中兴通讯股权激励方案设计研究
发布时间：2018-10-20 12:48
【摘要】：在公司治理中,股权激励是比较重要的制度。股权激励通过让管理人员持有一定数量的股票,使管理层和股东的利益趋于一致,从而缓解委托人和代理人之间的利益冲突。国外实行股权激励已有数十年历史,而我国引入股权激励的时间还不长。第一个规范意义上的股权激励方案是1997年万科施行的。随着《上市公司股权激励管理办法(试行)》的正式出台,股权激励这一激励制度在我国已经开始被很多企业采用,但是总的来说,由于资本市场不完善,上市公司的治理环境也普遍较差,实施效果并不十分成功。中兴通讯是较早实施股权激励的国有上市公司。虽然其股权激励计划相对来说比较完整,方案的设计和实施的程序也比较规范,同时在核心知识员工的激励和引入个人绩效指标等方面具有一定的特色和借鉴意义,但是仍然存在很多问题,需要改进。 本文采用文献研究和理论研究相结合的方法,选取中兴通讯股权激励计划作为主要研究对象,通过分析方案实施前后中兴通讯公司业绩表现,发现股权激励方案设计当中的问题,并通过分析方案本身,寻找问题产生的根源,在总结中兴通讯股权激励方案所存在问题的基础上,对股权激励方案进行改进设计。 研究结果发现,中兴通讯的股权激励计划并没有发挥应有的作用,公司的业绩并没有质的提升。股权激励方案本身存在激励模式不适合、力度过大、公平性欠缺、行权指标单一、价格确定不合理等方面问题。基于此,本文从模式选择、对象选择、股票和资金来源、价格确定、数量安排、时间安排、机制安排、行权条件等8个角度对中兴通讯股权激励方案的设计提出改进意见,并在此基础上,提出完善我国股权激励计划实施的政策性意见。
[Abstract]:In corporate governance, equity incentive is a more important system. By allowing managers to hold a certain number of stocks, equity incentives make the interests of management and shareholders converge, thus easing the conflicts of interest between the principal and the agent. Foreign countries have carried out equity incentive for decades, but the time of introducing equity incentive in our country is not long. The first normative equity incentive scheme was implemented by Vanke in 1997. With the formal introduction of the "measures for Stock incentive Management of listed companies (trial)", the incentive system of equity incentive has been adopted by many enterprises in China, but in general, because of the imperfect capital market, The governance environment of listed companies is also generally poor, the implementation effect is not very successful. ZTE is the early implementation of equity incentives of the state-owned listed companies. Although its equity incentive plan is relatively complete, the program design and implementation procedures are also more standardized, at the same time in the core knowledge of staff incentives and the introduction of personal performance indicators and other aspects of certain characteristics and reference significance. But there are still many problems that need to be improved. This paper adopts the method of combining literature research with theoretical research, selects ZTE's equity incentive plan as the main research object, and analyzes the performance of ZTE before and after the implementation of the scheme. Find out the problems in the design of the equity incentive scheme, and through the analysis of the scheme itself, find out the root of the problem, on the basis of summing up the existing problems of the equity incentive scheme of ZTE, improve the design of the equity incentive scheme. The research found that ZTE's equity incentive plan did not play its due role, and the company's performance did not improve qualitatively. The equity incentive scheme itself has some problems, such as inappropriate incentive mode, excessive intensity, lack of fairness, single exercise index, unreasonable price determination and so on. Based on this, this paper puts forward some suggestions on the design of ZTE's equity incentive scheme from the aspects of mode selection, object selection, stock and fund source, price determination, quantity arrangement, time arrangement, mechanism arrangement, exercise condition, etc. And on this basis, put forward to improve the implementation of China's equity incentive plan policy advice.
【学位授予单位】：浙江工商大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F272.92;F275;F426.63
本文编号：2283233
[Abstract]:In corporate governance, equity incentive is a more important system. By allowing managers to hold a certain number of stocks, equity incentives make the interests of management and shareholders converge, thus easing the conflicts of interest between the principal and the agent. Foreign countries have carried out equity incentive for decades, but the time of introducing equity incentive in our country is not long. The first normative equity incentive scheme was implemented by Vanke in 1997. With the formal introduction of the "measures for Stock incentive Management of listed companies (trial)", the incentive system of equity incentive has been adopted by many enterprises in China, but in general, because of the imperfect capital market, The governance environment of listed companies is also generally poor, the implementation effect is not very successful. ZTE is the early implementation of equity incentives of the state-owned listed companies. Although its equity incentive plan is relatively complete, the program design and implementation procedures are also more standardized, at the same time in the core knowledge of staff incentives and the introduction of personal performance indicators and other aspects of certain characteristics and reference significance. But there are still many problems that need to be improved. This paper adopts the method of combining literature research with theoretical research, selects ZTE's equity incentive plan as the main research object, and analyzes the performance of ZTE before and after the implementation of the scheme. Find out the problems in the design of the equity incentive scheme, and through the analysis of the scheme itself, find out the root of the problem, on the basis of summing up the existing problems of the equity incentive scheme of ZTE, improve the design of the equity incentive scheme. The research found that ZTE's equity incentive plan did not play its due role, and the company's performance did not improve qualitatively. The equity incentive scheme itself has some problems, such as inappropriate incentive mode, excessive intensity, lack of fairness, single exercise index, unreasonable price determination and so on. Based on this, this paper puts forward some suggestions on the design of ZTE's equity incentive scheme from the aspects of mode selection, object selection, stock and fund source, price determination, quantity arrangement, time arrangement, mechanism arrangement, exercise condition, etc. And on this basis, put forward to improve the implementation of China's equity incentive plan policy advice.
【学位授予单位】：浙江工商大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F272.92;F275;F426.63
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