董事高管责任保险的公司治理作用——基于双重代理成本的视角

发布时间：2019-03-14 07:37

【摘要】：董事高管责任险是公司金融与公司治理领域研究的热点问题,但是其治理职能并未得到一致的认可。本文以2009-2015年沪深上市公司为研究样本,运用混合截面最小二乘法、Heckman两阶段分析法及倾向得分样本匹配等多种方法实证检验了董事高管责任险的多个变量与上市公司第一类和第二类代理成本之间的关系。研究结果表明:董事高管责任险的引入、引入时间长度、保险金额及相对保险金额等变量能够有效地降低上市公司第一类和第二类代理成本,表明董事高管责任险具有激励效应和监督效应,是一个有效的公司治理机制;同时,根据产权性质分组研究发现,董事高管责任险对非国有控股上市公司的治理作用比对国有控股上市公司的治理作用更强。研究建议深化对董事高管责任险治理机制的研究,并加强促进其治理职能发挥的制度与环境建设。
[Abstract]:Director and executive liability insurance is a hot issue in the field of corporate finance and corporate governance, but its governance function has not been unanimously recognized. This paper takes Shanghai and Shenzhen listed companies from 2009 to 2015 as the research sample, and uses the mixed cross-section least square method. Heckman two-stage analysis and sample matching of tendency scores are used to test the relationship between the various variables of directors' liability insurance and the agency costs of the first and second types of listed companies. The results show that the introduction of directors' liability insurance, the length of time, the amount of insurance and the relative amount of insurance can effectively reduce the agency costs of the first and second categories of listed companies. It shows that directors' liability insurance has incentive effect and supervision effect, and it is an effective corporate governance mechanism. At the same time, according to the nature of property rights, it is found that directors' executive liability insurance has a stronger governance effect on non-state-owned listed companies than on state-owned holding listed companies. It is suggested to deepen the research on the governance mechanism of directors' and executives' liability insurance and to strengthen the system and environment construction to promote its management function.
【作者单位】：山东大学商学院;
【基金】：山东省社科规划项目“金融结构优化与经济增长方式转变关系研究”(15CJJJ16)
【分类号】：F271;F842.6

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