管理层收购、整体上市与公司治理—双汇模式案例研究

发布时间：2018-05-25 08:27

本文选题：管理层收购 + 整体上市　；参考：《苏州大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：过去十几年，我国国有企业改革取得了一定的成绩，但是仍然存在所有者缺位、产权不清、产权结构不合理、上市公司和母公司之间利益输送等历史问题，阻碍了我国市场经济的健康发展。党的十八届三中全会提出继续深化经济体制改革，坚持建立现代企业制度。现代企业的特征是所有权和经营权两权分离，，而这导致了委托-代理问题，代理成本的存在降低了公司的绩效。管理层收购作为一种制度创新，能够明晰产权、将企业剩余控制权和剩余索取权的都赋予管理层，从而强化激励机制，对于企业的有效整合、降低代理成本和提高经营管理效率都有着重大的意义。然而由于中国法律制度的缺失，管理层收购在应用过程中产生了一系列问题，其中又以控股股东与中小股东的利益冲突最为突出，控股股东即管理层容易通过关联交易等手段侵害中小股东利益。通过整体上市，把主业资产都注入到上市公司，可以减少关联交易，改善公司治理结构，提高公司绩效。本文以双汇公司为例，介绍了双汇管理层收购和整体上市的过程，通过对财务指标的分析研究双汇模式对公司治理的影响，总结了适用双汇模式的企业特征，最后针对双汇模式可能产生的新的问题提出对策建议。
[Abstract]:In the past decade or so, some achievements have been made in the reform of state-owned enterprises in our country, but there still exist historical problems such as the absence of owners, unclear property rights, unreasonable property rights structure, the transmission of interests between listed companies and their parent companies, etc. It hinders the healthy development of our market economy. The third Plenary session of the 18th CPC Central Committee proposed to continue to deepen the reform of the economic system and adhere to the establishment of a modern enterprise system. The characteristics of modern enterprises are the separation of ownership and management rights, which leads to the principal-agent problem, and the existence of agency cost reduces the performance of the company. As a kind of system innovation, MBO can clarify the property right, endow the management with the residual control right and residual claim right, so as to strengthen the incentive mechanism and effectively integrate the enterprise. It is of great significance to reduce agency cost and improve management efficiency. However, due to the lack of Chinese legal system, a series of problems arise in the application of MBO, among which the conflict of interest between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders is the most prominent. Controlling shareholders, that is, management, are apt to infringe on the interests of minority shareholders by means of related party transactions. Through the whole listing, the main business assets are injected into the listed companies, which can reduce the related party transactions, improve the corporate governance structure, and improve the corporate performance. Taking Shuanghui Company as an example, this paper introduces the process of Shuanghui MBO and the whole listing. Through the analysis of the financial index, the influence of Shuanghui model on corporate governance is analyzed, and the enterprise characteristics applicable to Shuanghui Mode are summarized. Finally, some countermeasures and suggestions are put forward for the new problems that may arise in the Shuanghui Model.
【学位授予单位】：苏州大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F271;F275;F426.82

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