基因检测技术进步对我国人身保险的影响研究
发布时间：2018-09-09 11:01
【摘要】：由基因检测技术的创新带来的基因检测成本的降低和检测时间的缩短,首先影响着我们的医学领域,为其诊疗疾病提供了新的思路。但同时基因检测技术的创新性发展也影响了其他领域,主要包括保险和就业领域。本文主要针对基因检测技术进步对人身保险领域的影响进行探讨。 一方面,在人身保险市场基因检测技术的进步,保险人面临的首要的问题为将是否使用基因信息作为承保的条件。投保人则以基因隐私权和平等权来反对这种“基因歧视”。目前在人身保险核保过程中,是否允许保险人使用基因信息存在较大的争议：伦理学家和法学家呼吁禁止基因歧视,目前欧美等一些国家立法也以禁止保险公司在人身保险核保过程中使用基因信息为主。我国在立法方面应借鉴发达国家立法经验,同时应综合考虑国内保险市场和医疗市场的发展状况。 另一方面,保险市场有其独有的运行规则,保险人遵循“保费负担公平原则”和“风险选择原则”。保险人根据所面临的风险大小而确定相应的保险费率,例如在身体状况相同的情况下,一个吸烟者的费率将会比一个不吸烟者的费率高,同时保险公司可以拒绝承保具有高风险的保险标的。因此保险业得以有效运行正是基于这种建立在保险精算基础上的“区别对待”。因此,立法的任务在于寻找人身保险核保过程中基因信息合理使用的评判标准,并依此建立法律制度以规制保险公司在核保过程中对基因信息的使用,平衡保险公司与投保人双方的利益与成本。 现阶段基因检测技术尚未大规模普及,除了已经发现单一致病基因与疾病发生之间具有确定的关系之外,大部分致病基因与疾病发生机理还未确定。为防止保险人滥用基因信息,造成对投保人的基因歧视,我们应首先确立在一般情况下禁止保险人使用基因信息的法律。 随着基因检测技术的进一步发展,基因检测成本进一步降低,投保人将可以自行检测以获知个体基因信息,形成投保人信息优势。通过博弈分析发现,投保人将出现逆向选择,此时由于保险人受制于一般禁止性的基因歧视原则,无法对所面临的基因风险进行合理区分,最终将破坏商业保险市场的正常运行,使得保险人因无法获得利润而退出市场。 基因检测成本的下降,使得个体的基因信息将更加容易获取,未来基因技术进一步发展以及临床统计数据库建立后,基因与未来疾病的发生关系将更加精确。为维护保险市场的正常运行,这时将会允许保险双方都可以使用基因信息,这时人身保险所涉及的风险将会发生演变：(1)身体不含致病基因的个体将不再投保人身保险；(2)必然致病的个体将被拒保；(3)保险人所承保风险将为介于前两者之间的风险。可保风险的分类也将更加细化,导致大数定律赖以使用的基数变小。同时,随着基因技术进步这项客观条件的不断变化,过去的经验用于预测未来情况存在溢出风险。这时,大数定律可能逐渐失效。 本文共分六章： 第1章绪论。 第2章基因检测技术的革新性发展。本章从基因检测技术出现以来开始论述,主要论述了进入新世纪后检测技术的飞速进步所带来的在基因检测领域的革新性发展。本章还将对基因体检与常规体检进行区别分析,同时对基因信息与常规检测信息之间的异同进行论述。通过本章论述,主要阐述革新性的新一代基因检测技术,造成检测成本大幅降低,作为本文论文论述的现实背景。同时对基因检测技术与人身保险的关系的研究进行相关论述。 第3章基因歧视与基因立法。本章从基因歧视的概念入手,对目前国内外人身保险领域存在的基因歧视问题进行了梳理。 第4章保险双方使用基因检测技术产生的问题及博弈分析。本章通过博弈分析,得出未来随着基因检测技术的发展,保险双方对是否使用基因信息将会经历两次博弈,形成三个阶段。第一阶段为一般性禁止保险人使用基因信息的第一阶段,第二阶段投保人大量进行逆向选择阶段,第三阶段保险双方均可利用基因信息阶段。 第5章基因检测技术进步对我国人身保险市场的影响。本章在前文分析的基础上,首先针对目前各国针对保险领域基因歧视的立法进行了简单评析,同时借鉴国外立法状况,在目前阶段的我国立法给出良好的建议。然后从健康保险和寿险领域内分别进行分析,探讨基因技术发展带来的机遇和挑战。 第6章主要结论与展望。
[Abstract]:The cost reduction and time reduction of gene detection brought by the innovation of gene detection technology first affect our medical field and provide new ideas for the diagnosis and treatment of diseases. But the innovation of gene detection technology also affects other fields, including insurance and employment. The impact of measurement technology progress on the field of life insurance is discussed.
On the one hand, with the advancement of genetic testing technology in the life insurance market, the most important question for insurers is whether to use genetic information as a condition of insurance coverage. In the larger controversy: ethicists and jurists call for the prohibition of genetic discrimination. At present, legislation in some countries, such as Europe and America, mainly prohibits insurance companies from using genetic information in the process of life insurance verification. Show the situation.
On the other hand, the insurance market has its own rules, the insurer follows the "fair premium burden principle" and "risk selection principle". The insurer determines the corresponding premium rate according to the risk faced, for example, in the same physical condition, a smoker's premium rate will be higher than a non-smoker's premium rate. Therefore, the effective operation of the insurance industry is based on this "differential treatment" based on the actuarial basis. Therefore, the task of legislation is to find the criteria for judging the rational use of genetic information in the process of life insurance verification and insurance, and establish a legal system accordingly. To regulate the use of genetic information by insurance companies in the process of checking insurance, and balance the interests and costs of both the insurance company and the insured.
In order to prevent the insurer from abusing genetic information and causing genetic discrimination against the insured, we should first establish the general situation. The law prohibits insurers from using genetic information.
With the further development of genetic testing technology, the cost of genetic testing will be further reduced, and the insured will be able to detect their own genetic information to obtain the information superiority of the insured. Reasonable differentiation of genetic risks will eventually destroy the normal operation of the commercial insurance market and make insurers withdraw from the market because they can not make profits.
In order to maintain the normal operation of the insurance market, both insurers and insurers will be allowed to use genetic information. When the risk involved in life insurance will evolve: (1) the body does not contain pathogenic genes will no longer be insured; (2) the inevitable pathogenic individuals will be rejected; (3) the insurer's insurance risk will be between the first two risks. The classification of insurable risks will also be more refined, leading to the basis on which the law of large numbers is based. At the same time, as the objective condition of genetic technology advances, past experience is used to predict future spillover risks. At this time, the law of large numbers may gradually become invalid.
This article is divided into six chapters.
The first chapter is introduction.
Chapter 2: Innovative Development of Gene Detection Technology. This chapter begins with the appearance of Gene Detection Technology, mainly discusses the innovative development in the field of gene detection brought about by the rapid progress of detection technology in the new century. The difference and similarity between the detection information are discussed. Through this chapter, the innovative new generation of gene detection technology, resulting in a significant reduction in detection costs, as the realistic background of this paper. At the same time, the relationship between gene detection technology and life insurance is discussed.
Chapter 3 Gene Discrimination and Gene Legislation. Starting from the concept of genetic discrimination, this chapter combs the current problems of genetic discrimination in the field of life insurance at home and abroad.
Chapter 4: Problems and Game Analysis of Gene Detection Technology Used by Insurers and Insurers The second stage involves a large number of adverse selection stages, and the third stage involves the use of genetic information by both parties.
Chapter 5: The impact of genetic testing technology progress on China's life insurance market. On the basis of the previous analysis, this chapter firstly makes a brief comment on the legislation against genetic discrimination in the field of insurance in various countries, and at the same time draws lessons from foreign legislative situation, gives good suggestions in the current stage of China's legislation. In the field of insurance, we analyzed the opportunities and challenges brought about by the development of genetic technology.
The sixth chapter is the main conclusion and prospect.
【学位授予单位】：东北财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：R440;F842.62
本文编号：2232187
[Abstract]:The cost reduction and time reduction of gene detection brought by the innovation of gene detection technology first affect our medical field and provide new ideas for the diagnosis and treatment of diseases. But the innovation of gene detection technology also affects other fields, including insurance and employment. The impact of measurement technology progress on the field of life insurance is discussed.
On the one hand, with the advancement of genetic testing technology in the life insurance market, the most important question for insurers is whether to use genetic information as a condition of insurance coverage. In the larger controversy: ethicists and jurists call for the prohibition of genetic discrimination. At present, legislation in some countries, such as Europe and America, mainly prohibits insurance companies from using genetic information in the process of life insurance verification. Show the situation.
On the other hand, the insurance market has its own rules, the insurer follows the "fair premium burden principle" and "risk selection principle". The insurer determines the corresponding premium rate according to the risk faced, for example, in the same physical condition, a smoker's premium rate will be higher than a non-smoker's premium rate. Therefore, the effective operation of the insurance industry is based on this "differential treatment" based on the actuarial basis. Therefore, the task of legislation is to find the criteria for judging the rational use of genetic information in the process of life insurance verification and insurance, and establish a legal system accordingly. To regulate the use of genetic information by insurance companies in the process of checking insurance, and balance the interests and costs of both the insurance company and the insured.
In order to prevent the insurer from abusing genetic information and causing genetic discrimination against the insured, we should first establish the general situation. The law prohibits insurers from using genetic information.
With the further development of genetic testing technology, the cost of genetic testing will be further reduced, and the insured will be able to detect their own genetic information to obtain the information superiority of the insured. Reasonable differentiation of genetic risks will eventually destroy the normal operation of the commercial insurance market and make insurers withdraw from the market because they can not make profits.
In order to maintain the normal operation of the insurance market, both insurers and insurers will be allowed to use genetic information. When the risk involved in life insurance will evolve: (1) the body does not contain pathogenic genes will no longer be insured; (2) the inevitable pathogenic individuals will be rejected; (3) the insurer's insurance risk will be between the first two risks. The classification of insurable risks will also be more refined, leading to the basis on which the law of large numbers is based. At the same time, as the objective condition of genetic technology advances, past experience is used to predict future spillover risks. At this time, the law of large numbers may gradually become invalid.
This article is divided into six chapters.
The first chapter is introduction.
Chapter 2: Innovative Development of Gene Detection Technology. This chapter begins with the appearance of Gene Detection Technology, mainly discusses the innovative development in the field of gene detection brought about by the rapid progress of detection technology in the new century. The difference and similarity between the detection information are discussed. Through this chapter, the innovative new generation of gene detection technology, resulting in a significant reduction in detection costs, as the realistic background of this paper. At the same time, the relationship between gene detection technology and life insurance is discussed.
Chapter 3 Gene Discrimination and Gene Legislation. Starting from the concept of genetic discrimination, this chapter combs the current problems of genetic discrimination in the field of life insurance at home and abroad.
Chapter 4: Problems and Game Analysis of Gene Detection Technology Used by Insurers and Insurers The second stage involves a large number of adverse selection stages, and the third stage involves the use of genetic information by both parties.
Chapter 5: The impact of genetic testing technology progress on China's life insurance market. On the basis of the previous analysis, this chapter firstly makes a brief comment on the legislation against genetic discrimination in the field of insurance in various countries, and at the same time draws lessons from foreign legislative situation, gives good suggestions in the current stage of China's legislation. In the field of insurance, we analyzed the opportunities and challenges brought about by the development of genetic technology.
The sixth chapter is the main conclusion and prospect.
【学位授予单位】：东北财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：R440;F842.62
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