the prevention mechanism of disputes in insurance contracts.
Secondly, in the analysis of the insurance contract dispute prevention mechanism, the economic mathematical model, including multi-stage dynamic game model, multi-task principal-agent model, reputation model, is used to analyze the factors affecting the construction of insurance contract dispute prevention mechanism in the micro, meso and macro level.
Finally, when studying the types of insurance contract disputes, we use the empirical analysis, and the data come from the latest data released by the CIRC in recent 2,3 years.
The inadequacies of this paper are the following points: first, the suggestions for the construction of China's insurance contract dispute prevention mechanism are from the theoretical point of view, the lack of practical basis, so it is not sure whether it can play a role.
Secondly, in the international reference of the insurance dispute prevention mechanism, the acquisition of foreign information is very difficult, so it may not be completely contrastive analysis, especially the large number of the micro body (the insurer), and the insurance contract dispute prevention is also of various characteristics, it is difficult to obtain one by one.
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F842.3

【参考文献】