网络互助融资平台信用风险成因及实证研究

发布时间：2017-12-30 17:30

本文关键词：网络互助融资平台信用风险成因及实证研究　出处：《电子科技大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：网络互助融资作为一种将民间借贷与网络技术相结合的新型金融服务,在诞生不到5年的时间里取得了令人瞩目的成绩。网络互助融资平台的出现不仅提供了新的融资渠道和投资工具,而且也为金融服务创新提供了一种新思路。尽管如此,网络互助融资平台的经营模式仍然存在着一些问题,阻碍其健康发展。本文拟从信用风险控制的角度对这些问题进行分析,研究内容包括五个部分。第一部分提出了本文的研究背景,并阐述了研究的目的和意义,然后对相关的研究成果进行了回顾,在此基础上提出了本文的研究思路和研究方法。第二部分首先对网络互助融资的相关概念进行了界定,然后在深入了解网络互助融资平台发展现状的基础上得出了其未来发展的重点,最后明确提出完善风险控制制度是网络互助融资平台发展壮大的前提。第三部分围绕着网络互助融资平台风险控制最核心的信用风险控制展开研究。首先分析了网络互助融资平台信用风险的成因,然后对现有的风险控制制度进行了评价,指出其局限性,最后提出,信息不对称问题是导致网络互助融资平台信用风险偏高的重要原因,需要在制度建设上加以改进。第四部分在第三部分的基础上,先利用非对称信息博弈模型得出参与者(投资人和受资人)的最优选择:在投资人无法分辨受资人信用水平的情况下,会倾向于选择利率水平高的标书(往往利率水平高的标书代表的受资人的违约概率也高),优质的受资人在无法承担过高利率的情况下就会放弃从网络互助融资平台上融入资金;在违约成本有限的情况下,受资人有动机改变既定的资金用途,由此使得投资人面临更高的违约风险。市场出清的结果就是没有交易发生,市场也不复存在。然后,对红岭创投的交易数据进行实证分析,结果显示,借款人的信用记录和利率水平呈现一定的负相关关系,成交利率越高的标书,发布的借款人的信用记录质量越低,由此证实了网络互助融资平台上的确存在着逆向选择现象;借款人的受欢迎程度与利率水平呈现负相关关系,即单个标书的投标人数越多,该标书的成交利率越低,由此证实了在平台上活跃的会员可以利用虚拟社会关系网络降低融资成本。另外,在担保贷款推出之后,平台上的整体利率水平有所下降,信用记录的影响增强。担保贷款可能通过担保人的信用水平和影响力降低了逆向选择发生的概率,同时,担保人在一定程度上承担了信用水平认证的功能,所以缓解了信息不对称的水平。最后基于以上分析,本文提出了网络互助融资平台信用风险控制优化的建议:完善信用评级系统,使其能够以较低的信息传递成本发挥社区内声誉机制的作用;促进虚拟社会关系网络生成,由此缓解信息不对称现象,并有效约束经济博弈中参与人的机会主义倾向;强化平台的技术系统,控制技术风险;规范网络互助融资平台个人信用信息采集,在合适的时候接入个人征信系统;在明确监管部门的基础上,建立行业协会,制定行业标准,促进网络互助融资市场的健康发展。
[Abstract]:Network mutual financing as a new type of financial services to private lending and the combination of network technology, less than 5 years has made remarkable achievements in the birth. The mutual aid network financing platform not only provides new financing channels and investment tools, but also for the financial services innovation provides a new way of thinking nevertheless, the mutual aid network financing platform business model still exists some problems that hinder its healthy development. This paper analyzes these problems from the credit risk control perspective, the study includes five parts. The first part presents the research background of this paper, and expounds the purpose and significance of the study, and then to related research results were reviewed, on the basis put forward the research ideas and research methods. The second part firstly defines the related concepts of network mutual financing, Then on the basis of in-depth understanding of network mutual financing platform on the development status of the focus of its future development, and finally put forward the risk control system is the premise of network mutual financing platform development. The third part around the network of mutual financing platform risk control is the core of the credit risk control research. Firstly analyzes the causes of network mutual financing the platform of credit risk, and then evaluates the existing risk control system, its limitations are pointed out. Finally, the problem of information asymmetry is the result of the mutual aid network financing platform credit risk is an important reason, needs to be improved in the system construction. The fourth part on the basis of the third part, first use of asymmetric information game the model draws participants (investors and by investors) is the best choice: the investor cannot credit level human capital resolution Next, interest rates will tend to choose high bids (often high interest rate tender represented by the default probability of the investor is high), high-quality capital people will give up from the mutual aid network platform into financing funds in the high interest rates can not bear the cost of default; in limited circumstances, subject to funding people have the motivation to change the use of funds established, which makes investors face a higher risk of default. The result is that there is no market clearing transactions, the market will not exist. Then, the transaction data of Hongling venture empirical analysis results show that the borrower's credit record and interest rate levels showed a negative correlation. The turnover rate is higher bids, issued by the borrower's credit record quality is low, it is confirmed that the mutual aid network financing platform is the existence of adverse selection phenomenon; the borrower's popularity and interest The rate is negatively related, which increase the number of single tender bidding, the tender turnover rate is low, which confirmed the active members on the platform can reduce the cost of financing the use of network virtual social relationship. In addition, after the launch of the secured loans, fell on the platform of the overall level of interest rates, to enhance the impact of credit records the guarantor may guarantee loans. The credit level and influence of reducing the probability of occurrence of adverse selection, at the same time, the guarantor assumes the credit level of the authentication function to a certain extent, so alleviate the information asymmetry level. Based on the above analysis, this paper puts forward a network mutual financing platform credit risk control optimization suggestions: improve the credit rating system, so that it can lower the cost of information transfer the reputation in the community; to promote the virtual social relationship network generation, Thereby alleviate the information asymmetry and opportunism tendency of participation and effective restraint in economic games; strengthening technology platform, risk control technology; specification of network mutual financing platform for personal credit information collection, at the right time to access the personal credit information system; based on clear regulatory departments, the establishment of industry associations, industry standards, and promote the the healthy development of network mutual financing market.

【学位授予单位】：电子科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F724.6;F832.4

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