我国建筑承包市场挂靠经营现象及治理机制研究

发布时间：2018-10-23 09:11

【摘要】：建筑市场的挂靠经营现象兴起于我国建筑行业资质管理制度的实施。随着市场经济体制的确立，我国建筑业也得到国家的重点扶持，迅速发展，市场的繁荣也带来行业内竞争的加剧。为了保证建筑市场健康发展，维护公平有序的竞争，提高市场的竞争效率，以1984年出台的《建筑企业营业管理条例》为标志，我国开始实施对建筑企业实行资质管理的市场准入制度。在此基础上，建设部在后期又对建筑企业的资质管理进行了扩大和深化。资质管理制度规定禁止建筑施工企业超越本企业资质等级许可的业务范围或者以任何形式用其他建筑施工企业的名义承揽工程。但是，从法律实施效果来看，相关规定并没有得到很好的执行，建筑领域的挂靠经营已经被各方所接受甚至成为行业主流。利益的驱动使大量不具备资质条件的企业或个人争相进入建筑行业，出现了建筑业市场特有的挂靠经营现象，给建筑市场带来了诸多问题。本文以问卷调查作为研究基础。首先，，从建筑市场挂靠经营现象的基本特征入手，论述了挂靠经营的来源、界定、法律特征及表现形式，通过实际调查分析了挂靠经营对市场参与主体和建筑行业产生的各类风险，立足于挂靠经营现象的现状及内涵分析提出挂靠经营本质上一种降低资源配置效率的寻租行为，应该及时进行有效治理；其次，对挂靠经营现象进行了经济学分析，挂靠经营是资质作为稀缺资源在市场中合理配置的结果，符合建筑企业的利益需求。并以博弈论为基础分析了挂靠经营的形成机制，探讨了挂靠双方罔顾被政府查处的风险接受挂靠经营的原因；再次，比较国内外相关国家的建筑企业管理制度的异同，得出发达国家的建筑企业管理制度对我国资质管理制度改革的借鉴意义，结合问卷调查的内容提出我国资质管理制度改革的初步构想，弱化资质管理制度，尝试信用体系的建设，实现建筑企业的动态管理；最后，通过治理机制理论分析，得出目前我国建筑承包市场挂靠经营现象治理最有效的方式是第三方治理，通过第三方介入完善信息传递的效率和对市场违约主体的有力惩处来约束和规范市场主体，即完善市场信用体系的建设，而政府应承担信用体系的建设的责任。并运用治理机制理论分析了第三方信用治理下市场主体的成本收益，基于信用机制作用下市场主体的博弈策略选择，得出市场主体挂靠经营的影响因素是挂靠经营被发现的概率和违约成本。提出了完善建筑市场信用的制度建设和信息传递机制等办法，通过一系列配套制度来增加建筑市场的透明度和违法成本，从而达到遏制挂靠经营的目的。
[Abstract]:The linked management of the construction market arises from the implementation of the qualification management system of the construction industry in China. With the establishment of the market economy system, the construction industry of our country has also been supported by the state and developed rapidly, and the prosperity of the market has also led to the aggravation of the competition in the industry. In order to ensure the healthy development of the construction market, maintain fair and orderly competition and improve the competitive efficiency of the market, it is marked by the "regulations on Business Administration of Construction Enterprises" issued in 1984. Our country begins to implement the market access system that carries out the qualification management to the construction enterprise. On this basis, the Ministry of Construction in the latter part of the construction enterprise qualification management has been expanded and deepened. The qualification management system stipulates that construction enterprises shall be prohibited from contracting projects in the name of other construction enterprises in any form or beyond the scope of business permitted by their own qualification grades. However, from the effect of the implementation of the law, the relevant provisions have not been implemented very well, the construction industry has been linked to the operation has been accepted by all parties or even become the mainstream of the industry. Driven by interests, a large number of enterprises or individuals who do not have the qualifications compete to enter the construction industry, which brings many problems to the construction market. This paper is based on questionnaire survey. First of all, starting with the basic characteristics of the phenomenon of linked management in the construction market, this paper discusses the source, definition, legal characteristics and manifestation of the linked operation. Through the actual investigation and analysis of all kinds of risks to the market participants and the construction industry caused by the linked management, based on the analysis of the current situation and connotation of the linked management phenomenon, the paper puts forward that the linked management is essentially a rent-seeking behavior that reduces the efficiency of the allocation of resources. Secondly, the phenomenon of linked management is analyzed by economics, which is the result of the rational allocation of qualification in the market as scarce resources, which is in line with the interest needs of construction enterprises. On the basis of game theory, this paper analyzes the forming mechanism of linked management, discusses the reasons why the two parties ignore the risk of being investigated by the government to accept the linked operation. Thirdly, it compares the similarities and differences of the management systems of construction enterprises in the relevant countries at home and abroad. The paper draws a conclusion that the management system of construction enterprises in developed countries can be used for reference to the reform of qualification management system in our country. Combined with the contents of questionnaire survey, this paper puts forward the preliminary conception of the reform of qualification management system in our country, and weakens the qualification management system. Finally, through the theoretical analysis of governance mechanism, it is concluded that the most effective way to manage the phenomenon of building contract market in our country is the third party governance. The third party is involved in perfecting the efficiency of information transmission and punishing the subject of market breach of contract to restrain and standardize the market subject, that is, to perfect the construction of the market credit system, and the government should bear the responsibility of the construction of the credit system. Using the theory of governance mechanism, the paper analyzes the cost and income of the market subject under the third party credit governance, and the game strategy choice of the market subject under the action of the credit mechanism. It is concluded that the influencing factors of the market main body are the probability of discovery and the cost of breach of contract. This paper puts forward some measures such as perfecting the system construction and information transmission mechanism of credit in construction market, which can increase the transparency and illegal cost of construction market through a series of supporting systems, so as to achieve the purpose of curbing the linked operation.
【学位授予单位】：南京工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F426.92

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