分税制下地方政府增值税偏好对工业用地供给的影响——基于全国35个大城市的实证

发布时间：2018-06-27 04:57

本文选题：地方政府 + 增值税　；参考：《求索》2015年11期

【摘要】：提出现行分税制下地方政府增值税偏好对工业用地供给的影响机理,建立理论模型,利用全国35个大城市面板数据开展了工业税收驱动地方政府低价供应工业用地的实证分析。研究发现:增值税偏好驱动地方政府发展工业增加工业用地供给量的机制是存在的。分税制改革后,增值税占到地方税收的近一半,成为地方政府招商引资的最大动力。由于增值税的征收主要依赖于当地工业的发展,各地政府竞相投入到城市新区、工业开发区的建设中,刺激了工业用地的增加;同时,为了在招商引资中获胜,地方政府往往采用低价供地的策略,导致了工业用地的价格无法呈现市场化的趋势,成为我国土地政策失效的深层次原因。
[Abstract]:This paper puts forward the influence mechanism of local governments' VAT preference on the supply of industrial land under the current tax distribution system, establishes a theoretical model, and carries out an empirical analysis of the industrial land supply driven by industrial tax revenue at low prices by using the panel data of 35 big cities in China. It is found that the VAT preference drives local governments to develop industry and increase the supply of industrial land. After the reform of tax sharing, VAT accounts for nearly half of local taxes and becomes the biggest motive force for local governments to attract investment. Since the collection of VAT mainly depends on the development of local industries, local governments are competing to invest in new urban areas, and the construction of industrial development zones has stimulated the increase of industrial land. At the same time, in order to win in attracting investment, Local governments often adopt the strategy of low price land supply, which leads to the market trend of industrial land prices, and becomes the deep reason for the failure of land policy in our country.
【作者单位】：南京农业大学公共管理学院;南京农业大学;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71073082);国家自然科学基金重点项目(71233004)
【分类号】：F812.42;F424

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