董事高管责任保险与企业风险承担:理论路径与经验证据

发布时间：2018-07-06 14:14

本文选题：董事高管责任保险 + 企业风险承担　；参考：《会计研究》2017年05期

【摘要】：董事高管责任保险对管理者财产风险存在"兜底"效应,有助于缓解管理者的风险规避等代理冲突,但同时也可能导致管理者自利成本降低从而诱发潜在的道德风险。为此,本文以2007-2013年中国A股上市公司为样本,考察了董事高管责任保险对企业风险承担的影响并对其作用机制进行了检验。研究发现,引入董事高管责任保险有助于增加企业风险承担;在控制了内生性等问题之后,该结论依然成立。对作用机制的分析表明,董事高管责任保险主要通过"激励效应"提升企业风险承担,而"道德风险效应"没有得到支持。本文是基于企业风险承担视角对董事高管责任保险的首次研究尝试,对于深入理解董事高管责任保险在资本市场中的作用角色具有重要意义。
[Abstract]:Directors' liability insurance has a "bottom" effect on managers' property risk, which helps to alleviate agency conflicts such as risk aversion, but at the same time, it may lead to the reduction of self-interest cost of managers and induce potential moral hazard. Therefore, this paper takes China A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2013 as a sample to examine the impact of directors' liability insurance on corporate risk-taking and its mechanism of action. It is found that the introduction of directors' liability insurance helps to increase the risk taking of enterprises, and the conclusion is still true after controlling the endogenous problems. The analysis of the mechanism of action shows that the liability insurance of directors and executives mainly promotes the enterprise's risk taking through the "incentive effect", but the "moral hazard effect" is not supported. This paper is the first attempt to study directors' liability insurance from the perspective of enterprise risk taking, which is of great significance to understand the role of directors' liability insurance in the capital market.
【作者单位】：海南大学经济与管理学院;暨南大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71562010)的资助
【分类号】：F271;F272.3;F842.69

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