社会养老保险的道德风险及规避研究
发布时间：2018-08-28 12:21
【摘要】：社会养老保险是世界各国社会保障体系的核心内容，往往决定着一国社会保障体系建设的成败。根据人力资源和社会保障部统计的数据，截至2011年底，我国城镇职工基本养老保险、新型农村社会养老保险、城镇居民社会养老保险参保人数共计6.473亿人，基金收入18005亿元，社会养老保险范围迅速扩大，待遇水平进一步提高。可见经过20多年的改革，我国社会养老保险改革与制度建设取得了很大成就，，现行制度惠及越来越多的劳动者与退休人员。但社会养老保险的道德风险随之产生，并伴随着社会养老保险事业的发展而不断加重、蔓延，其多重破坏性极大地影响了社会养老保险制度的正常运作。能否有效规避社会养老保险领域的道德风险，将直接影响我国社会保障事业的发展与成败。 本文从社会养老保险道德风险的表现及影响、诱因等角度出发，理论与实际相结合，对社会养老保险的道德风险及规避进行了研究。研究发现，我国社会养老保险道德风险主要体现在相关利益主体及养老保险金的管理过程中。被保险人、企业、政府以及代理人的道德风险严重侵占了社会养老保险基金，加重了国家的财政负担，违背了诚信原则，破坏了社会公平。通过对社会养老保险道德风险表现的分析，可以看出是信息不对称、人的机会主义倾向以及社会养老保险体系的不健全导致了社会养老保险道德风险。综合分析社会养老保险道德风险的表现及诱因后，易得出规避道德风险的途径，即建立信息公开化、透明化的社会养老保险运行机制，建立利益激励和约束机制，完善社会养老保险体系。规避、遏制社会养老保险道德风险有力地保障了我国社会养老保险基金的安全，减轻了国家的财政负担，有助于促进社会公平和谐发展。
[Abstract]:Social old-age insurance is the core content of the social security system in the world, which often determines the success or failure of the construction of a country's social security system. According to statistics from the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, by the end of 2011, the total number of urban workers' basic old-age insurance, new rural social old-age insurance and urban residents' social old-age insurance was 647.3 million, and the income of the fund was 1.8005 trillion yuan. The scope of social endowment insurance has expanded rapidly and the level of treatment has been further improved. It can be seen that after more than 20 years of reform, great achievements have been made in the reform and system construction of social old-age insurance in China, and the current system has benefited more and more workers and retirees. However, the moral hazard of the social endowment insurance is produced, and with the development of the social endowment insurance, it is aggravated and spread, which has greatly affected the normal operation of the social pension insurance system. Whether we can effectively avoid the moral hazard in the field of social endowment insurance will directly affect the development and success of social security in China. This paper studies the moral hazard and circumvention of social endowment insurance from the angle of expression and influence of moral hazard and inducement of social endowment insurance, combining theory with practice. It is found that the moral hazard of social endowment insurance in China is mainly reflected in the management process of the relevant stakeholders and pension insurance funds. The moral hazard of the insured, enterprise, government and agent has seriously encroached on the social endowment insurance fund, increased the financial burden of the country, violated the principle of good faith and destroyed the social equity. Through the analysis of the moral hazard of social endowment insurance, we can see that the information asymmetry, the opportunism tendency of human and the unsound social endowment insurance system lead to the moral risk of social endowment insurance. After synthetically analyzing the expression and inducement of moral hazard of social endowment insurance, it is easy to find out the way to avoid moral hazard, that is, to establish the operation mechanism of social endowment insurance with open information, transparent social pension insurance, and interest incentive and restriction mechanism. We will improve the social endowment insurance system. Circumventing and containing the moral hazard of social endowment insurance can ensure the security of social endowment insurance fund, lighten the financial burden of the country, and help to promote the fair and harmonious development of the society.
【学位授予单位】：河南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F842.67
本文编号：2209382
[Abstract]:Social old-age insurance is the core content of the social security system in the world, which often determines the success or failure of the construction of a country's social security system. According to statistics from the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, by the end of 2011, the total number of urban workers' basic old-age insurance, new rural social old-age insurance and urban residents' social old-age insurance was 647.3 million, and the income of the fund was 1.8005 trillion yuan. The scope of social endowment insurance has expanded rapidly and the level of treatment has been further improved. It can be seen that after more than 20 years of reform, great achievements have been made in the reform and system construction of social old-age insurance in China, and the current system has benefited more and more workers and retirees. However, the moral hazard of the social endowment insurance is produced, and with the development of the social endowment insurance, it is aggravated and spread, which has greatly affected the normal operation of the social pension insurance system. Whether we can effectively avoid the moral hazard in the field of social endowment insurance will directly affect the development and success of social security in China. This paper studies the moral hazard and circumvention of social endowment insurance from the angle of expression and influence of moral hazard and inducement of social endowment insurance, combining theory with practice. It is found that the moral hazard of social endowment insurance in China is mainly reflected in the management process of the relevant stakeholders and pension insurance funds. The moral hazard of the insured, enterprise, government and agent has seriously encroached on the social endowment insurance fund, increased the financial burden of the country, violated the principle of good faith and destroyed the social equity. Through the analysis of the moral hazard of social endowment insurance, we can see that the information asymmetry, the opportunism tendency of human and the unsound social endowment insurance system lead to the moral risk of social endowment insurance. After synthetically analyzing the expression and inducement of moral hazard of social endowment insurance, it is easy to find out the way to avoid moral hazard, that is, to establish the operation mechanism of social endowment insurance with open information, transparent social pension insurance, and interest incentive and restriction mechanism. We will improve the social endowment insurance system. Circumventing and containing the moral hazard of social endowment insurance can ensure the security of social endowment insurance fund, lighten the financial burden of the country, and help to promote the fair and harmonious development of the society.
【学位授予单位】：河南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F842.67
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前2条
1 郑功成;;《社会保险法》:我国社会保障法制建设的里程碑[J];中国劳动;2011年01期
2 郝文清;;道德风险的防范与化解[J];社会科学家;2011年05期
本文编号：2209382
本文链接：https://www.wllwen.com/jingjilunwen/bxjjlw/2209382.html
