电力市场竞价模式的博弈分析
发布时间:2018-01-28 22:04
本文关键词: 发电侧电力市场 差价合约模式 有限竞价模式 博弈均衡 出处:《东南大学》2004年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文
【摘要】:2002 年底,国家电力公司正式“厂网分开”,新成立了五大发电集团和两 家电网公司,为实行发电商竞价上网奠定了坚实的基础,标志着中国电力市场化 改革已迈出了关键的一步。在竞价上网的过程中,所有的发电公司都想使自身的 收益最大化,而电网公司却想使购电费用最小化。在建立电力市场过程中,找到 一种有效合理的竞价模式就显得很重要,既激励发电企业强化管理、提高效率, 从而降低了上网电价,又要考虑到电力改革的市场风险与平稳过渡。 本文对国内试点的两种竞价模式(差价合约模式与有限竞价模式)进行了深 入研究与分析,揭示了两种竞价模式的本质区别在于发电商的上网电量小于合约 电量时收益的结算差别;运用博弈论、微观经济学、电力市场理论的相关部分分 析了在发电侧电力市场中,各发电公司和电网公司面对两种竞价模式的博弈行 为,基于发电商竞价是完全信息博弈模型,相继分析了一次性博弈和重复博弈的 均衡;在分析重复博弈时,研究了发电商合作的必要条件,为竞价规则的设计提 供了防止发电商合谋的思路;在完全信息静态博弈的基础上,建立了在两种竞价 模式下,由多个发电商参加的产量博弈模型,并给出了数学解;最后在综合比较 两种竞价模式的基础上,本文提出了某个区域电网的电源结构对选择竞价模式的 影响。 本文主要是为当前的中国电力市场改革的实施提供一些理论支持,希望通过 对竞价模式的理论研究,深化对中国电力工业市场化改革的认识。
[Abstract]:In end of 2002, the State Power Company officially "separated the power plant and network", and set up five major power generation groups and two new power generation groups. The home appliance network company has laid a solid foundation for the implementation of power generation companies bidding for the Internet, marking the marketization of electricity in China. The reform has taken a crucial step. In the bidding process, all the power generation companies want to make their own While grid companies want to minimize the cost of buying electricity, they want to maximize revenue. In the process of building a power market, find An effective and reasonable bidding model is very important, which not only motivates power generation enterprises to strengthen management, but also improves efficiency. Therefore, the electricity price is reduced, and the market risk and smooth transition of electric power reform should be taken into account. In this paper, two bidding modes (contract for difference model and limited bidding model) are discussed in detail. Through research and analysis, it is revealed that the essential difference between the two bidding modes lies in the fact that the power on the net of the generator is less than the contract. The difference of income between electricity and electricity; applying Game Theory, Microeconomics, and relevant parts of electricity Market Theory In the generation side electricity market, each generation company and the power grid company face the game of two bidding modes. Based on the complete information game model, the one-off game and the repeated game are analyzed one after another. In the analysis of repeated game, the necessary condition of power generation cooperation is studied, which is proposed for the design of bidding rules. On the basis of static game of complete information, two kinds of bidding are established. In this paper, the output game model with the participation of multiple generators is given, and the mathematical solution is given. Finally, a comprehensive comparison is made On the basis of two bidding modes, this paper proposes a new method for selecting bidding modes in a regional power grid. Influence This paper is mainly to provide some theoretical support for the implementation of the current reform of China's electricity market. The theoretical research on the bidding mode, deepening the understanding of the market-oriented reform of China's electric power industry.
【学位授予单位】:东南大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2004
【分类号】:F407.61
【引证文献】
相关硕士学位论文 前7条
1 顾洪超;基于演化博弈论的发电商竞价行为的研究[D];华北电力大学(北京);2011年
2 邓琳玮;我国电力价格两部制竞价上网机制研究[D];北京工商大学;2010年
3 杨根;水电厂发电报价策略及其辅助决策系统研究[D];贵州大学;2006年
4 刘建良;水电厂报价决策支持系统研究[D];贵州大学;2007年
5 朱江艳;基于Repast仿真平台的发电商演化博弈竞价策略研究[D];华北电力大学(北京);2010年
6 李海澎;企业电力负荷特性及需求侧管理技术措施的研究[D];华北电力大学(河北);2009年
7 朱维莹;随机演化博弈模型在发电市场的应用及分析[D];华北电力大学;2012年
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