上市公司经理人“运气薪酬”问题研究

发布时间：2018-01-21 23:47

本文关键词： 报酬激励经理人薪酬业绩评价运气薪酬　出处：《复旦大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着我国收入分配制度改革的深入与公司治理结构的完善,上市公司经理人薪酬制度也不断发展。根据经典委托代理理论与激励理论,薪酬是从股东利益最大化的角度出发,为了激励经理人努力工作而设定的一种契约。为了产生有效的激励,经理人的薪酬应该与业绩挂钩。但是业绩本身受到宏观经济形势、行业景气情况等诸多“运气”因素影响,也就是说经理人享受了运气薪酬,这又与薪酬设计的初衷不符。本文以运气薪酬为研究对象,利用理论和实证相结合的方法,试图较为完整的梳理运气薪酬问题。首先在理论层面,分别从经理人和股东效用最大化的角度进行论证。本文建立运气薪酬模型,提出运气本身并非确定因素,具有不可控的特征,也就是运气风险的存在,使得经理人并不期望获得运气薪酬。即使在经理人可以在股票市场上通过对冲来分散风险的情况下,经理人也没有足够的动机去寻求运气薪酬。而股东也不会将这种没有激励效果的薪酬赋予经理人。而运气薪酬存在的真正原因在于其不对称性,加之经理人对薪酬存在一定的控制力,使得运气薪酬具有向上的惯性与向下的刚性。在现实层面,本文首先用2000-2013年的数据通过横向比较与纵向比较相结合的方式在宏观上展现了运气薪酬的存在性与不对称性,然后选取2010-2012年的面板数据采用两阶段最小二乘法进行回归分析,得出更有说服力的结论。即经理人获得了运气薪酬,同时公司因运气付薪的比重大于因能力和努力付薪的比重,不仅如此,经理人因为好运而获得的薪酬增加远大于因为厄运造成的薪酬减少。最后本文在理论研究的基础上,提出一些具有现实意义的建议。
[Abstract]:With the deepening of the reform of the income distribution system and the perfection of the corporate governance structure, the executive compensation system of listed companies is also developing. According to the classical principal-agent theory and incentive theory. Compensation is a kind of contract set up in order to encourage managers to work hard from the angle of maximization of shareholders' interests, in order to produce effective incentives. Managers' compensation should be linked to performance. But performance itself is affected by many "luck" factors, such as the macroeconomic situation, industry prosperity and so on, that is, managers enjoy lucky pay. This is not in line with the original intention of the compensation design. This paper takes the compensation of luck as the research object, using the combination of theory and empirical method, trying to sort out the problem of the compensation of luck. First of all, in the theoretical level. From the perspective of maximizing the utility of managers and shareholders, this paper establishes the compensation model of luck, and points out that luck itself is not a certain factor and has the characteristics of uncontrollable, that is, the existence of luck risk. It makes managers not expect to get lucky pay, even when managers can hedge in the stock market to spread risk. Managers also do not have enough incentive to seek luck pay, and shareholders do not give managers such unmotivated compensation. The real reason for the existence of luck pay lies in its asymmetry. In addition, managers have a certain amount of control over the salary, which makes the salary of luck have the inertia of upward and the rigidity of downward. This paper first uses the data from 2000 to 2013 to show the existence and asymmetry of luck pay on the macro level through the combination of horizontal comparison and vertical comparison. Then the panel data of 2010-2012 were analyzed by two-stage least square method, and a more convincing conclusion was drawn, that is, managers got lucky compensation. At the same time, companies pay more for luck than for ability and hard work, not only that. The salary increase of managers due to good luck is far greater than that caused by bad luck. Finally, this paper puts forward some practical suggestions on the basis of theoretical research.
【学位授予单位】：复旦大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51

【相似文献】