风险投资项目经理跟投激励契约机制研究

发布时间：2017-12-31 11:27

  本文关键词：风险投资项目经理跟投激励契约机制研究　出处：《华南理工大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

  更多相关文章： 风险投资 项目经理 内部契约机制 跟投激励模型

【摘要】：风险投资作为链接资本、技术、人才的权益投资方式，对于提高全要素生产效率，实现产业结构转型具有重要意义。然而风险投资是一项具有严重逆向选择和道德风险的过程，风险投资项目经理对于项目的成败乃至行业的发展起着举足轻重的作用。因此，如何有效的激励和约束风险投资项目经理,应当成为我国风险投资发展的重要命题之一。 在风险投资内部激励契约机制上，以往的理论研究往往将风险投资家和风险投资项目经理统称为风险投资家，基于风险投资者和风险投资家的第一重委托代理关系、风险投资家和创业者的第二重委托代理关系展开激励约束问题的研究。但实际上风险投资项目经理有别于风险投资家，风险投资企业与风险投资项目经理的第三重委托代理关系仍有待研究。有鉴于此，笔者基于这第三重委托代理关系，有机结合了监督机制和激励机制搭建跟投激励契约模型定量分析内部契约机制，，探讨如何解决代理问题。 本研究首先梳理了研究背景及意义、国内外研究文献综述，以及论文的研究内容、研究目的和研究方法。然后，从委托代理关系出发，阐述了相关概念，梳理分析了项目经理跟投激励机制的优势和作用，并基于风险投资特性阐述了三重委托代理运作机制。其次，搭建了风险投资项目经理跟投激励契约模型进行定量分析，得出了如下结论：1、信息对称情况下，项目经理最优努力水平的选择和期望项目收益与其工作能力正相关，而与绩效薪酬系数、跟投比例无关；2、信息不对称情况下，项目经理的工作能力、绩效薪酬系数、跟投比例均与其愿意付出的项目额外努力水平和期望项目收益呈正相关关系；3、信息不对称情况下，项目经理的工作能力越强、项目收益的不确定性越小、努力成本系数越小、风险规避系数ɡ越小，其愿意承担更大的风险；4、信息不对称情况下，项目经理为风险规避时，引入可观测变量有助于激励项目经理更加努力工作并承担更大项目风险，进而提高期望项目收益，降低总代理成本；5、信息不对称情况，在不同条件下，跟投比例满足不同区间时，采用跟投激励机制有助于提高委托代理双方的项目净收益期望值；6、跟投比例和绩效薪酬系数与委托代理双方的项目净收益期望值在不同条件下呈现不同的关系。最后，总结归纳研究结论和实践借鉴意义，提出了研究的局限性和未来展望。
[Abstract]:Venture capital as a link of capital, technology, talent equity investments, to improve total factor productivity, realize the industrial structure transformation has important significance. However, risk investment is a kind of serious adverse selection and moral hazard of venture investment project manager plays an important role in the development of the success of the project and it industry. And how effective incentive and restraint of venture investment project manager should become one of the important proposition of the development of venture capital in China.
The internal incentive contract mechanism in risk investment, the previous theoretical studies tend to be manager of venture capitalists and venture investment project called venture capitalists, the first principal-agent relationship between venture investors and venture capitalists based on venture capitalists and entrepreneurs of the dual principal-agent relationship of the incentive problem but in fact. Project manager is different from venture capitalists, venture investment enterprises and venture investment project managers third principal-agent relations remains to be studied. In view of this, the author based on the third principal-agent relationship, the organic combination of the supervision mechanism and incentive mechanism to build internal investment contract mechanism analysis quantitative incentive contract model, discusses how to solve the agency problem.
This paper summarize the research background and significance, literature review, and research papers, research purpose and research methods. Then, from the point of view of the principal-agent relationship, explains the related concepts, this paper analyzed the project manager with the investment incentive mechanism advantages and effects and risk investment based on the characteristics described three the principal-agent mechanism. Secondly, build the project manager with the investment incentive contract model for quantitative analysis, the conclusions are the following: 1, under symmetric information, the optimal effort level of the project manager selection and the expectations of the project revenue and work ability are positively correlated, and the coefficient of performance pay, has nothing to do with the proportion of investment; 2, under the circumstance of asymmetric information, the project manager's ability, the coefficient of performance pay, with the investment proportion and are willing to pay the extra effort level and expectations of project project revenue Cheng Zhengxiang Close relationship; 3, under the circumstance of asymmetric information, the project manager's ability is stronger, income uncertainty is small, the effort cost coefficient is small, and the smaller the risk aversion coefficient, which are willing to take more risks; 4, under the circumstance of asymmetric information, the project manager for risk aversion, introduction the observed variables helps motivate project manager to work harder and take more risks, and improve the expectations of the project revenue, reduce total agency costs; 5, the situation of information asymmetry, under different conditions, with the proportion of investment to meet the different interval when used with the investment incentive mechanism is helpful to improve both the principal and the agent of the project of net income the expected value of 6, with the proportion of investment projects; and the coefficient of performance pay and both the principal and the agent's net income expectations show different relationship in different conditions. Finally, summarize the research conclusion and practical significance, put forward The limitations and future prospects of the study.

【学位授予单位】：华南理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.48

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