YLG公司股权激励问题研究
发布时间:2018-03-24 16:36
本文选题:股权激励 切入点:报酬契约 出处:《湘潭大学》2014年硕士论文
【摘要】:改革开放以来,随着中国资本市场的运行逐步走上正轨,融资融券的方法逐渐成熟与完善,吸引了广大的投资者参与资本市场的运营,而资本市场的壮大带动了上市公司的发展。通过资本市场的运营和资金的融通,,投资者的利益和上市公司的业绩表现、分红政策等紧密的联系在了一起。然而近年来却出现一些上市公司财务绩效亏损,但管理层却能获得丰厚回报的“怪”现象,对企业的正常发展、市场的有序运营产生了一定的影响,也损害了投资者和所有者的利益。本文以股权激励对企业的影响为研究对象,从股权激励设计,财务绩效等系列相关因素着手,综合分析上市公司YLG公司的股权激励和财务绩效表现数据,探讨了股权激励的效果和对企业产生的财务绩效的影响。 文章首先对股权激励的源头—管理层报酬契约的两种重要理论进行了总结。一般认为,委托—代理理论下的利益趋同效应和激励理论的应用可以对上市公司的长期股权激励提供理论基础。现代企业中,运用合理的管理层股权激励能够对公司管理层起到激励作用。随后本文分析了上市公司YLG公司的股权激励方案和之后的财务绩效表现,并发现YLG公司在施行股权激励方案以后,公司的财务绩效反而出现了停滞和下滑。在对YLG公司的进一步研究发现中,本文探讨了YLG公司股权激励方案的预期效果与实际财务绩效不一致的原因。最后,在综合了同行业数据经验数据对比和股权激励设计方法后,本文对YLG公司的股权激励方案的设计和财务绩效评价提出了一些优化的建议。 本文的研究创造性的从管理层报酬契约和企业财务绩效的激励效用角度入手,对上市公司YLG的股权激励方案对企业的实际影响进行了分析,拓展了关于企业设计和实施股权激励政策的理论深度,并提供了实际的应用和指导,丰富了股权激励理论的范围和应用层次。由于本文选取的YLG公司在行业内具有一定的代表性,其选用的股权激励制度等系列管理层政策无论是在行业内还是市场表现都有重要的借鉴意义和经验教训。因此,文章的研究思路与方法,加之以实践数据的分析能够帮助其他上市公司提供一定的参考,并对未来市场的良好运行与规范化的治理提供经验。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, with the operation of China's capital market gradually on the right track, the method of margin financing has gradually matured and improved, attracting the vast number of investors to participate in the operation of the capital market. And the growth of the capital market has led to the development of listed companies. Through the operation of the capital market and the financing of funds, the interests of investors and the performance of listed companies, However, in recent years, there have been some financial performance losses of listed companies, but the "strange" phenomenon of management being able to obtain substantial returns has brought about the normal development of enterprises. The orderly operation of the market has a certain impact on the interests of investors and owners. This paper focuses on the impact of equity incentive on enterprises, starting with a series of related factors, such as equity incentive design, financial performance, etc. This paper comprehensively analyzes the data of equity incentive and financial performance of listed company YLG, and probes into the effect of equity incentive and its influence on the financial performance of enterprise. This paper first summarizes the two important theories of management compensation contract, which is the source of equity incentive. The benefit convergence effect under principal-agent theory and the application of incentive theory can provide the theoretical basis for the long-term equity incentive of listed companies. Then this paper analyzes the equity incentive scheme and financial performance of listed company YLG, and finds out that YLG company has implemented the equity incentive scheme after the implementation of the equity incentive scheme. On the contrary, the financial performance of the company has stagnated and declined. In the further study of YLG Company, this paper discusses the reasons why the expected effect of the equity incentive scheme of YLG Company is not consistent with the actual financial performance. After synthesizing the empirical data of the same industry and the design method of equity incentive, this paper puts forward some optimized suggestions for the design of equity incentive scheme and the evaluation of financial performance of YLG Company. From the angle of management compensation contract and incentive utility of enterprise financial performance, this paper creatively analyzes the actual influence of YLG's equity incentive scheme on the enterprise. It expands the theoretical depth of designing and implementing equity incentive policy, and provides practical application and guidance. It enriches the scope and application level of equity incentive theory. Because the YLG company selected in this paper is representative in the industry, The series of management policies, such as equity incentive system and so on, have important reference significance and experience and lessons in both industry and market performance. Therefore, the research ideas and methods of this article, In addition, the analysis of practical data can help other listed companies to provide some reference, and to provide experience for the good operation and standardized governance of the future market.
【学位授予单位】:湘潭大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F272.92;F426.82
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