我国制造业上市公司管理层股权激励研究

发布时间：2018-05-19 09:11

本文选题：管理层 + 股权激励　；参考：《云南师范大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：所有权与经营权分离的现代企业管理制度决定了管理层将在企业中扮演着重要的角色，他们虽然不拥有企业，但是在企业的生产经营过程中，经营者掌握着许多所有者不知道的信息，站在企业经营决策的最前沿，而股东却不参与企业的日常决策，导致委托人跟代理者之间存在着信息不对称的问题，委托人很有可能要承担代理人的“道德风险”。因此，股东如何监督管理层，让其行为跟股东利益保持一致，是企业面临的一大难题。为了最大程度增加公司的价值，降低管理层的代理风险和代理成本，提高公司的经营绩效，就需要让管理层在日常经营决策与股东的利益保持一致。股权激励机制为解决这一难题提供了一个新的途径，该机制会给予管理层一定的剩余索取权，以此将管理层的利益整合到了股东的利益之中，并将管理层的利益所得与公司的发展命运捆绑在一起，建立企业价值最大化与管理层利益的正相关关系，来降低代理成本，提高企业绩效，改善企业的经营管理机制。为了完善我国上市公司的内部治理结构，提高企业的绩效，在20世纪90年代后半期，逐渐将股权激励制度引入我国。随着股权激励机制的引入，我国越来越多的学者开始关注并研究股权激励的问题。早期由于各种原因，股权激励并没有被大规模的实施，即使有一些公司实施了，但是实施的结果并不显著，并未发挥该机制的激励作用。随着我国完成了股权分置改革，并在2006年《上市公司股权激励实施管理办法》的颁布与实施，为股权激励的广泛实施提供了广阔的空间。在目前很多上市公司实施股权激励机制的背景下，从制造业上市公司的角度继续研究股权激励实施的效果具有重要的现实意义。本文主要阐述了论文的研究背景、方法意义等；论述了国内外对股权激励研究的现状和股权激励的理论支撑；对目前我国制造业上市公司实施股权激励的基本状况进行了整体考察；剖析了股权激励实施过程中存在的主要问题；考虑数据的获取性与股权激励的时滞性，选取了2008年—2010年实施股权激励的公司为样本数据，，对影响实施管理层股权激励水平的相关因素进行了实证分析，重点揭示实施管理层股权激励与企业绩效的关系。最后得出：实施管理层股权激励能够提升企业业绩，但是效果不显著的结论；就如何更好的实施股权激励，提出了相关的对策建议。
[Abstract]:The modern enterprise management system, which separates the ownership from the management right, determines that the management will play an important role in the enterprise. Although they do not own the enterprise, but in the process of production and operation of the enterprise, The operator holds many information which the owner does not know and stands at the forefront of the enterprise management decision, but the shareholders do not participate in the daily decision of the enterprise, which leads to the problem of information asymmetry between the principal and the agent. The client is likely to bear the "moral hazard" of the agent. Therefore, how the shareholders supervise the management and keep their behavior consistent with the shareholders' interests is a big problem faced by enterprises. In order to increase the value of the company to the greatest extent, reduce the agency risk and agency cost of the management, and improve the performance of the company, it is necessary for the management to keep consistent with the interests of the shareholders in the daily operation decision. The equity incentive mechanism provides a new way to solve this problem. This mechanism will give the management a certain residual claim, thus integrating the interests of the management into the interests of the shareholders. The benefits of management and the fate of the development of the company are tied together to establish a positive correlation between the maximization of enterprise value and the interests of management to reduce agency costs improve corporate performance and improve the management mechanism. In order to perfect the internal governance structure of Chinese listed companies and improve the performance of enterprises, equity incentive system was gradually introduced into China in the second half of 1990s. With the introduction of equity incentive mechanism, more and more scholars in China begin to pay attention to and study the issue of equity incentive. Because of various reasons, equity incentive has not been implemented on a large scale, even if some companies have implemented, but the implementation results are not significant, did not play the incentive role of the mechanism. With the completion of the reform of the split share structure in China and the promulgation and implementation of the "measures for the implementation of equity incentives in listed companies" in 2006, it provides a broad space for the extensive implementation of equity incentives. Under the background of many listed companies implementing equity incentive mechanism, it is of great practical significance to continue to study the effect of equity incentive from the perspective of manufacturing listed companies. This paper mainly expounds the research background and method significance of the paper, discusses the current situation of the research on equity incentive at home and abroad and the theoretical support of equity incentive. This paper makes a general investigation on the basic status of equity incentive in Chinese manufacturing listed companies, analyzes the main problems existing in the implementation of equity incentive, and considers the data acquisition and the delay of equity incentive. This paper selects the companies that implemented equity incentive from 2008 to 2010 as sample data, and analyzes the relevant factors that affect the level of executive equity incentive, and puts emphasis on revealing the relationship between the implementation of management equity incentive and enterprise performance. Finally, the conclusion that the implementation of management equity incentive can improve enterprise performance, but the effect is not significant; on how to better implement equity incentive, put forward the relevant countermeasures.
【学位授予单位】：云南师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F424;F832.51;F272.92

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