中央银行的宏观监管职能:经济效果与影响因素分析

发布时间：2017-12-31 14:34

本文关键词：中央银行的宏观监管职能:经济效果与影响因素分析　出处：《财经研究》2012年05期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：文章以跨国数据为基础,对中央银行是否应分离银行监管职能这一问题进行了系统的实证分析。结果表明,在中央银行未分离或未完全分离银行监管职能的国家,其金融稳定性通常更高,经济增速更快,而且未出现明显的"通货膨胀倾向"。这意味着金融监管的独立性并不是简单地将监管职能从中央银行分离的问题,中央银行的独立性也并不必然排斥其继续实施金融监管职能。通过将货币政策和金融监管的兼容性置于政治经济学框架下加以解读,文章发现真正影响金融监管实际独立性的并非监管主体的设置问题,而是更广泛地依赖于不同的政治制度条件。上述结论表明,如何在既定的政治制度和政策框架下切实加强货币政策和金融监管的协调与配合才是问题的核心和关键。
[Abstract]:Based on transnational data, this paper makes a systematic empirical analysis on whether the central bank should separate the function of bank supervision. In countries where central banks have not separated or have not fully segregated their banking supervisory functions, their financial stability is generally higher and their economies are growing faster. And there is no apparent "inflationary bias". This means that the independence of financial regulation is not simply a matter of separating regulatory functions from central banks. Nor does the independence of the central bank necessarily preclude it from continuing to carry out the function of financial supervision. It is interpreted by putting the compatibility of monetary policy and financial regulation under the framework of political economy. It is found that the real influence on the actual independence of financial supervision is not the issue of the establishment of the main body of supervision, but more extensive dependence on different political system conditions. How to strengthen the coordination and coordination of monetary policy and financial supervision under the established political system and policy framework is the core and key of the problem.
【作者单位】：中国人民大学财政金融政策研究中心;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71150003) 北京市教育委员会共建项目“中国货币国际化战略研究”
【分类号】：F832.1;F224
【正文快照】： 一、引言随着世界范围内金融监管体制的变革和重构,金融监管的独立性问题逐渐成为中央银行独立性改革过程中所讨论的新内容。从已有的文献看,针对金融监管独立性的研究,其基本的出发点依然是监管当局对于政治干预的独立性,相应的指标编制和实证研究也大多以此为基础(Barth等,2

【共引文献】