基于动态博弈的矿业投资政策风险研究

发布时间：2018-07-16 21:51

【摘要】：在矿业市场中,地方政府既是矿业市场的管理者和监督者,也是独立的利益主体,与矿业投资者产生利益争夺,这就造成了政策上的不确定性,给矿业投资者带来政策风险,而投资者可采取的防范政策风险的对策非常有限。文章运用博弈论工具分析了地方政府与矿业投资者之间的相互作用,构建了动态博弈模型,探讨了不同类型的政府所选择的均衡策略,解释了管制型政府作为利益主体有积极性通过采取机会主义行为给矿山企业以较大的政策风险来获得好处这一事实。文章还提出了矿业投资者防范政策风险的一个基本对策,即安排客户、银行、保险公司以及其他权力部门等多方参与进来,并通过博弈模型对该对策进行了分析。最后对肯尼科特公司在经营智利铜矿中规避政策风险的案例进行了分析,通过实例证明了该对策的可行性和有效性。
[Abstract]:In the mining market, the local government is not only the manager and supervisor of the mining market, but also the independent interest subject, which causes the uncertainty of the policy and brings the policy risk to the mining investors. And investors can take the policy risk prevention measures are very limited. This paper analyzes the interaction between local governments and mining investors by means of game theory, constructs a dynamic game model, and probes into the equilibrium strategies chosen by different types of governments. This paper explains the fact that the regulated government, as the main body of interest, has the initiative to obtain benefits by taking opportunistic actions to give mine enterprises greater policy risks. The paper also puts forward a basic countermeasure for mining investors to guard against the policy risk, that is, arranging customers, banks, insurance companies and other power departments to participate, and analyzes the countermeasures through the game model. Finally, the paper analyzes the case of Kenicot Company to avoid the policy risk in the operation of Chile Copper Mine, and proves the feasibility and effectiveness of the countermeasure by an example.
【作者单位】：河南工业大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金青年项目(41401630) 河南省教育厅人文社会科学研究项目(2015-GH-244)
【分类号】：F426.1;F224.32

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