WTO争端解决机制下我国资源性产品出口限制争端研究
发布时间:2018-05-09 15:32
本文选题:WTO争端解决机制 + 出口限制 ; 参考:《西南财经大学》2014年硕士论文
【摘要】:随着中国经济持续的高速发展,中国对于资源性产品的需求也越来越大,许多资源需要进口才能满足本国的需求,比如石油和铁矿石。但是仍然存在少数的资源性产品,中国的存储量排在世界前列,比如稀土等。巨大储蓄量使得中国在这类产品上一直处于出口的态势。最近几年,随着其他一些国家逐渐减少国内战略性资源的开采量,国际资源性产品的价格逐渐上升。由此带来的结果是中国在稀土等战略性资源产品的开采量上逐渐增大,比如说稀土的开采量已经占到世界总的开采量的95%以上。虽然这些资源性产品的出口能够在一定程度上带动经济的发展,但是因为不合理的开采使得开采地的环境遭到严重破坏。同时,中国政府逐渐意识到以稀土为代表的战略性资源产品对于我国经济的可持续发展、政治和军事安全的重要作用。正是基于这种认识,中国政府采取了各种法律和行政法规措施来限制资源性产品的开采量,例如对资源的出口实施配额和征收关税等。中国政府的这些措施在一定程度上减少了资源的开采量,保护了国内的环境和资源,但是欧美等发达国家却申诉到WTO,认为中国政府的限制措施损害了他们的利益,违反了WTO的相关规则。WTO成员国之间的纷争通常都会通过WTO争端解决机制解决,而WTO争端解决机制能够用动态博弈解释。同时资源性产品出口限制案件在WTO争端解决机制下同样能够用动态博弈的方法分析,因此本文利用动态博弈的方法结合WTO争端解决机制来分析中国的资源出口限制管理。对于中国的资源出口限制管理,多数的国内学者也是利用理论的方法来分析,而本文则采用案例分析的形式来研究中国的资源性产品出口限制管理,并对其提出具体的政策建议。在涉及中国资源性产品出口限制的案件中,又以欧盟、美国和墨西哥申诉中国原材料出口限制案和稀土案最为典型,.所以本文以中国原材料出口限制案和稀土案作为案例分析的对象。 在描述和分析中国资源性产品的出口限制措施现状的基础上,本文利用动态博弈分析了WTO争端解决机制,并求出了争端当事双方的最优策略解,以及在争端解决机制的每一阶段当事双方在不同环境下的行为选择。接下来本文结合中国原材料出口限制案和稀土案件分析了中国在该机制条件下的行为选择是否合理。 在经过上述分析之后,本文得到了如下有关结论:(1)一般而言,WTO争端解决机制进行到上述执行阶段就结束了,主要是因为相对执行成本而言,不执行WTO决议的成本要高很多;(2)在WTO争端解决机制中,多个阶段存在占优策略,这些阶段主要包括报复实施阶段、上述执行阶段、以及申诉阶段;(3)中国在原材料出口限制案的行为选择是合理的,但存在不足,而在稀土案中的行为选择就克服了这些不足。 结合运用动态博弈分析WTO争端解决机制的结论和案例分析的结果,本文对中国资源性产品出口限制管理提出了如下政策建议:(1)我国利用WTO争端解决机制的对策,比如“重视磋商”、“依法应对”、“区别对待”、“掌握主动”和“积累经验”的指导思想,以及借鉴中国原材料出口限制案中的行为选择,和我国应该增强应对WTO争端的处置能力;(2)修改与WTO规则不符的国内法,国内法与WTO规则的不符是导致其他国家申诉我国的主要原因。 纵观全文,本文的创新之处主要存在以下几个方面:(1)在研究方法上本文采用动态博弈模型分析了WTO争端解决机制,同时利用案例分析法研究了中国资源性产品的出口限制问题;(2)在进行案例分析时,本文主要分析在WTO争端解决机制下中国行为选择是否合理,而非前人从如何改制出口管制措施或法律的角度来研究。同时由于研究能力的限制,本文还存在如下的不足之处:(1)在设置动态博弈模型时,本文没有考虑政治因素给模型带来的影响,虽然引入该变量之后模型更具有解释性,但是引入政治变量之后不一定会改变当事方的行为选择;(2)在设置动态博弈模型时,主要是从国家层面考虑国家会有怎样的行为,但是如果考虑国内相关利益行业的行为,从更微观的角度出发,模型可能更加说服力;(3)在选择案例分析时,由于没有相关变量的数据,所以案例分析的精确性较差。对于这些不足之处希望在今后的学习和研究中得到解决,也希望有关学者能够提出批评和具有指导性的意见。
[Abstract]:With the continuous rapid development of China's economy, China's demand for resource products is increasing, and many resources need to be imported to meet its own needs, such as oil and iron ore. But there are still a few resource products, and China's storage capacity is ranked in the front of the world, such as rare earth. Huge savings make China here. In recent years, with the gradual reduction of the exploitation of strategic resources in other countries, the price of international resource products has increased gradually in the last few years. The result is that China has gradually increased the exploitation of strategic resource products such as rare earth, for example, the mining of rare earth has occupied the world. More than 95% of the total amount of exploitation is achieved. Although the export of these resource products can promote economic development to a certain extent, the environment of the mining area is seriously damaged because of the unreasonable exploitation. At the same time, the Chinese government is gradually aware of the strategic resource products represented by the rare earth for the sustainable development of our economy, It is the important role of political and military security. It is based on this understanding that the Chinese government has adopted various laws and administrative regulations to restrict the exploitation of resource based products, such as the implementation of quotas and tariffs on the export of resources. These measures have reduced the exploitation of resources to a certain extent and protected the domestic market. Environment and resources, but developed countries such as Europe and America complain to WTO, think the Chinese government restricts the measures to harm their interests, violates the related rules of WTO, the disputes between.WTO members are usually solved by the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, and the WTO dispute settlement mechanism can be adequately explained by the dynamic game. At the same time, the export of resource products is exported. The limited case can be analyzed by the dynamic game method under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Therefore, this paper uses the dynamic game method to combine the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to analyze China's resource export restriction management. For China's resource export restriction management, most of the domestic learners are also using the theory method to analyze, and this paper In the form of case analysis, we study the export restriction management of China's resource based products and put forward specific policy suggestions. In the cases involving the export restrictions of China's resources, the most typical case of the EU, the United States and Mexico appeals to China's export restrictions on raw materials and the case of dilute soil. Therefore, this article is based on Chinese raw materials. The export restriction case and the rare earth case are the object of the case analysis.
On the basis of describing and analyzing the current situation of export restrictions on Chinese resource products, this paper uses dynamic game to analyze the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, and finds out the optimal strategic solution of the parties to the dispute, and the behavior choice of the parties under the different environment at each stage of the dispute settlement mechanism. The export restrictions of raw materials and rare earth cases have analyzed whether China's choice of behavior under the mechanism is reasonable.
After the above analysis, the following conclusions are obtained: (1) generally speaking, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is completed at the above implementation stage, mainly because of the relative execution cost, the cost of not implementing the WTO resolution is much higher; (2) in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, there are many stages dominant strategies in these stages. It mainly includes the stage of retaliation implementation, the above implementation stage, and the appeal stage; (3) the choice of China's export restrictions on raw materials is reasonable, but there is a shortage, and the choice of behavior in the rare earth case overcomes these shortcomings.
Combined with the results of the conclusion and case analysis of WTO dispute settlement mechanism by dynamic game analysis, the following policy suggestions are put forward for the export restriction management of China's resource based products: (1) the Countermeasures of using WTO dispute settlement mechanism in China, such as "paying attention to consultation", "coping with the law", "different treatment", "master initiative" and "product" The guiding ideology of "tired experience", and the choice of behavior in the case of China's raw material export restriction, and our country should strengthen the disposal ability to deal with the WTO dispute; (2) amend the domestic law which is inconsistent with the WTO rules, and the difference between the domestic law and the WTO rules is the main reason for other countries to appeal to our country.
Throughout the full text, the main innovations of this paper are as follows: (1) in this paper, the dynamic game model is used to analyze the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, and the case analysis method is used to study the export restriction of Chinese resource products. (2) in the case of case analysis, this paper mainly analyzes the WTO dispute resolution machine. The choice of China's behavior is reasonable, not the study of how the predecessors have changed the export control measures or laws. At the same time, because of the limitations of the research ability, there are some shortcomings in this paper. (1) when setting up the dynamic game model, this paper does not consider the influence of the political factors to the model, although the variable is introduced. The model is more explanatory, but the introduction of political variables does not necessarily change the behavior choice of the parties. (2) when setting up a dynamic game model, it is mainly from the state level to consider what kind of behavior the country will have, but if the behavior of domestic related interests is considered, the model may be more convincing from a more micro perspective. (3) in the case of case analysis, the accuracy of case analysis is poor due to the lack of data from the relevant variables. These deficiencies are hoped to be solved in future studies and studies, and the relevant scholars are expected to be able to put forward criticism and instructive opinions.
【学位授予单位】:西南财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F752.62;F426
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